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Introduction 
Dazzling fields of flowers, magnificent to the eye of the be-
holder, stretched across the Chinese countryside. Far be-
yond the horizon more flowers bloomed in India. Beauti-
ful as they were these flowers were not grown to please the 
eye; with them bloomed international controversy, war, 
greed, degradation, misery, and death. These were no or-
dinary blossoms-they were opium poppies. 
Opium was the subject of controversy in China through-
out the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. No one 
could say how many Chinese were addicted to the drug, but 
addicts surely numbered in the millions, and their families, 
who suffered indirectly, added many more to the list of those 
harmed by the drug. Opium was an emotional issue for the 
Chinese. Its use had been prohibited by the Yung-cheng 
emperor in 1729, but as trade with the West increased opium 
imports to China gradually grew from about two hundred 
chests a year early in the eighteenth century to about one 
thousand chests a year in 1767. In 1781 the British East In-
dia Company took over the British part of the trade from 
private merchants, and by 1790 the company's trade in 
opium amounted to 4,054 chests. A Chinese imperial edict 
prohibited all importation in 1796, but it was openly ignored, 
and by 1830 the amount of opium entering China was 16,877 
chests. The amount had grown to 20,619 by 1838, just be-
fore the Opium War of 1839-42. The Opium War, the first 
war in which the Chinese were defeated by the Europeans, 
was fought largely over the foreigners' right to sell opium 
in China. Following the hostilities, 50,000 chests of opium 
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were thought to have been imported in 1850, and 85,000 
chests entered in 1860 when the trade was legalized by 
treaty.! Once the trade was legalized opium imports were 
recorded by the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Ser-
vice. These reached a peak of 102,927 piculs in the year 
1879.2 After the legalization of the trade, domestic produc-
tion of opium increased dramatically, too, and, although 
statistics were extremely difficult to obtain, production was 
estimated at 376,000 piculs in 1879.3 Legalization clearly did 
not diminish the demand for opium but rather caused its 
use to increase yearly. Within half a century the Chinese 
had an enormous social problem, and public outrage against 
the drug finally resulted in a nationwide suppression cam-
paign.4 
Westerners and opium were associated in the minds of 
the Chinese, who blamed the foreigners for bringing opium 
to China and addicting the Chinese to it in an effort to 
weaken them so that the Westerners could gain more privi-
leges from the Chinese government. Because it was an emo-
tion-laden issue, most Chinese did not stop to consider that 
smuggling opium into China in the early years of the nine-
teenth century could never have taken place if Chinese 
themselves had not been the foreigners' accomplices who 
transported the drug into the interior for sale to other Chi-
nese. 
The issue was also an emotional one for some Western-
ers, particularly the Protestant missionaries, who saw it as 
an evil their countrymen had perpetrated, and continued 
to perpetrate, on the Chinese. It was a source of deep em-
barrassment for many of these missionaries that they had 
arrived in China on ships that also carried opium, as all 
ships heading to China did for many years. 
Most missionaries, as new arrivals in China, had had the 
experience of enrolling as converts in their fledgling 
churches opium addicts who had concealed their addiction. 
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Most of the missionaries took quick action to remove the 
addicts from their churches and to bar addicts from mem-
bership, once they discovered that addicts were unreliable, 
dishonest, and generally despised by other Chinese. Yet, the 
missionaries were also struck by the plight of the pathetic 
addicts. In search of moral conquests, as well as to alleviate 
the suffering of addicts and to gain new converts, the Prot-
estant missionaries embarked upon a new crusade-ridding 
China of opium. In this quest, the missionaries were aided 
both by home mission boards and by their fellow country-
men, particularly some in Britain, who were indignant that 
their government should have an official role in the opium 
trade. 
Britain yearly sent vast amounts of the drug from India 
to China and used the revenues from the trade to finance 
the government of India. Even the pro-opium Royal Com-
mission on Opium appointed in 1893 concluded, "The main 
purpose of the production and sale of opium in British In-
dia unquestionably is to supply the Chinese and other East-
ern markets."5 To the missionaries, such government involve-
ment was simply wrong. Protestant missionaries spent many 
years in their crusade against the opium trade and opium 
use by the Chinese, but their role was primarily that of data-
gatherers and publicists. 
Medical missionaries in China gathered the first scien-
tific data on the nature of the drug, helping to convince 
even the most hardened skeptics that opium really was 
harmful. The missionary doctors' scientific evidence was 
used by the International Opium Conferences in 1909 and 
1911-12 in their deliberations. These conferences, the first 
ever held, were instrumental in effecting cooperation among 
the various nations in controlling opium and its derivatives. 
To the missionaries goes the credit for not allowing the 
opium issue to die even in the days after the Boxer Upris-
ing in 1900, when emotions against the Chinese ran high. 
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The missionaries were convinced that they were right about 
the harm opium did, and they had the courage not to aban-
don their cause. 
Arrayed against the missionaries were powerful govern-
ment and business interests who were involved in the trade 
and who argued that the Chinese wished to end the import 
of opium from India only so that they might monopolize 
the trade, and thus the profits, for themselves. The busi-
nessmen who traded in opium were not interested in moral 
arguments; they were interested in profits, and as astute 
businessmen they were wise enough not to hire opium ad-
dicts to work in their firms. 
In the nineteenth century, China was not the only coun-
try with an opium problem; addiction to the drug and its 
derivatives, particularly laudanum and morphine, was a 
worldwide problem, although perhaps not as serious else-
where as in China. Opium use differed from country to 
country, and medical doctors were just beginning to accu-
mulate data on the dangers of the drug, which was widely 
prescribed for many ailments. After the Crimean War and 
the American Civil War, opium derivatives were widely given 
as pain killers to amputee veterans, who usually became life-
long addicts. 6 In Western countries the drug was also used 
in patent medicines, which were indiscriminately sold prior 
to the twentieth century when laws were passed restricting 
the movement of opium domestically and internationally. 7 
Westerners drank the refined forms of the drug or in-
jected it in the form of morphine; in India it was eaten. 
The Chinese alone chose to consume the drug by smoking, 
and apparently this difference made the Westerners view 
the Chinese addicts with disgust. Then, too, addiction was 
very visible in China, where opium was smoked in public 
dens. This visible use conflicted with Western standards of 
propriety and added to the foreigners' contempt for the 
Chinese. The fact that Chinese smoked the drug, and in 
the process developed a craving for the smoke, contributed 
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An opium den in Canton, 1919. The smokers seem to be 
scholars. Keystone Photo from the Library of Congress. 
5 
to the English language the word "yen," meaning craving. 
In Chinese, yen, often translated as "smoke," meant-liter-
ally-a craving for opium smoke. 
When Chinese students went abroad in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century, they discovered that drug addiction 
existed in other countries but not in the same manner that 
it did in China. They also discovered just how much con-
tempt the foreigners harbored for the Chinese because of 
the opium problem. When they returned to China, they saw 
how extensive the problem was, and many determined to 
work toward ridding China of the opium evil. This type of 
concern set the mood for the Chinese suppression cam-
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paign, which began in 1906 following the issuance of an 
imperial edict. For all the missionaries' efforts and concern, 
when the great campaign against opium began it was led 
by Chinese nationalists, and the Protestant missionaries, who 
had crusaded against the drug for so long, were largely by-
standers, although some still ran opium refuges for those 
who sought to break the habit. 
Determining when a nation is ready for social reform is 
not easy, but by 1906 the Chinese were ready to try to end 
the use of opium. In the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty 
many reforms were tried, but the most successful by far was 
opium suppression. The campaign was perhaps "the larg-
est and most vigorous effort in world history to stamp out 
an established social evil."8 The effort was not completely 
successful, but for it to have accomplished what it did re-
quired mass determination on the part of the Chinese 
people. To young Chinese, opium addiction was a sign of 
China's weakness. It reminded them of past wars lost and 
foreign business interests in their country. In truth, at the 
turn of the century, China probably produced eight times 
as much opium as it imported, but that fact was usually over-
looked by the Chinese. There had been anti-opium procla-
mations from the Chinese government for nearly two hun-
dred years, but what made the Chinese people willing to 
obey the edict of 1906? 
The answer is not simple, but it lies partly in emerging 
Chinese nationalism and all it implied. Chinese now wanted 
China to be strong and able to determine its own course. 
Perhaps many Chinese really saw the opium addicts for the 
first time in the years following the Boxer Uprising. Those 
who wanted China to be a modern nation realized that 
achieving that ideal meant all Chinese had to be involved 
in creating the new state. Perhaps the victory of Japan over 
Russia in 1905 infused the Chinese with new determina-
tion. The Japanese had demonstrated that Asians were not 
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inferior to Westerners. Perhaps the denunciation of Chi-
nese society contained in the report of the United States' 
Philippine Commission on Opium, which was published in 
1905 and which angered many Chinese, aroused them to 
seek to eradicate opium from their country. The report said 
there was no Chinese nation, only a Chinese race. (It should 
also be noted that the Philippine Commission recommended 
that children be taught in school that opium was a danger-
ous drug so that they might know to avoid its use.) 
Many Chinese were determined that China be a nation 
accepted on the same basis as the other nations of the world. 
Perhaps, too, many officials whose responsibility it became 
to stop poppy cultivation and opium use finally realized 
what great harm it did to China. Opium addicts, weakened 
by their years of addiction, were seen as a hindrance to the 
new society. Although many Chinese had decided opium 
addiction had to cease, the task was not an easy one. The 
addicts all condemned their habits and were always ready 
to give up the drug-tomorrow. In the new nation being cre-
ated, the addict had to be convinced to give up the drug 
today. Merchants had to be convinced to forgo the profits of 
the opium business, farmers had to be convinced to give up 
the sure profit from poppies for the uncertainties of other 
less lucrative crops, and the government had to find new 
sources of revenue to replace the taxes it collected from 
opium. Yet, despite these difficulties, opium eradication was 
one reform of the late Ch'ing years that enjoyed an imme-
diate and high degree of success. Many other reforms of 
the post-Boxer period, such as the constitutional or educa-
tional ones, by their very nature could not be quickly vis-
ible. Evidence of opium reform was. That the Chinese could 
arouse people to take action against opium surprised many 
foreigners. Perhaps more than anything else, the fervor the 
Chinese exhibited over opium eradication convinced the 
foreigners that a new China was emerging and that this new 
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nation was not going to accept foreign domination. The 
event that signaled the new era was the International Opium 
Commission meetings held in Shanghai in 1909. 
For years, medical missionaries had been accumulating 
information to prove that the physiological effects of opium 
use were debilitating, and when their overwhelming evi-
dence could no longer be ignored, the nations of the world 
decided to control the international trade in opium. Gov-
ernments realized that opium and other dangerous drugs 
had to be internationally supervised if any nation were to 
be free from the threat of wide-scale addiction. That a new 
era for China had emerged was evident at the 1909 confer-
ence, where the Chinese participated on the basis of equal-
ity. One Chinese delegate commented as the conference 
ended that it had been the first international conference 
that China had participated in without having to cede ter-
ritory or pay an indemnity.9 
The story of opium suppression in China is a many-sided 
one involving Chinese nationalists and reformers, British 
social activists who took up the anti-opium crusade soon 
after the abolition of slavery, and various governments which 
were involved in the efforts to control the international 
movement of opium and other dangerous substances. This 
book focuses only on the role of the Protestant missionar-
ies in China in the opium suppression campaign. They were 
the one who gathered the medical evidence to demonstrate 
that opium was a pernicious drug. They campaigned for 
decades to convince the British government to end its in-
volvement in the opium trade from India. And it was the 
missionaries who saw their carefully gathered evidence of 
the dangers of opium used by the delegates of the first in-
ternational conferences, which sought to regulate the traf-
fic in opium and other drugs. More than any other group 
at the turn of the twentieth century, the Protestant mission-
aries in China truly understood the nature of opium addic-
tion and had the courage to pursue their campaign against 
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the drug until they finally convinced others of the correct-
ness of their position. 
If few were willing to acknowledge that the missionaries 
had been right about opium all along, at least the mission-
aries could pride themselves that they had finally prevailed. 
The Protestant missionaries alone had an altruistic interest 
in the issue; everyone else-poppy farmers, opium traders, 
government officials-had a monetary interest in continu-
ing the trade. The addicts, of course, had a physiological 
dependence on the drug, which medical doctors, most of 
them missionaries, were only beginning to understand and 
try to treat. 
The story of the efforts to rid China of opium in the 
early years of the twentieth century is relevant to the clos-
ing years of the century. The arguments of the pro-opium 
advocates-"we are only meeting a need," "farmers earn 
more money from opium than from food crops," "if we do 
not make money, someone else will" -have a familiar ring 
in the late twentieth century. Yet no one in the closing years 
of this century would argue, as many did in the late nine-
teenth century, that opium is a harmless drug or that some 
people need it to survive. How much has been learned about 
harmful drugs in the last century is evidenced by the 1899 
survey of medical doctors in China, in which four reported 
that Chinese had told them babies could be born addicted 
to opium. None of the four ventured to state that they them-
selves could confirm such reports. 
No one knows precisely why so many Chinese took to 
opium smoking in the nineteenth century, but they did so 
to such a degree that they weakened their army so that it 
could no longer successfully defend the country. Opium 
sapped the strength of the Chinese in many ways, and for-
eigners were willing to take advantage of those weaknesses. 
In China, legalization, which came in 1860, clearly resulted 
in more addicts each year. Many people, including all the 
Protestant missionaries, cried out against the use of the 
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drug, but a serious effort to eradicate its use in China did 
not come until the Chinese themselves recognized the dan-
ger of the drug and what it was doing to their country. In-
tense moral outrage by a significant proportion of the popu-
lation resulted in the anti-opium campaign, begun in ear-
nest in 1906. Chinese wanted to rid their country of the 
drug, and their government successfully negotiated a treaty 
with the British to end the importation of India opium. 
Even the British diplomat in China, Sir John N. Jordan, 
who had sent a gunboat to enforce treaty rights on opium 
in 1906, by 1908 simply wanted his government to get out 
of the opium trade with as much grace and dignity as pos-
sible. 
-ONE-
Opium in China in the 
Late Nineteenth Century 
The origins of the opium poppy (Papaver somniferum) are 
obscure, but many botanists believe the plant is wild rather 
than the result of cultivation. l No one knows where it origi-
nated, but recent evidence suggests it might have been in 
Europe.2 Whether or not the opium poppy was grown in 
China in ancient times is subject to dispute, but many au-
thors cite the lack of a Chinese word for it as proof that it 
was not known in China before the arrival of the Western-
ers. The Chinese term for opium, ya-pien, is clearly a loan 
word from English. Part of the problem in tracing opium's 
origin lies in the fact that there are many varieties of pop-
pies, some of which were grown in China. 
Some credit the Arabs with introducing the opium poppy 
to China in the seventh or eighth century A.D., and others 
credit the Portuguese with its introduction in the 1500s. 
Hosea Ballou Morse, noted author of works on Chinese in-
ternational relations during the Ch'ing dynasty, stated that 
the Dutch in Taiwan introduced the practice of smoking 
opium mixed with tobacco to the Chinese.3 Yet, if the Chi-
nese did not use opium prior to the arrival of the Portu-
guese, one might argue that there would not have been the 
ready market for the drug that the Portuguese found. One 
can assume that the opium poppy was known in China and 
that opium was used as a drug at least by the reign of the 
K'ang-hsi emperor (1661-1722), since the first edict against 
the use of the drug was issued just shortly after his death. 
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, opium was 
12 CRUSADERS AGAINST OPIUM 
the major import of China, replaced by cotton only in 1890. 
The Imperial Maritime Customs Service kept statistics on 
the amount of opium imported and the taxes collected on 
it. Based on the Customs statistics, Morse reported that 
the amount of opium imported to China was 50,087 piculs 
in 1863; 60,948 in 1867; and 82,927 in 1879 when the trade 
reached its height. In addition, Morse estimated that in each 
of these years another 20,000 piculs were smuggled into 
China. The imports fell slightly, to 82,612 piculs in 1888 and 
then to 49,309 piculs in 1897. By 1905 imports stood at 51,920 
piculs. In each of these years, Morse estimated 5,000 piculs 
of opium went unreported. In 1911 he reported 27,758 piculs 
imported with 3,000 piculs unreported. The price of the 
foreign opium varied greatly, depending upon its quality 
and place of origin and the port in China where it was sold. 
It was not uncommon for high quality Patna opium to sell 
for 1,000 Haikwan Taels (Hk. TIs.) or more in Shanghai in 
the 1880s. The opium arriving in China was about equally 
divided between the Bengal and the Malwa products that 
together totaled about 95 percent of the trade. A duty of 
30 Hk. TIs. per picul had been established in 1858, and the 
Chefoo Convention of 1876 set the likin on opium at 80 Hk. 
TIs. per picul, making the total duty 110 Hk. TIs. The an-
nual value of the opium imports was between 30 and 40 
million Hk. Tls.4 Sir Robert Hart, inspector general of Cus-
toms, was concerned that the free port of Hong Kong was 
the smugglers' chief point of entry and once suggested sta-
tioning a Customs commissioner in India to collect both 
the Chinese customs duty and the likin.5 
Cultivation of the opium poppy in China probably be-
gan in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries and 
gradually spread to all parts of the empire. By the late 1880s 
it was a major crop in some parts of China and took valu-
able land away from food crops. Because of the money that 
could be made from the sale of opium, many farmers 
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planted opium poppies on their best land, with the result 
that food crops were frequently in short supply. 
Although in India only the white poppy was grown, the 
Chinese grew all varieties of the plant, and when it flow-
ered the fields were ablaze with white, yellow, red, pink, 
and purple blossoms. The plant is an annual, and after flow-
ering it produces a seedpod about the size of an egg that, 
by a highly complex chemical process, produces opium for 
about a ten-day period. The pod is scratched at sunset and 
oozes a white, milky substance which quickly turns into a 
brownish-yellow, sticky mass.6 After collection, the raw 
opium turns black. In India it was stirred for hours to dry 
it so that it could be formed into balls. In China the raw 
opium was boiled to reduce it by 50 per cent to make it 
purer. 
Accurate statistics on the extent of opium cultivation in 
China in the late nineteenth century are virtually nonexist-
ent, because poppy cultivation was illegal and the Chinese 
government had no agency for maintaining statistics on the 
production, which was not subject to taxation. Much of the 
opium that was transported from province to province was 
smuggled to avoid customs officials. Import statistics kept 
by the Imperial Maritime Customs Service show a decline 
in the importation of opium in the closing years of the cen-
tury, and this is often attributed to the rising domestic cul-
tivation, since the number of addicts was increasing at that 
time. 
In an attempt to gather information on the extent of na-
tive cultivation, Sir Robert Hart issued circulars in 1864, 
1879, and 1887 to the various Customs stations in China in-
quiring if native opium were known there, where it came 
from, how much was cultivated in each place, what the taxes 
on it were, and what varieties were being sold. 
The 1864 responses indicated that native opium was 
known in all the ports, but few acknowledged it being grown 
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in their areas. A. MacPherson, the acting commissioner of 
Customs in Hankow, reported that native opium was 30 
percent cheaper than imported opium but that the differ-
ence was compensated for by the fact that the imported va-
rieties were of a greater strength. He also wrote that hos-
tilities, related to the Nien Rebellion, had interrupted the 
supplies of opium in the city.7 James Brown at Ningpo re-
ported that juice from the red poppy had been produced 
locally but smokers described it "as having an insipid taste, 
and as losing much weight during the boiling process of its 
preparation for the pipe."8 
In 1879 C. Lenox Simpson in Chefoo reported, "Much 
difficulty has been experienced in eliciting answers to the 
various questions put to the Native Opium shops and oth-
ers, all viewing with suspicion any inquiries made, evidently 
fearing that some prohibition is about to be put on trade, 
or that their interests are in some way to suffer." H.E. 
Hobson in Amoy reported that when one asked about na-
tive opium the reply was that it was not grown, as it was 
"prohibited."9 Ernest T. Holwill in Kiukiang reported that 
estimates of native cultivation in his area ranged from none 
to his own guess of 77,000 piculs. He also reported that the 
American missionary, John Thorne, had recently returned 
from a tour of Anhwei where he noted that in many dis-
tricts on the north bank of the Yangtze there were "acres 
and acres of ground devoted to nothing but the cultivation 
of the poppy .... Notwithstanding a heavy tax and the ex-
tortion of the officials, the people find this much more lu-
crative than ordinary grains." Holwill concluded, "If this 
be true, its cultivation is not likely to decrease."lo 
In 1887, of the nineteen stations reporting to Hart all ac-
knowledged the presence of native opium in the trade of 
the ports. Only those stations on Taiwan reported no sig-
nificant amounts of native opium in their districts. Tamsui 
officials, for instance, reported only sketchy information 
from local officials, who reported no native trade at the port, 
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although some smuggling was suspected. The reported lo-
cal attempts at cultivation had produced only very little, 
extremely inferior opium. Takow reported no local opium 
production but some importation by junks from the main-
land that arrived at nontreaty ports. II 
The ports on the mainland all reported trade in native 
opium and local production. There was a considerable 
amount of interprovince trade in the drug. For example, 
Newchwang officials reported that native opium was exten-
sively cultivated throughout Manchuria, Tientsin officials 
reported production in Chihli, and Chefoo and Ichang both 
reported local production. Hankow reported importation 
from ten of the eighteen provinces, the largest amount ar-
riving from Szechwan, which, with Yunnan, was the usual 
place of origin of most of the opium traded within China. 
Officials at Ningpo reported that local production had been 
evident in their area for more than thirty years, while those 
at Foochow could only provide sketchy information and 
thought native opium was not traded at their port. 12 
At Kiungchow, Hainan, officials reported that opium had 
never been known to be cultivated on the island, and deal-
ers reported no native opium being sold in the port city, yet 
the Customs official there, C.C. Clark, stated that he had 
found one shop in the city that was selling Yunnan opium, 
leading him to believe that native opium was known, even 
though it had never been recorded officially or taxed; he 
was unable to guess at its amount. 13 
Estimating the extent of native opium production was also 
difficult for the Customs officials. As J. A. Van Aalst reported 
from Amoy, when local officials were questioned about the 
amount of opium produced in southern Fukien, they were 
told, "The cultivation of poppy is forbidden, thus no Opium 
is gathered." Van Aalst guessed that perhaps 600 piculs a 
year were produced in the region, basing his estimate on 
the amount of land under poppy cultivation and the yield 
one might expect. 14 
16 CRUSADERS AGAINST OPIUM 
Although most Customs stations reported Szechwan and 
Yunnan opium traded through their ports, no one could 
accurately state the amount of opium produced in either 
province. Hankow officials estimated the Szechwan produc-
tion to be about 150,000 piculs a year, while officials in 
Kiukiang estimated the Szechwan production to be only 
40,000 piculs a year, and those at Shanghai set the number 
at 10,000 piculs but admitted they had no data on which to 
base their estimate. Francis W. White at Canton hazarded a 
guess about Szechwan, which he estimated sent about 2,000 
piculs of opium a year into his province, with perhaps 200 
to 500 piculs entering the city of Canton. The cost of do-
mestically grown opium varied widely, with Tamsui, Taiwan, 
reporting a low of 130-43 Hk. TIs. per catty and Newchwang, 
Manchuria, reporting a high of 737 Hk. TIs. per picul. The 
average price at the other Customs ports was about 300 Hk. 
TIs. per picul. 15 
The amount of taxes collected on the sale of native opium 
represented only a very small portion of what the govern-
ment might have collected, since all officials replying to 
Hart's circular indicated that the amount of native opium 
passing through their ports was only a tiny portion of the 
amount that was sold illegally. Many stated that opium con-
sumption was on the rise in their districts, yet the amount 
of foreign opium passing through the Customs houses de-
clined yearly. 16 
Native opium was taking over the market, but little of it 
was being taxed at the Customs houses. Methods of taxa-
tion varied greatly, but the duty most likely to be collected 
was the likin. How many taxes the opium was subject to de-
pended upon the port and whether or not the officials there 
recognized the existence of the trade in native opium. Wuhu 
reported that previously native opium had been taxed at 
half the rate of foreign opium, but recently no taxes had 
been collected, since all native opium was being smuggled 
into the district. Amoy reported no taxes collected, since 
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native opium was prohibited and was subject to confisca-
tion. Swatow also reported no taxes collected. 17 
At the other extreme, Chinkiang reported that locally 
grown Kiangsu opium was subject to the following taxes: 
0.64 Hk. Tis. at the point of production as a charity tax 
and 0.32 Hk. Tis. as a registration fee. In addition, en route 
to the point of sale a picul of opium was subject to 8.5 Hk. 
Tis. of duty and 2.24 Hk. Tis. for the grain tribute tax. It 
was also subject to a likin of 43 Hk. Tis. at the port. 
Newchwang taxed native opium most heavily with duties of 
31.64 Hk. Tis. being collected at the place of production 
and 54.2 Hk. Tis. at the port. In addition, dealers and di-
van keepers in the city of Fengtien had to purchase licenses 
for 24 Hk. Tls.18 
OPIUM ADDICTS 
How many opium addicts China had was always a subject 
of controversy, and estimates varied widely. As the opposi-
tion to the opium trade grew, the anti-opium forces both in 
China and overseas sometimes inflated the number of ad-
dicts to illustrate more graphically the damage opium was 
doing to the Chinese people. 
In 1879 Sir Robert Hart made a careful analysis of the 
amount of imported opium, size of chests, loss in the weight 
of the opium during preparation, and the amount the av-
erage addict smoked in each pipe (estimated at three mace), 
and concluded that the number of addicts totaled one mil-
lion, or one-third of 1 percent of the population. By in-
cluding the Customs estimates for native opium production, 
Hart doubled his figures and set the number of addicts at 
two million, or two-thirds of 1 percent of the population. 19 
It should be noted that a number of the Customs offi-
cials reporting to Hart guessed that the number of pipes 
one mace of opium would fill depended upon whether the 
addict was a heavy or light smoker. Some thought addicts 
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smoked one mace per pipe, while others thought a mace 
would fill ten to twenty pipes, and that a heavy addict might 
smoke six to eight mace a day. The range of such guesses 
dearly indicates that Hart's figures of one-third or two-
thirds of 1 percent of the population addicted might be off 
by a huge margin. 20 
Hart included in his report details of fifty opium addicts 
who had tried to break the habit at Dr. John G. Kerr's hos-
pital in Canton. The addicts ranged in age from twenty to 
fifty-nine and had been addicted to the drug for periods 
ranging from one to twenty years. Two of the addicts used 
only seven-tenths of a mace of opium per day, but others 
reported using as much as six to eight mace daily. There 
seemed to be no correlation between the number of years 
one had been addicted and the amount of the drug used, 
for the two who had been addicted for twenty years used 
three and seven mace per day, and three who had been ad-
dicted for ten years reported using only one mace per day. 
Those reporting they used seven-tenths of a mace per day 
had been addicted for six and ten years. 21 The dangers of 
such statistics were well known, because opium addicts were 
known to be untruthful or imprecise about their addiction. 
In the replies to the questionnaires Hart sent out in 1887, 
some officials offered no estimates of the number of ad-
dicts, but Tientsin reported 170 opium shops in the city and 
Hankow reported that at least 70 percent of the men and 
many women and children smoked.22 Many foreigners be-
sides Hart tried to estimate the number of addicts, but all 
were only guessing. One put the total at 40 percent of the 
town population and 20 percent of the country population,23 
while another cited 1,130 opium dens in the city of Wenchow 
in 1891, which then had a population of 80,000. 24 
There were probably more addicts in the provinces where 
great quantities of the drug were produced, and many for-
eigners stated that 80 percent of the population of Szechwan 
were opium users.25 In terms of numbers, the estimates of 
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The equipment of an 
opium smoker. The 
ornate nature of the 
pipe and the lamp, 
the artistic shape of 
the palette, and the 
inscription on the 
handle of the scraper 
suggest that the owner 
of these items was a 
person of some wealth. 
Benjamin Broomhall, 
Evangelisation of the 
World, 1886. 
addicts ranged from Hart's extremely low 1 million to the 
Rev. J . Dyer Ball's 40 million, the latter being approximately 
one-tenth of the population of China. 26 Jonathan Spence 
has done a careful analysis of the various numbers given 
for addicts and opium production and concludes, "Unde-
niably, opium was being smoked in China on a gigantic 
scale."27 
Exactly why so many Chinese became addicted to opium 
in the nineteenth century is one of the unanswered ques-
tions about the society. Many people were first advised to 
use the drug to cure some physical ailment and quickly 
found themselves addicted,28 but why people engaged in the 
recreational use of the drug is more difficult to determine. 
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Perhaps they were like the husband of Mrs. Ning in Ida 
Pruitt's Daughter of Han, who, when asked why he smoked 
opium, replied, "Oh, ... don't you know. All the Immortal 
maidens of the ninth heaven come trooping to me."29 
Certainly China was in a time of rapid, sometimes cata-
strophic, change, and some people who had found the hal-
lucinatory experience of smoking opium an escape from 
physical pain might have decided to use it to ease psycho-
logical pain as well. But such reasons alone cannot account 
for the millions who became addicted to the drug. Accu-
rate information was very difficult to obtain, because de-
grees of addiction varied and new users of the drug were 
constantly falling into its grip. 
For Chinese suffering from chronic illnesses, such as 
malaria, dysentery, or tuberculosis, both the specialist in tra-
ditional Chinese medicine and the Western-trained medi-
cal doctor were likely to prescribe a small amount of opium, 
as it was considered to be the best treatment. It must be 
noted that the same prescription, in the form of laudanum, 
was commonly given to patients with chronic diseases in 
Western countries in the nineteenth century. The pernicious 
effects of opium smoking soon meant that the chronically 
ill patient had not only the original disease, still uncured, 
but also an opium habit, which grew until it consumed more 
and more of the time, money, and resources of the person. 
It was frequently said by the Chinese that the cure for 
chronic diseases was worse than the diseases themselves. For 
example, opium was ft:equently prescribed instead of qui-
nine for the treatment of malaria, with the result that in 
areas where malaria was quite prevalent the rate of opium 
addiction was high. As early as the beginning of the IS90s, 
some medical men recognized that the use of opium for 
malaria treatment was quite dangerous and suggested that 
if quinine could be readily available at a low price the use 
of opium would be reduced. Indeed, as the evidence of the 
uselessness of opium either as a prophylactic or as a cure 
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for malaria accumulated, many doctors stopped prescrib-
ing it for the disease. 3o Many Chinese also believed that 
opium was an aphrodisiac, though, in truth, long-term use 
had the opposite effect and decreased desire. 
The ravages of opium were no respecters of class in 
China. Most foreigners thought that the majority of users 
were coolies, but addicts could be found at all levels of soci-
ety, from the imperial court to the beggar in the street. All 
ages of people smoked. Some children, particularly boys, 
were addicted, having been given the drug by parents who 
thought it would stimulate their growth or cure illnesses. 
Addicts were certainly not considered good marriage pros-
pects, but some did marry, and some matchmakers con-
cealed the addiction. Although the average life span of the 
addict was not long-estimates vary from thirty to forty 
years-addicts in their sixties who had been using opium 
for thirty years were not unknown. 31 
The income, general health, and occupation of the indi-
vidual prior to beginning the opium habit generally deter-
mined the manner of life once the habit became pro-
nounced. For the government official who could rely on 
others to manage his affairs and who had an income large 
enough to support his habit, addiction did not necessarily 
mean financial ruin. The worst problem for the officials 
was the time consumed in indulging in the habit. When 
the addiction was quite advanced, the individual might 
spend half his time engaged in smoking and sleeping off 
the effects of the drug. If the official had capable subordi-
nates who were conscientious in performing their tasks, it 
was possible for the functions of the government to con-
tinue. Unfortunately, this was seldom the case. The official 
who was addicted to opium usually had subordinates who 
were also addicts. To further complicate matters, many of 
the yamen runners, scribes, and messengers were also likely 
to be addicts. 
During an antiforeign riot in Chungking in 1886, a mis-
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sionary reportedly asked an assistant of the local magistrate 
to send out men to search for missing members of the 
missionary's party. The official replied, '''Whom can I de-
pend on? We have two hundred men here in this establish-
ment and they are two hundred opium smokers, and none 
of them is to be trusted.' The magistrate himself was an 
opium smoker. "32 There were also reports of officials who 
postponed their duties to indulge their habits and of sol-
diers who took the drug to avoid dangerous military activi-
ties. 33 
A member of the gentry, if he were in good health and 
had substantial financial assets, might also support the 
opium habit for years without bringing financial ruin to 
his family, yet many did have their fortunes ruined by ad-
diction to the drug. Wealthy gentry sometimes had a spe-
cial room in the house devoted to enjoying the drug, thus 
freeing the smoker from the necessity of patronizing the 
local opium den and associating there with lower-class ad-
dicts. Like the official, the gentry member might partake 
of opium without having his affairs suffer, provided he had 
responsible subordinates. Yet, as with the official, such cases 
were rare; the addicted gentry member frequently had sub-
ordinates and other family members who were also addicts. 
If the responsible, adult members of the family all became 
addicted to the drug, their assets soon dwindled away as a 
result of mismanagement or duplicity on the part of ser-
vants. 
Women addicts were apparently most numerous among 
the gentry class, probably because they had the money and 
theleisure to indulge in the drug. It was generally believed 
that gentry women became addicts following the examples 
of their husbands. In Szechwan, one missionary reported 
it was considered polite for gentry women to offer women 
guests opium to smoke.34 
Peasant addicts and their families were the most pathetic. 
If the life of the peasant woman portrayed in Ida Pruitt's 
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Daughter of Han was typical of addicts and their families their 
lives were indeed difficult. Frequently, peasants' financial 
resources were small prior to becoming addicted and were 
quickly eroded by the opium habit. For example, if the 
peasant's cash income was sufficient to purchase the daily 
requirement of opium when beginning use, it was soon in-
adequate, as more and more money was needed to purchase 
the drug as the addiction developed. If a man did not have 
the cash to make his daily opium purchases he began slowly 
selling off his assets to finance the habit. 
First to go were whatever small luxuries the family had-
perhaps the wife's ring or an extra piece of furniture. When 
the money thus gained was exhausted, the addict, desper-
ate for the drug, would begin selling the necessities of life-
the land, the house, or sometimes pieces of it-the roof tim-
bers or the bricks. When material assets had been exhausted 
to the extent that even the cooking pot had been sold, the 
desperate man would begin selling his children-daughters 
first, and then the sons, starting with the youngest. With 
the need for opium increasing relentlessly, the addict, hav-
ing no children left, would then sell his wife. Sometimes 
the children and wife were sold into slavery, but if they were 
sold to a person who was not an opium addict it was pos-
sible that their lives improved with the sale. At least they 
were free from life with a person hopelessly addicted to 
opIUm. 
The addict, having exhausted all his resources, contin-
ued to live from one pipe to the next, earning money from 
whatever work he could find and resorting to begging or 
thievery if he were unable to find employment. Peasant 
women who became addicted to the drug often suffered a 
worse fate. If both husband and wife were addicts, the wife 
was usually abandoned, since she could not be sold unless 
her addiction could be concealed. Left on her own, the 
woman was forced to resort to begging or prostitution to 
get money for her habit. Such a course of events was most 
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frequent among the peasants, but it was not unknown to 
find a large estate owner who had followed the same down-
ward road after having become an opium addict. 
Addicts who became beggars were never sure if they 
would have money for the opium they needed. They were 
frequently seen at mission hospitals and churches asking 
for money. Many of the missionaries quickly learned that 
any coin given to a beggar was likely to be used to support 
the habit. Archdeacon Arthur E. Moule wrote, "I have been 
told that some of the lowest of the opium dens depend al-
most entirely upon the custom of beggars. This is, 1 fancy, 
a reversal of the true story. Beggars do not support opium 
shops-but opium-smoking brings many a man to beggary. "35 
The physical effects of addiction were horrible. Again, 
the wealth of the addict at the time he acquired the habit 
influenced how quickly the drug produced its deleterious 
effects. The presence of the drug in the bloodstream upset 
the body's ability to digest food. If the addict were of the 
upper classes and had sufficient money to purchase both 
food and the drug, he likely continued to eat properly, at 
least in the early stages of addiction. Also, an upper-class 
person likely had enough money to purchase the drug with-
out having to work, so the addiction did not interfere with 
his earning his livelihood. However, the luxury of the 
addict's surroundings and the wealth he possessed could 
not prevent the drug from ravaging his body. 
For the peasant, addiction was likely to devastate the body 
quite rapidly because of the lack of proper food. The smoker 
usually was able to continue to do his normal work for a 
period of time after becoming addicted, but how long the 
person could remain functional depended upon his gen-
eral physical condition prior to becoming addicted, the 
amount of opium smoked, and whether or not adequate 
food was eaten as the addiction increased. For anyone who 
depended upon a day's work to earn money to buy that day's 
food, addiction was the most devastating. Undernourished 
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at the time of introduction to the drug, these people were 
quick to suffer the most pernicious effects of it. 
Eventually, rich and poor addicts suffered the same fate. 
Physiologically, opium diminished the bodily functions. The 
nervous system became impaired, and vital internal organs 
ceased to secrete their fluids. The first symptom of chronic 
opium addiction was the inability of the body to absorb food. 
Because of this, the person who ate little and smoked much 
was likely to become an addict quicker than one who had 
plenty of food. The problems of digestion meant that many 
addicts simply starved. Many foreign doctors in China noted 
that opium addicts had few children and tended to blame 
this on the fact that they were interested in little but smok-
ing. Only in the late nineteenth century did some doctors 
realize that opium addiction diminished sexual desires and 
that longtime addicts had lost the ability to procreate. Even 
the importance of continuing the family line was of no in-
terest to the addict. If two generations of a family were ad-
dicted, it was generally assumed that they would be the last 
of their line. 
Many of the foreigners in China in the nineteenth cen-
tury viewed opium as China's vice but saw it as no more 
harmful than the vices found in other countries. Those who 
sought to downplay the extent of the harm opium was do-
ing to the Chinese people frequently compared the use of 
opium in China to the use of alcohol in Western countries. 
These foreigners tended to point out that neither drunk-
enness nor alcoholism was a problem in China. Lacking 
medical knowledge, many observers attributed this to the 
fact that the Chinese were physiologically different from 
Westerners and thus were able to avoid the Westerner's ad-
diction to alcohol while requiring opium to survive. 
Indeed, many foreigners thought that if the opium trade 
were to end, the Chinese population would suffer even 
greater devastation because of their peculiar reliance on the 
drug for sustaining life. It must be pointed out that West-
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erners were not alone in thinking that there were physiologi-
cal differences between the races, nor can one attribute the 
idea to the late nineteenth century Social Darwinists. At the 
time of the Opium War, Commissioner Lin Tse-hsu thought 
that the unique physiological characteristics of the West-
erners made tea and rhubarb necessities of life for them, 
and by cutting off the trade in these items he thought the 
foreigners would agree to his demands. 36 Of course, some 
people insisted that opium was not harmful to the Chinese. 
This belief developed partly because many people did smoke 
opium in small quantities for years before the pernicious 
effects of the drug manifested themselves. All had to agree, 
however, that these people were in a minority.37 
Such was the situation with opium in China in the late 
nineteenth century. Before many years passed, that situa-
tion would be drastically altered by social, political, and 
medical forces in China and in the West. 
-TWO-
Missionaries Organize 
to Oppose Opium 
As the nineteenth century entered its closing decade, the 
moral issue came to dominate the arguments of those Chi-
nese and foreigners who were opposed to the continuation 
of the opium trade. Missionaries were in the forefront of 
those who wanted to stop the opium traffic on the grounds 
that it was harmful to the Chinese people and, hence, that 
the British government was wrong in profiting from it. 
Those in Britain who were opposed to the trade were fond 
of citing Commissioner Lin Tse-hsu's memorial of 1839 to 
Queen Victoria, in which he described the benevolence of 
the Chinese emperor, who sought to bring peace, justice, 
and harmony to his people, and then inquired why she did 
not wish the same for the Chinese. Lin pointed out that the 
Chinese knew opium was harmful and had issued an edict 
prohibiting its use a century earlier. He asked, "Where is 
your conscience? I have heard that the smoking of opium 
is very strictly forbidden by your country; this is because 
the harm caused by opium is clearly understood. Since it is 
not permitted to do harm to your own country, then even 
less should you let it be passed on to the harm of other 
countries-how much less to China." He pointed out that 
there was a death penalty in China for anyone who dealt in 
the drug. If foreigners smuggled harmful drugs into En-
gland, would they not be subject to English law if caught? 
he asked. He urged that the queen show her benevolence 
and stop the opium trade immediately.l 
In 1881 Li Hung-chang brought up the moral question 
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in regard to the opium trade in a letter dated 24 May at 
Tientsin addressed to the Rev. Frederick Storrs-Turner, sec-
retary of the Society for the Suppression of the Opium 
Trade, in Britain. Li stated he had long known of the 
Society's efforts to end the opium traffic but noted that 
"opium is a subject in the discussion of which England and 
China can never meet on common ground. China views the 
whole question from a moral standpoint; England from a 
fiscal." He continued that England wanted to maintain the 
source of income for India "while China contends for the 
lives and prosperity of her people." He said it was the pur-
pose of the Chinese to repress the use of opium by heavy 
taxation, while "with England the manifest object is to make 
opium cheaper, and thus increase and stimulate the demand 
in China." He also stated that the "single aim of my Gov-
ernment in taxing opium will be in the future, as it has 
always been in the past, to repress the traffic-never the de-
sire to gain revenue from such a source." He continued that 
the Chinese government would "gladly cut off all such rev-
enue in order to stop the import of opium. My sovereign 
has never desired his empire to thrive upon the lives or in-
firmities of his subjects."2 Li noted that the poppy was grown 
illegally in China but that the government did not condone 
it any more than it condoned other crimes. He expressed 
his desire that the Society continue its efforts to rid China 
of the drug. 
Such moral pronouncements from the Chinese must cer-
tainly have galled members of the Society for the Suppres-
sion of the Opium Trade, many of whom were clergymen, 
yet these utterances tended to strengthen the argument of 
many of the British clergy that the opium trade was im-
moral. 
At a time when the concept of public opinion as a factor 
in government policy was still quite new, the missionaries 
used their ready-made audiences in churches to spread their 
views about the opium problem in the hope that their lis-
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teners in turn would pressure politicians on the issue. Be-
cause there was a constant flow of missionaries from the 
Western countries to China and back, there were many 
people who could deliver firsthand accounts to willing lis-
teners who were eager to hear anything about China and 
the mission work being done there. Church publications 
were eager for articles that would tell their readers of the 
good works the missionaries were doing in China, and they 
were willing to publish articles about opium to which they 
could attribute some of the blame for the missionaries not 
having made more converts. The need to further the work 
of the anti-opium crusaders, to open and staff opium ref-
uges, and to offer addicts the latest cures could all be used 
to solicit contributions for the churches' work in China. 
Church conferences and public meetings, as well as sessions 
of governing boards of church and mission agencies, pro-
vided anti-opium speakers with other ready forums to ex-
press their views, again with the hope that an informed 
public would influence the government to take a stand 
against the opium trade. 
Arrayed against the missionaries were powerful pro-
opium forces. Many who favored the continuance of the 
opium trade pointed out that the Chinese grew opium and, 
hence, stopping the 'trade would not end the use of the drug 
in China. To this argument one of the most prominent mis-
sionaries in China, the Rev. Griffith John, replied that it 
was "useless" for foreigners to argue that the Chinese would 
grow opium themselves if the import of the drug were 
stopped, as foreigners could do nothing about "the possible 
or probable action of the Chinese in this matter." It was the 
task of the foreigners "to wash our hands clean of the iniq-
uity, and allow [the Chinese] to deal with [opium] as they 
please. The trade is immoral, and a foul blot on England's 
escutcheon. It is not for us to perpetrate murder in order 
to prevent the Chinese from committing suicide."3 
The moral question was a particularly sticky one for the 
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British, but for many years the economic question was more 
important to them. The missionaries said that the trade 
ought to stop because it was harmful and no just govern-
ment could be proud of profiting from harm brought to 
others. Yet, supporters of the policies of the Indian gov-
ernment pointed out that they could not govern India with-
out the revenues gained from the sale of opium grown on 
government lands. They argued that the demand for opium 
existed in China and that they were simply fulfilling that 
demand. Further, they argued that if they did not sell opium 
to the Chinese someone else would, and then they would 
be without the revenue they needed. Indeed, many Britons 
saw no harm in selling opium to the Chinese because they 
were heathens who had not accepted Christianity and thus 
could not expect to be treated as Christians treated one an-
other. In the tradition of the Social Darwinists, the Chi-
nese were inferior people, as evidenced in part by the fact 
that they were addicted to opium. The arguments went in a 
vicious cycle. 
THE MISSIONARIES IN CHINA 
The missionaries played a very vocal role in the debate over 
the opium traffic. The Rev. Silvester Whitehead of the 
Wesleyan Missionary Society in Canton noted "the mission-
aries in China are absolutely one on this important ques-
tion." He stated it was the only question on which they 
"equally agreed," noting they were "men of different na-
tionalities and training; they hold various creeds; they are 
apt to look at questions from diverse standpoints ... yet the 
whole six hundred of them with one accordant voice pro-
claim the opium a curse, and they tell you that the trade in 
the past was a monstrous wrong, and thus it is still a gigan-
tic evil."4 
All missionaries in China had seen firsthand the effects 
of opium addiction. The missionary community in China 
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was small enough that, generally speaking, everyone knew 
everyone else, if not personally then by reputation. This 
small group was able to exercise influence far beyond its 
numbers. The medical missionaries were responsible for 
compiling the much-needed scientific data on the effects 
of opium addiction. All the missionaries, particularly 
through the anti-opium societies, were responsible for keep-
ing the opium question before the British public and gov-
ernment until the trade was finally ended. But the mission-
aries had little to do with the suppression of the use of 
opium in China by the Chinese government because they 
were never able to exercise significant influence with the 
decision-makers in China. Indeed, they little understood 
how the Chinese government operated and never knew who 
had the authority to make a decision on the opium ques-
tion. When opium suppression finally came to China, it was 
because the Chinese, not the missionaries, desired it. In 
addition, the missionaries had many other serious con-
cerns--conversions; translation of the Bible, religious litera-
ture, and music into Chinese; famine relief; improvement 
of the status of women; anti-footbinding efforts-with which 
opium had to compete for their time and attention. The 
missionaries, especially a few vocal ones, were the publicists 
who constantly called the government to task for policies 
the missionaries considered wrong, and in this they were 
active for many years. 5 
The Protestant missionaries in China had two major 
means of communicating their opinions on the opium ques-
tion to each other. One means was the ecumenical Chinese 
Recorder, published at the Presbyterian Mission Press in 
Shanghai beginning in 1868, and the other was the peri-
odic regional and national missionary conferences at which 
representatives of all Protestant denominations met and 
discussed their work, their difficulties, their plans for the 
future, and their roles in China. 
It was through the pages of the Chinese Recorder that the 
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missionaries kept in touch with one another. In one of the 
first issues of the periodical the editors noted with alarm 
the lack of knowledge on the part of Westerners about the 
opium trade and stated that articles on it would appear in 
coming issues.6 Opium was a subject much discussed in the 
Chinese Recorder in the last years of the nineteenth century. 
Editorially, the periodical took a strong stand against the 
use of opium, under the leadership of an American Meth-
odist, Dr. L.N. Wheeler, editor from 1890 to 1895, and an-
other American, Dr. G.F. Fitch, superintendent of the Pres-
byterian Mission Press, who served as editor from 1895 to 
1907.7 
In 1891 an editorial urged missionaries to collect photo-
graphs of opium smokers and send them to the anti-opium 
societies in Britain and the United States to support the 
arguments against the opium trade. "Now is the time to send 
home floods of literature on the subject. Old arguments 
revamped, new facts tersely put, illustrations from real life, 
are all in place," Wheeler wrote. 8 A year later the editor 
wrote that China was "not now strong enough to prohibit 
[opium] cultivation on her own soil," but if outside pres-
sures were removed the Chinese government could inau-
gurate reforms for self-preservation.9 An 1894 editorial 
stated, "It behooves the missionaries of China to redouble 
their prayers in this important matter, and beseech God to 
grant them deliverance from the stigma of offering salva-
tion with one hand while with the other they hold out 
opium. "10 
The Rev. William Muirhead of the British and Foreign 
Bible Society, writing to the missionaries on the opium ques-
tion in 1894, stated, "It has engaged your attention more or 
less during all your missionary life, having been forced upon 
you by the circumstances in which you are placed, and in 
regard to it there are not two opinions among us." He went 
on to note that "opium, as it is currently used in China, is 
an acknowledged evil, a curse, fraught with misery and mis-
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chief throughout the country, and producing the most 
baleful effects in every department of social life. Our great 
desire is to get rid of it, and in this we have the fullest sym-
pathy of all right-minded Christian men at home and 
abroad, natives and foreigners."ll 
Missionaries forbade opium addicts to become church 
members, because the addicts were known to be untrust-
worthy individuals who would steal or do anything to ob-
tain money to support their habits. Because they were fre-
quently in contact with opium addicts or their families and 
found opium addiction to be a hindrance to their efforts to 
convert the Chinese to Christianity, many of the missionar-
ies founded opium refuges to aid the addicts in breaking 
their habits. Some were also attracted to the plight of the 
addicts because they knew that Westerners were at least 
partly responsible for the opium problem. 12 Because foreign-
ers had brought opium to China and the missionaries were 
foreigners, many Chinese blamed the missionaries for the 
opium curse. Much to their dismay, many missionaries 
learned they were thought of in conjunction with opium 
when crowds heckled them about the opium problem as they 
attempted to preach in the countryside. 13 In England in 1902, 
the Rev. Arthur E. Moule, archdeacon of the Church Mis-
sionary Society, told the Society for the Suppression of the 
Opium Trade that frequently when preaching to the Chi-
nese, "someone shouts out, 'Who sells Opium?' My answer 
has been, I fear, not a very Christian answer, 'Who smokes 
the Opium?' I have thus silenced them hundreds of times."14 
An editorial in the Chinese Recorder in 1892 summed up 
the problem by quoting a missionary from Fukien who 
thought it was utterly hopeless to engage in missionary work 
"in localities where the people are almost universally ad-
dicted to the drug." Although some cases of "deliverance 
by Divine grace from the power of evil appetite" were known, 
"the unreliability of converts in general who have been 
Opium smokers is a well-known fact." The editorial contin-
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ued, "We recoil in horror from that term now coming into 
use in some parts of China, 'Jesus opium.' And yet these 
words express the almost universal Chinese idea with ref-
erence to the foreign drug. To say that this state of things 
does not seriously hinder the progress of missions, is to call 
darkness light and evil goOd."15 Other missionaries found 
the opium question so personally embarrassing that they 
were reluctant to admit they were citizens of the nations 
that engaged in the trade. 16 
The missionaries chose various ways to oppose opium. 
In some cases, individuals took stands against the opium 
trade, and many were able to convince church conferences 
to oppose it. Dr. John Fryer of the London Missionary So-
ciety, one of the education editors of the Chinese Recorder, 
organized in 1895 an essay contest to expose the evils of 
Chinese society-"opium, footbinding, and the literary ex-
aminations" -in the manner that the novel Uncle Tom's Cabin 
had exposed the evils of slavery in the United States. 17 Seven 
prizes ranging from eight to fifty dollars (U.S.), were to be 
awarded. One hundred fifty manuscripts were received, 
many from students in Christian schools. They ranged in 
length from several pages to a six-volume work by a profes-
sional novelist. IS Eventually, thirteen prizes totaling two hun-
dred dollars (U.S.) were awarded, but the editors noted that 
little new information was contained in any of the essays.19 
The missionaries' other means of communication were 
their interdenominational conferences. The most impor-
tant of these were the national conferences, such as the one 
held in 1890 in Shanghai. At this meeting the problem of 
opium was dealt with at one of the sessions, with letters 
from the Society of Friends (Quakers) of Great Britain be-
ing read. Authors of the letters deplored the opium trade 
and indicated that interest in stopping the trade had been 
increasing in Britain for several years. Quakers had long 
been active in opposing the trade and in 1874 under the 
leadership of Edward Pease had founded the Anglo-Orien-
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tal Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade.20 A let-
ter from a committee of the Society urged the missionaries 
to include in the reports they sent to the mission boards at 
home information on the opium habit and the role the Brit-
ish government played in the trade. The missionaries were 
urged to promote anti-opium societies in China and to send 
news of their activities to the societies in Britain. They were 
also asked to pray that the rulers of Britain and India would 
end the national sin of the opium trade. They were also to 
pray that the Christian public in Britain would be enlight-
ened as to the nature of the trade, that Chinese authorities 
would take action to end the domestic growth of poppies, 
and that China would end opium importation despite the 
large revenue gained from it. The missionaries were also 
requested to appoint a committee of the conference to send 
news of opium to the societies at home. 
Other aspects of the meeting included the reading of 
papers on the problems of running opium refuges and the 
extent of the opium evil in China. The dangers of the use 
of morphine as an opium cure were discussed by Dr. W.H. 
Boone. The China Medical Missionary Association asked 
the conference to seek ways to stop the dispensing of mor-
phine and anti-opium pills, many containing morphine, by 
both missionaries and Chinese Christians. Dr. Alexander 
Lyall of the English Presbyterian Mission in Swatow re-
ported that the anti-opium pills, known as "Jesus opium," 
had already spread from Hong Kong into his area of Kwang-
tung province. 21 
The missionaries attending the 1890 Shanghai mission-
ary conference also discussed the problems they faced since 
many Chinese still associated Christianity and opium, in 
part because of the unfortunate circumstance that early 
Protestant missionaries had arrived in China on opium clip-
pers. They noted increasing difficulty in communicating 
their views to Chinese officials. Previously, they had been 
able to memorialize Li Hung-chang on the opium problem 
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through the American minister, but the 1881 treaty between 
the United States and China, which prohibited Americans 
from engaging in the opium trade, had closed this avenue 
since the American minister no longer wanted to appear as 
interfering in the commercial interests of Great Britain. The 
missionaries noted with alarm that when they had arrived 
in China nearly half a century earlier there were only two 
million adult men who smoked opium, but at the time of 
the conference there were twenty million men, women, and 
children using the drug. 22 
After much discussion and many compromises, the con-
ference voted a resolution, the wording of which was "stu-
diously temperate," continuing their opposition to the 
opium traffic, urging Christians in China to arouse public 
opinion against it and Christians around the world to pray 
for the end of the opium trade, as well as the morphia trade, 
which was increasing. They also agreed to establish the Per-
manent Committee for the Promotion of Anti-Opium So-
cieties. The members of the committee were John G. Kerr, 
M.D., American Presbyterian Mission in Canton; B.C. 
Atterbury, M.D., American Presbyterian Mission in Peking; 
Archdeacon Arthur E. Moule, Church Missionary Society 
in Shanghai; Henry Whitney, M.D., American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions in Foochow; the Rev. 
Samuel Clarke, China Inland Mission in Kweiyang; the Rev. 
Arthur Shorrock, English Baptist Mission in Taiyuan; and 
the Rev. Griffith John, London Mission Society in Hankow. 23 
One of the interesting aspects of the all-China mission 
conferences was that their work did not end when the con-
ferences adjourned. The desire of the missionaries that their 
ideas be carried out caused them to form "continuation com-
mittees" that were assigned tasks to assure that action would 
be taken on whatever matters had been approved by the con-
ferences. 
Regional missionary conferences were also forums for 
opposition to the opium trade. At a Canton conference in 
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1891 a committee on the opium traffic reported that it was 
thankful for the increasing awareness on the part of Chris-
tians in Britain, where the issue had been discussed recently 
in Parliament. The conference noted with alarm the increas-
ing use of opium in China and elsewhere in Asia and the 
fact that many of the British colonial governments, particu-
larly those in India, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Penang 
obtained a considerable portion of their revenues from the 
opium trade. The complete prohibition of opium in Japan 
and Korea was cited as evidence that the drug could be con-
trolled. The committee noted that "the Christian Church 
in China is practically an anti-opium society" and urged that 
members work to save victims of the habit and to prevent 
others from becoming addicts. Conference attendees were 
urged to work for the suppression of both the opium trade 
and the cultivation of the poppy in China. Christians were 
asked to communicate with the Chinese and foreign, secu-
lar and religious press to disseminate knowledge on the 
opium question and to petition the British and the Chinese 
governments to stop the opium traffic and opium use. 24 The 
Chinese Recorder reported on this conference and in an edi-
torial in the same issue pointed out that the Chinese gov-
ernment tolerated the domestic growth of the poppy for 
the revenue it obtained but stated that the Indian drug was 
much "stronger and more poisonous" because the efforts 
of chemists had improved the Indian drug. 25 
Two years later another regional missionary conference 
was held in Shansi. Those attending this meeting adopted 
a resolution stating "that as far as we can judge opium has 
most seriously damaged, physically and morally, a large pro-
portion of the population of this province; has sadly crippled 
legitimate trade, and threatens yet more serious conse-
quences in the future." The conference viewed "with alarm 
the indiscriminate sale in opium refuges and otherwise of 
medicines containing opium and its alkaloids, and urge[d] 
every Christian in the province to do his utmost to put an 
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end to the practice."26 Missionaries in India also took a 
strong stand against the opium trade, and the Decennial 
Missionary Conference held in Bombay in 1893 adopted a 
resolution condemning the trade. 27 
When the British government appointed a royal com-
mission in 1893 to investigate the opium question, the 
missionaries were elated until they learned that the Royal 
Commission on Opium would study the question in India 
but not in China. As the commission began its work, the 
China missionaries quickly found their opinions were go-
ing to be ignored and the anti-opium societies, which in 
many cases had been fostered by the Women's Christian 
Temperance Union, were too casually organized and lacked 
the funds required to send telegrams to the commission to 
attempt to correct the situation. 
Accordingly, a plea went out in the Chinese Recorder for 
money from anyone in China and Britain who wished to 
have the views of the China missionaries expressed to the 
commission. Largely as a result of their dealings with the 
commission, many missionaries realized the need to develop 
a national organization to combat the opium problem. Thus 
in June 1896, the missionaries in China proposed an anti-
opium league, to be "composed of representatives of all the 
missionary communities in the empire, along with all who 
sympathize with its objectives and are willing to lend a help-
ing hand." The objectives of the league were "1. To cooper-
ate with the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade 
[in Britain]' 2. To collect information and statistics as to the 
effects of opium use in China. 3. To inform the Christian 
people of the countries from which we come concerning 
the evils of opium, and to enlist their prayers, sympathy and 
efforts in behalf of this cause. 4. To agitate the anti-opium 
question among the Chinese themselves and to enlist the 
aid of those who sympathize with our object."28 
The Anti-Opium League in time had a few Chinese mem-
bers, but it was primarily a missionary organization, and 
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missionaries served as its officers throughout its existence. 
The idea for the league grew out of the 1890 Missionary 
Conference and the work of an anti-opium group in 
Soochow, which had formed a committee in February 1896 
to correspond with other missionary communities on the 
opium question. In December 1896, the Soochow group 
proposed a national meeting to be held in Shanghai the 
following year. All local anti-opium societies were urged to 
register with the Shanghai Missionary Conference so that 
there might be a record of the groups in existence. 
The Provisional Executive Committee of the Anti-Opium 
League was composed of the Rev. Hampden C. DuBose, 
American Presbyterian Mission in Soochow; Duncan Main, 
M.D., Church Missionary Society in Hangchow; William H. 
Park, M.D., American Southern Methodist Mission in 
Soochow; the Rev. George L. Mason, American Baptist Mis-
sionary Union in Huchow, Chekiang; and the Rev. John N. 
Hayes, American Presbyterian Mission in Soochow.29 The 
close relations of the entire missionary community, scattered 
across the whole of China, and the influence of the Chinese 
Recorder as their means of communication, were well dem-
onstrated in the case of the Anti-Opium League, which was 
proposed, came into existence, adopted goals, elected an 
executive committee, and set a time and place for its first 
meeting all within the space of one year through the pages 
of the publication. When the league met for the first time 
in Shanghai on 23 September 1897, its major work was to 
propose that a pamphlet be issued giving the views of mis-
sionary doctors on the effects of opium use by the Chinese. 
All were convinced of the harm opium did to the Chinese, 
and the league saw anti-opium writing as its major work. 
The task before them was to convince the people in their 
home countries of the correctness of their views and to ob-
tain support in the crusade against opium. 
A pamphlet was to be compiled by William H. Park, M.D., 
of the Soochow Hospital. Questionnaires were sent "to all 
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the (Western) doctors in China so far as known. "30 (A list of 
the questions asked appears in the Appendix.) In case any-
one had been missed, the questions were published in the 
Chinese Recorder. The results of the survey were published 
in both Chinese and English in 1899 under the title opin-
ions of Over 100 Physicians on the Use of opium in China. A 
free copy was sent to every missionary in China. Most of 
the 106 doctors who replied to the questionnaire were mis-
sionaries who practiced among the Chinese. Twenty-five of 
the doctors were women and four were Chinese who had 
been educated in Western countries. All the doctors except 
two, practicing among foreigners at Shanghai, spoke Chi-
nese. Replies from doctors on Taiwan were also included. 
The years the doctors had practiced in China ranged from 
one to forty-four, with the average being nine. Together they 
saw some 750,000 patients in a year. 31 
Asked to describe the moral, physical, and social effects 
of opium on its users, one doctor commented "bad, utterly 
bad," while another replied, "Morally-demoralizing, Physi-
cally-weakening, Socially-degrading." Other responses 
were "Ruin"; "Opium ruins the consumer morally and physi-
cally, and if money fails, his social position is ruined also. 
Some rich receive no injury in any way"; "Have seen no good 
effects except in cases of incumble pain where it afforded 
relief"; and "No one can live amongst opium smokers with-
out the unpleasant conviction that in all three points its rav-
ages are deplorable. It destroys morals, makes physical 
wrecks and severs social relationships. "32 
In reply to the question "What are the proportions of 
those who smoke opium: A. Without injury? B. With slight 
injury? C. With great injury (opium sots)?" most of the 
doctors said few or none smoked with no injury. Those suf-
fering slight injury were estimated between "very few" and 
"the majority." The most commonly cited figures were 30 
to 50 percent and the highest was 80 percent, reported by 
one of the physicians whose practice was confined to the 
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foreign community at Shanghai. Those who suffered great 
injury and became opium sots were estimated to number 
between 5 percent and "all who continue the habit."33 The 
difficulty with the statistics stemmed from the contact the 
doctors had with opium addicts. Many found that addicts 
gave unreliable answers when questioned about their ad-
diction. Quite often the doctors were unsure how long a 
person had been using opium or how much was used. 
All the doctors reported that opium smoking was increas-
ing in their districts or remaining steady, and one cited the 
decline in price as the probable cause. Only Dr. Peter Ander-
son, an English Presbyterian who practiced on Taiwan, re-
ported a decline in the number of addicts, probably due to 
the efforts of the Japanese, who had gained control of the 
island in 1895.34 Most doctors reported that women smoked 
opium, but few were able to cite any specific numbers. The 
majority of the doctors thought there were few children who 
smoked opium, but many had at least seen some cases of 
child addicts; others said boys smoked but girls did not or 
that older children smoked but not younger ones. 
Replies to the question "Do the effects of opium-smok-
ing by parents show in their children?" indicated that little 
was known of childhood addiction. Some of the doctors 
knew of no effects upon the children, but others noted that 
children of addicts tended to be weak and diseased. Some 
of the doctors knew that opium smoking tended to dimin-
ish the ability to procreate, with some stating that if both 
husband and wife were addicts they were unlikely to have 
children. A few doctors thought the children of addicts were 
likely to become addicts themselves at an early age. Dr. Tho-
mas Rennie, who practiced among the foreign community 
in Taiwan; Dr. James B. Woods of the American Southern 
Presbyterian Mission in Hwaian; Dr. Herbert Parry of the 
China Inland Mission, who had practiced in Szechwan and 
Shantung; and Dr. Park all reported that Chinese had told 
them that newborn babies of addicts craved opium, indi-
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eating that some Chinese, if not the Western doctors, rec-
ognized that children could be born with an addiction to 
the drug. Park stated, "The Chinese say the child of an 
opium-smoking mother cries incessantly and cannot live 
unless opium fumes are, at short intervals, blown into its 
face, and if it grows up it is almost sure to become an 'opium 
devil.'" Dr. Woods' report was similar. He wrote, "The Chi-
nese say children are born with the opium 'yin,' and die 
often unless their mothers or friends blow the opium smoke 
down their throats, quickly soothing them and enabling 
them to nurse, which they have before refused to do." Parry 
and Rennie also reported that Chinese said the babies of 
addicts needed opium smoke blown into their faces if they 
were to live.35 
Ninety-five doctors thought there was a tendency for ad-
dicts to increase the amount of opium smoked. Only six 
thought it was possible to smoke opium for years without 
becoming addicted, and each of the six qualified his state-
ments by saying it was possible to avoid addiction only if 
very little opium were smoked or by saying it was possible 
but extremely rare. 
Questioned about the prevalence of opium use among 
laborers, merchants, and artisans, the doctors again cited 
widely varying figures, but the average was about 40 per-
cent. Some thought chairbearers were the most heavily ad-
dicted, while others thought the habit was more prevalent 
among merchants and yamen officials. Many thought that 
addiction was more prevalent among urban dwellers than 
among the farm population. Many thought opium was likely 
to increase the efficiency of workers temporarily, but it was 
known to be detrimental in the long run. Most reported 
employers did not like to hire addicts because they were 
untrustworthy, inefficient, and dishonest. Park reported 
making a sedan chair ride to the home of a patient who 
had been poisoned by opium. Five of his six chairbearers 
were addicts and were barely able to reach the destination. 
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At the conclusion of his business, he found the five addicts 
at a nearby opium den, smoking to get enough strength to 
carry him home! 36 
Chinese generally condemned the habit as degrading or 
injurious, eighty-five of the doctors replied. 37 Since the 
opium habit was often compared to addiction to alcohol, 
which was common in the Western countries, the doctors 
were queried about this. Seventy of the doctors questioned 
thought opium was worse than alcohol, while three thought 
alcohol was worse than opium, and twenty-nine were un-
able to state which was worse. Some of the doctors stated 
they had never heard the Chinese compare the two habits 
and noted that drunkenness in China was not the problem 
it was in the Western countries. 38 
Seventy-seven of the doctors stated that, to their knowl-
edge, opium was not a prophylactic against fever, rheuma-
tism, or malaria, and sixty-four stated that the Chinese in 
their areas did not regard opium as such. However, most of 
the doctors reported that Chinese physicians prescribed the 
drug for chronic illnesses and that the sufferer might ob-
tain temporary relief by using the drug. 39 
Questioned about opium-related deaths, all the doctors 
replied that the drug was frequently used as a means of com-
mitting suicide, and others died either from prolonged use 
of the drug, which destroyed their bodies, or from attempted 
cures of the habit. With few exceptions, the doctors reported 
suicide was quite common in their parts of China. Park 
noted that in Soochow suicide by opium was so common 
that several native physicians and many quacks made a prac-
tice of rescuing those who had taken opium to kill them-
selves. There were doctors at several institutions in the city 
who made calls day or night to treat those who had taken 
the drug. One of these institutions had answered 111 calls 
to treat would-be suicides in the first six months of 1898. 
Of these, forty-two of the forty-seven men who had tried 
suicide were rescued and fifty-two of the sixty-four women 
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Line drawings from a series that appeared in many pub-
lications, most likely first in a pamphlet of the Society 
for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, showing the 
problems of the family of a wealthy opium user. 
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were saved. In the city of Soochow, Park estimated, about 
one thousand persons a year tried suicide and about 15 per-
cent of them succeeded. Using his figures from that city, 
he estimated that there were 800,000 attempted suicides in 
China each year, of which 120,000 succeeded. He noted that 
opium was the most common means of committing suicide 
and that these deaths, added to the 70,000 or 80,000 opium 
addicts who died yearly from the ravages of opium smok-
ing, accounted for an awesome number of lives lost. 40 
Park's estimates on the number of suicides where opium 
was used were probably fairly accurate. The China Inland 
Mission station at Chunking had reported that its doctors 
treated at least one would-be suicide a day in 1877 and in 
1885 rescued more than five hundred persons from inten-
tional death by the drug. 41 
Opinions concerning the desire of opium smokers to 
break the habit differed widely. Some doctors thought ad-
dicts would prefer to be free from the habit, but others dis-
agreed. Many said addicts wanted to end the habit "tomor-
row," or if it could be done painlessly. Most of the doctors 
agreed that it was rare for an addict to break the habit by 
himself, although it was not unknown. Most also reported 
the use of morphia pills openly sold as an opium cure, and 
some noted that hypodermic injections were also known. 
Of the doctors working in opium refuges, most used both 
the sudden and the gradual withdrawal methods, depend-
ing upon the patient being treated.42 
The question of how many smokers began using opium 
to cure some ailment brought responses ranging from a few 
to 90 percent to all. Dr. Alexander Lyall of Swatow reported 
that many opium smokers said they began the habit to cure 
some illness, but he thought this was an excuse rather than 
the truth. How many of the doctors' patients had been per-
manently cured brought responses ranging from "I cannot 
speak of permanent cures" to "90 percent," a figure cited 
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by several doctors. Gaining Christian converts was one of 
the reasons missionaries became involved with opium ad-
dicts. The questionnaire asked, "What number, after being 
cured, have joined the Church?" Responses included "In 
my own experience, none," "Very few," and "six in three 
years." Dr. Dugald Christie of the United Free Church of 
Scotland Mission in Mukden reported fifty had joined the 
church in a fifteen-year period. Dr. Herbert]. Hickin, who 
had practiced in Hangchow; Tachow, and Ningpo, perhaps 
reflected the attitudes of many missionaries concerning 
former addicts when he stated, "Very few. The danger of 
relapse is so great that we do not care to admit them into 
the church, and those who have been admitted have many 
of them relapsed." Others reported former addicts had be-
come faithful church members, particularly if they had 
wanted to join the church and had given up the opium habit 
primarily to be accepted into membership.43 
General remarks from the missionaries indicated the ex-
tent of opium use and its effects upon the Chinese. Dr. H. 
Mather Hare of Chengtu reported, "In this city of less than 
100,000 people, there are seven hundred families making 
their living by boiling opium for sale." Dr. Robert J. 
Coltman of the American Presbyterian Mission in Chinan 
stated, "I scarcely ever used any form of opium in my prac-
tice for any disease, as I fear the 'yin'." Dr. Mary Gale of 
the Women's Missionary Union in Shanghai related a story 
of addiction among the rich. A family she knew married 
their "beautiful, healthy daughter of fifteen or sixteen years 
of age. . . to a young man in a wealthy family in which the 
father and six sons were all opium addicts. The groom, pale 
and emaciated, with indigestion and insomnia, came for 
treatment, but soon wearied of the effort at a cure of his 
bad habit," she wrote. The youngest son, just six years old, 
"died shortly, a withered little old man." Before long the 
"pretty, healthy young bride joined the daily opium de-
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bauch." Also at Dr. Gale's hospital she at one time had for 
treatment "a mother and daughter, of sixteen, for the cure 
of the opium habit. After a week's treatment the daughter 
ran away. The mother remained until cured, but on going 
home shortly relapsed. Her excuse was that she could not 
resist the constant sight and odor of opium in her house." 
Dr. Henry M. McCandliss, an American Presbyterian sta-
tioned on the island of Hainan, stated, "I think [opium] is 
the judgment of God on a dishonest race. "44 
The doctors were also asked to estimate the poppy 
cultivation in their areas, but the most accurate statistics 
anyone could give were those obtained from the Customs 
houses. Park believed that the Chinese grew poppies pri-
marily to drive the foreign opium out of China so that 
the Chinese could profit from the sale of the drug. He 
stated that as long as the foreign opium trade continued 
the Chinese would not listen to the foreigners who advo-
cated stopping the use of opium by eliminating the poppy 
fields from China. He thought the Chinese would see any 
anti-opium agitation on the part of the foreigners as sim-
ply a disguised attempt to regain the opium market for 
themselves.45 
While Park was compiling the materials for his pamphlet, 
the other work of the Anti-Opium League continued. The 
Rev. DuBose called for anti-opium meetings to be held 
throughout China in May 1898 and urged that Chinese of-
ficials and gentry who were interested in the movement be 
invited to attend. He noted that Ningpo had "a very effi-
cient native organization" that opposed opium.46 He also 
noted that both Christian and non-Christian Chinese would 
be interested in these meetings. The anti-opium crusade 
was one issue on which the missionaries in China were will-
ing to work with anyone regardless of their religious be-
liefs. With every mention of the league in the Chinese Re-
corder, contributions were requested. The November 1898 
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issue reported the league had funds totalling $296.30 (Mexi-
can). The annual meeting was set for 7 December 1898 at 
Shanghai, and local committees were again urged to send 
representatives.47 At the meeting the league's constitution 
officially incorporated the objectives that had been set forth 
when the league was proposed two years earlier.48 
Chinese became contributors to the Anti-Opium League, 
if not active participants. An 1899 financial report listed 
assets at $982, of which $583 had been collected from Chi-
nese. The treasurer stated, "The Chinese will give if we only 
ask them. "49 That same year the league started a bimonthly 
newspaper, Anti-Opium News, edited by the Rev. J.L. Hendry 
of the American Southern Methodist Mission in Shanghai. 
In early 1900, Dr. Park issued a tract, which the league pub-
lished, entitled, "Shall We All Smoke Opium?" It was dis-
tributed to all the missionaries in China. At the same time, 
the local committees were urged to "collect funds for the 
cause, distribute anti-opium literature, organize societies, 
and do all that is possible to create a local interest in this 
anti-opium crusade."50 
The Boxer Uprising, which had been taking form in 
north China in the late 1890s and which culminated in the 
siege of the legations at Peking in the summer of 1900, had 
a damaging effect on the anti-opium movement. Prior to 
June 1900, nearly every issue of the Chinese Recorder con-
tained news and reports of the Anti-Opium League, but in 
that month the news of the league ceased. The league's 
newspaper now appeared only sporadically. The major lead-
ers of the anti-opium campaign were not among those mis-
sionaries killed by the Boxers, but apparently the Boxers 
dimmed the fervor of the league. The league continued to 
exist and reemerged with the same leaders after the 1906 
Imperial Edict prohibiting the use of opium in China, but 
in the days immediately after the Boxer Uprising the league 
became dormant. 
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THE MISSIONARIES AND THEIR SUPPORTERS AT HOME 
Missionaries on leave in their home countries and mission-
ary boards of the various churches represented in China 
also served to publicize the opium problem. There were 
continual departures from China by missionaries going on 
leave, which usually lasted at least a year because of the travel 
time required for such journeys. Any missionary who de-
parted was urged to spread the word among the homefolk 
about the evils of opium, and the missionary was supplied 
with all the latest anti-opium literature to aid him. 
Missionary conferences, such as the interdenominational 
Centenary Conference of the Protestant Missions of the 
World held in London in 1888, took up the issue of the 
opium trade, the involvement of the British government in 
it, the question of the Indian government's opium revenues, 
and the effects of the trade on the Chinese as points of dis-
cussion. The Rev. J. Hudson Taylor, founder of the China 
Inland Mission, told the Conference, "I am profoundly con-
vinced that the opium traffic is doing more evil in China in 
a week than Missions are doing good in a year."51 At the 
meeting, representatives of the missions in India also ex-
pressed their beliefs that the opium trade was harming In-
dia as well as China, and they blamed the Indian govern-
ment for its policy of financing itself through opium rev-
enues.52 
The Rev. Taylor proposed a resolution calling for the con-
ference, which represented "most of the Protestant Mission-
ary Societies of the Christian world," to acknowledge "the 
incalculable evils, physical, moral, and social, which con-
tinue to be wrought in China through the opium trade-a 
trade which has strongly prejudiced the people of China 
against all Missionary effort." The resolution also deplored 
"the position occupied by Great Britain, through its Indian 
administration, in the manufacture of the drug, and in the 
promotion of a trade which is one huge ministry to vice." 
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The resolution called for the complete suppression of the 
opium trade and appealed "to Christians of Great Britain 
and Ireland to plead earnestly with God, and to give them-
selves no rest, until this great evil is entirely removed." Cop-
ies of the resolution were sent to the prime minister and 
the secretary of state for India.53 James L. Maxwell, M.D., 
secretary of the Medical Missionary Association of London, 
made a brief speech in support of the resolution, stating 
that Christians in Britain had become apathetic in recent 
years about the opium problem. He had been a missionary 
in China, but he wrote, "I confess I am sometimes amazed 
at myself, at the want of feeling concerning the terrible-
ness of this evil amongst the Chinese." While tens of thou-
sands of Chinese suffered from the drug, he said, "we sit 
quietly in England, and do not rouse ourselves to deal with 
it, and to protest against this great and grievous sin." He 
called for those at the meeting to work for the end of the 
opium trade. Following his speech, the resolution of the 
Rev. Taylor was unanimously adopted.54 
In addition to the interdenominational efforts to end the 
opium trade, many of the individual churches with mission-
aries in China took stands against the opium trade. The 
Presbyterian Church of England passed resolutions at synod 
meetings in 1858, 1880, 1881, 1887, 1891, and 1898 calling 
for the abolition of the opium trade. During that period, 
missionaries sought to disassociate themselves from their 
countrymen who were in China as merchants and sailors 
and from the policies of their government, which caused 
them difficulties with their diplomatic representatives in 
China.55 
Following the Boxer Uprising, the Society of Friends 
meeting in London said it did not condone the massacres 
in China but recognized that many Chinese were demoral-
ized and had an aversion to foreigners because of the opium 
trade, which the British government had fostered. The 
Friends wrote, "It is only too true that the opium vice has 
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impoverished the Chinese in mind, in character, in estate, 
and in development."56 Other British churches that ex-
pressed their opposition to the opium traffic included the 
Free Church of Scotland, the Wesleyan Conference, and the 
Methodist New Connexion. '11 
The 1891 Methodist Ecumenical Conference in Washing-
ton, D.C., devoted a session to a discussion of the opium 
traffic and extended, in a resolution to the Christians in 
Britain, "warmest sympathy and earnest prayers for their 
success in the removal of this national dishonor and the 
abolition of this appalling evil."58 
Missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church in China 
were generally not active in the anti-opium movement, and 
the Vatican was slow to condemn the opium trade and the 
use of the drug. Finally, in 1892 the Pope issued a decree 
absolutely forbidding Roman Catholics to engage in the use, 
manufacture, or trade of opium. "The use of opium as ex-
isting in China is held by the Church to be a detestable 
abuse, and therefore illicit," he wrote. The medical use of 
opium was still permitted for Roman Catholics.59 
A Shanghai clergyman, the Rev. Yen Yung-king, who had 
been educated in the United States and ordained by the 
American Protestant Episcopal Missionary Society, jour-
neyed to England on a speaking tour in 1894.60 Between 
February and September he visited 52 cities and addressed 
112 meetings, 49 of which were concerned with the opium 
problem. The Rev. Yen also testified before the Royal Com-
mission on Opium, which was meeting in London at the 
time of his visit. As one of the most prominent of the anti-
opium crusaders and the only ordained Chinese to speak 
on the subject in England, he was important in the anti-
opium movement. Many of the missionaries in China hoped 
Yen's impact on Britain would stir up new opposition to 
the opium trade. 
The Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade used 
a farewell meeting for Yen in September 1894 to express 
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the society's views on the opium trade. Yen's visit was ac-
knowledged as having done a "great service" to those op-
posing the opium trade. Yen noted that the Christian 
Church in China condemned opium because many Chinese 
condemned it and Chinese Christians "not only see the evils 
of the Opium traffic, but they feel that the Christian Church 
could not have a standard of morality and virtue lower than 
the heathen standard." Yen was an attraction to many who 
had attended the meetings he addressed. "Many people 
came to hear him from curiosity, yet he was sure that they 
went away with an interest in the Opium question." He 
noted that many of the people stayed to shake his hand, 
and he expressed gratitude that "those Christian friends 
should show so cordial an interest in a nation afar off, in a 
people of another race, another tongue, another religion, 
and that they should thus be expressing their opposition 
to a system of trade carried on by their own Govern-
ment."61 
Yen noted that at the more than one hundred meetings 
he had addressed, only one person had opposed a resolu-
tion against the opium traffic at the Lincoln and Manches-
ter meetings and three or four had opposed the resolution 
at Cambridge, but on the grounds that it was premature 
since the Royal Commission on Opium had not yet issued 
its report. The Rev. Yen criticized "newspaper writers [who] 
sit in their offices and say that Opium [is] a good thing, 
and also ... officials in India, with the telescope turned 
round the wrong way"; if they were Chinese and "saw their 
families wrecked and ruined by the use of Opium, they 
would 'sing another song.'" He said that "in China neither 
smokers nor non-smokers had a word of praise for the drug. 
Opium smokers were called Opium devils, and were por-
trayed in pictures which carried the idea of disgrace."62 Yen, 
"a forcible speaker against the opium traffic [whose] whole 
soul was stirred by the mischief which that pernicious drug 
was doing to his countrymen," died in 1898 while assisting 
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Dr. Park with the publication of the Anti-Opium League's 
pamphlet on the survey of physicians.63 
Among the English clergy active in the anti-opium move-
ment was the Rev. Arthur E. Moule, archdeacon of mid-
China.64 A missionary of long service and prominence in 
China, he published a book in 1892 in which he denounced 
England for having introduced opium to China and decried 
the presence of so many opium shops in the international 
city of Shanghai. On home leave just prior to the publica-
tion of his book, Moule told English audiences that the 
Chinese considered opium smoking a sin and hence smok-
ers were not admitted to church membership. He stressed 
that it was the Chinese who considered opium smoking a 
sin and that missionaries had not forced the idea upon them. 
Since comparisons of opium and alcohol were frequently 
made, Moule remarked that "the only true comparison is 
between the use of opium and the abuse of alcohol. . . . 
The opium smoker is not noisy like the drunkard, he does 
not kick his wife. But the difference is about this, that the 
one kicks his wife, the other sells her. "65 
Moule went on to say that in the future he would tell the 
Chinese that the members of the Society for the Suppres-
sion of the Opium Trade were Englishmen concerned with 
helping the Chinese end the use of opium in their country. 
A quarter of a century earlier Moule had written an essay 
on the opium trade, and some people had accused him of 
being unpatriotic because of his attacks on England and its 
role in the trade. Moule said he had opposed the opium 
trade since that time and would continue to do so. He noted 
that many people accused the missionaries of going home 
on leave to preach about opium, but he said he never 
preached on the subject and never brought up the ques-
tion of the opium trade in public unless someone questioned 
him about it. 66 
Moule also described to the Society persecutions of Chi-
nese Christians during the recent Boxer Uprising. "One of 
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the conditions on which a man would be let off and his life 
spared was this: Smoke a pipe of Opium. No Christian ever 
touches Opium." The persecutors, he stated, hated "Chris-
tians because of their connections with the foreigners, but 
they know that Christianity has a high moral creed, and 
these persecutors themselves know that to touch Opium is 
immoral, and no Christian would do an immoral act." That 
was one of the articles of recantation.67 
THE SOCIETY FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE OPIUM TRADE 
In Britain the anti-opium movement centered around the 
Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, founded 
in November 1874 by Edward Pease. After Pease's death in 
1880 his grandson, Sir Joseph Pease, an industrialist and 
Liberal M.P., was the chief financial supporter of the Soci-
ety.68 The earl of Shaftesbury served as head of the Society'S 
46-member General Council. The council included Tho-
mas Hughes, Liberal M.P. and author of Tom Brown's School-
days, and Donald Matheson, who for a time had worked in 
his family'S firm, Jardine, Matheson, and Company, which 
dealt in opium. After resigning from the firm, Matheson 
had become a leader in the anti-opium movement. 69 
Leaders of the Society tended to be Quakers or mem-
bers of other nonconformist churches. An exception was 
the Rev. Frederick Storrs-Turner, who had served the Lon-
don Missionary Society in China for many years. 70 Mem-
bers of other churches, including the Church of England, 
were involved with the Society, particularly through their 
missionaries in China. It should be noted that those opposed 
to the opium traffic were not limited to the clergy or even 
to the churches. John Morley, who became active in the end-
ing the British government's opium trade, was an agnos-
tic. 71 Nor were the anti-opium activists limited to one politi-
cal party, although they tended to be stronger when the Lib-
erals were in office. 
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The Society's newspaper, Friend of China, edited by the 
Reverend Storrs-Turner, was the primary organ in Britain 
for both Englishmen who opposed the opium trade and the 
missionaries in China who were so vocal about the harm 
the drug was doing to the Chinese. Begun as a monthly, the 
Friend of China was issued sporadically in the 1880s, 1890s, 
and early 1900s but usually appeared at least eight times a 
year. The publication contained articles on the growth of 
opium in India, the reliance of the Indian government on 
the revenue from the sale of the drug, statements by offi-
cials of the British and the Chinese governments condemn-
ing the use of opium, book reviews of the latest publica-
tions on opium, and reports on the progress of the Society's 
activities. The Friend of China was also a frequent forum for 
the latest missionary tracts condemning opium. 
The Society was active in the publication of tracts and 
books on the subject of opium. Many were reprints of ar-
ticles that had appeared in the Friend of China, but some 
were original works by leaders of the anti-opium movement. 
Among the Society's publications were Joshua Rowntree's 
The Imperial Drug Trade, Benjamin Broomhall's Truth About 
opium Smoking, and The Chinese opium Smoker, which con-
sisted of twelve illustrations showing the decline of a man 
once he had become an opium user. In January 1886 the 
Society issued a "Statement of Facts and Principles Upon 
Which the Action of the Society for the Suppression of the 
Opium Trade is Based." The statement reassessed the posi-
tion of the Society, which previously had sought to oppose 
the military and diplomatic pressure to which the British 
had subjected the Chinese in order to permit opium to en-
ter the country. Now the Society decided to concentrate its 
efforts on ending the production of opium in India since 
the drug was no longer forced upon the Chinese, as had pre-
viously been the case. The Society also sought to convince 
both the British and the Chinese governments of the "de-
MISSIONARIES ORGANIZE 57 
sirability of placing restrictions upon the consumption of 
opium."72 
Sir Joseph Pease, M.P., as president of the Society, brought 
up the subject of opium in the House of Commons on 10 
April 189I.73 Citing evidence from statesmen, physicians, and 
missionaries on the effects of opium, he mentioned peti-
tions from various anti-opium groups and asked that the 
government "no longer continue promoting the kingdom 
of the devil by sanctioning this detestable traffic. "74 The 
motion, which declared the opium trade "morally indefen-
sible," was supported by 160 members of Parliament and 
opposed by 130. Some of those supporting the motion, in-
cluding Sir Edward Grey and John Morley, were later to 
become prominent in the ending of the opium trade in the 
early twentieth century. As part of the debate, Sir James 
Fergusson, speaking for the government, said, "If the Chi-
nese Government thought proper to raise the duty to a pro-
hibitive extent, and shut out the drug altogether, this coun-
try would not expend a pound in powder or shot, or lose 
the life of a soldier, in an attempt to force opium upon the 
Chinese. "75 
Even though the motion did not become a resolution of 
Commons because of an amendment calling for the com-
pensation of the Indian government for any financial losses 
attributed to the suppression of the trade, the 'thirty-vote 
majority greatly encouraged the anti-opium societies and 
revived interest in the opium question in Britain at a time 
when the missionaries in China were also urging the issue 
be kept continually before the public. Part of the response 
to the success of Pease's motion was the increasing involve-
ment of the British clergy in the anti-opium activities. In 
1892 the Rev. H.H.T. Cleife of Somerset published a book, 
England's Greatest National Sin: Being Selections and Reflec-
tions on our Asiatic Opium Policy and Tmffic, in which he listed 
the reasons why the trade had gained that reputation. 
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Among the reasons given were that Indian subjects were 
allowed to indulge in a vice unlawful in England, opium 
was sold in Burma against the wishes and religion of the 
people, opium was sold in China where the British pro-
hibited any local taxation, making it impossible for the 
provinces to protect themselves from the drug by excessive 
duties, and opium hindered the work of the Christian mis-
sions.76 
In 1894 Joseph Alexander, honorary secretary of the So-
ciety for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, journeyed 
to China after giving evidence before the Royal Commis-
sion on Opium in India. He wanted to obtain firsthand in-
formation on the opium problem and to convey to the mis-
sionaries in China the support of the Society. He also sought 
to learn from Chinese officials whether their hostile atti-
tudes on opium had changed and if and how they would 
work to rid their country of the drug. In April he met with 
Tsai Sih-ying, Taotai of Wuchang, who served as an assis-
tant to Chang Chih-tung on foreign affairs. Tsai was hos-
tile to the opium traffic but thought Alexander's motive was 
to gain some advantage for the government of India. When 
he realized the Society was sincere in its desire to end the 
opium trade, he "became extremely sympathetic. "77 Follow-
ing the interview, Alexander received a letter stating Chang 
shared the views of the Society that the restriction or aboli-
tion of the opium trade would benefit the Chinese. Chang 
indicated he could not then state what actions China might 
take along these lines, but that he was in favor of the Society's 
aims.78 
Chang denounced opium in his work, Learn, published 
in 1898, by noting that China's imports exceeded its exports 
by TIs. 30,000,000, which was the amount spent on opium. 
He said that opium had spread throughout all the prov-
inces and was worse than the plagues of the past, since they 
had lasted only a short time. Opium was far worse since it 
sapped the strength of the user and made him incapable 
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of doing a day's work. He said it was up to officials to set 
the example for the people by refusing to tolerate opium 
smoking in their districts. 79 
Alexander went to Peking, where he had a meeting at 
the Tsungli Yamen with Chang Yin-hwan, president of the 
Board of Revenue and former minister to the United States. 
Through his interpreter, a missionary of forty years' ser-
vice in China, Alexander proposed that "the opium trade 
and the growth of the poppy in China should be brought to 
an end by concurrent action in India and China, gradually 
reducing the area of poppy growth over a period of ten 
years." Chang told Alexander he had met the governor-gen-
eral of India, "who appeared 'embarrassed' in speaking of 
the Opium trade." Alexander informed Chang that it had 
been said in the British Parliament that China was free to 
stop the import of Indian opium if it desired. Chang re-
plied, "We did stop it once, and it caused a war." He indi-
cated that he thought stopping the trade would be a viola-
tion of the treaty with Britain.80 
Alexander next met with Li Hung-chang at Tientsin. Li 
was "as emphatic with regard to China's hostility to opium 
as the two other Ministers" and urged that the stoppage of 
the Indian trade be the objective of the Society. Li noted 
that opium was "in the Treaty tariff" so China was "bound 
to receive it." Li continued that China would not take any 
action to stop the domestic growth of opium until the Brit-
ish stopped the trade, but he assured Alexander that when 
the importation stopped the Chinese would no longer per-
mit the poppy to be grown in China. Li promised to write 
to Alexander on the subject, but the letter apparently was 
not forthcoming, probably because the outbreak of hostili-
ties in Korea would have occupied Li's time.81 
Li had, however, written to the Society for the Suppres-
sion of the Opium Trade in 1881 expressing his views on 
the opium trade. Although the other two officials had not 
mentioned to Alexander what steps China would take to 
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end domestic production, Li had given "the most explicit 
assurance that if England ceased sending poison to China, 
the Chinese government would certainly take measures to 
prevent its people from providing poison for themselves." 
Alexander noted that the Chinese officials did not endorse 
his plan for the gradual suppression of the drug in China, 
but they did ask for the stoppage of the Indian trade. He 
hoped that public opinion in Britain would support an end 
to the trade since both British political parties "have com-
mitted themselves publicly to the position that China has 
only to ask for the suppression of the trade, and it will at 
once be accorded." Alexander went on to say, "Our depen-
dence will, I trust, never be placed on popular sentiment 
or on official declarations, but on Him who works in His 
own way to bring about His purposes of love towards the 
nations of the earth. "82 
In addition to meeting with government leaders, 
Alexander met with missionaries and Chinese Christians 
during visits to Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghai, Hankow, 
Tientsin, Peking, and Tungchow. He also met with mission-
aries from Amoy, Kiukiang, and Nanking. He consulted 
with the Opium Committee of the Hankow Missionary Con-
ference on the wording of the memorial he presented to 
the Tsungli Yamen when he visited Peking. This commit-
tee had earlier prepared a memorial to the Royal Commis-
sion on Opium expressing the views of seventeen British 
missionaries who had been in China twenty-five years or 
more. The Rev. Griffith John headed the committee.83 
Reporting to the Society at home on his trip, Alexander 
noted that while the Chinese officials to whom he had talked 
were in favor of stopping the importation of foreign opium, 
not one of them had mentioned the loss of revenue China 
would suffer if an end to the trade occurred. However, 
Alexander noted that in 1871 Sir Rutherford Alcock and in 
1881 Sir Robert Hart expressed the opinions that the Chi-
nese government would forgo its revenues if the opium trade 
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could be brought to an end. Alexander also expressed the 
view that it was up to the British to take the first step in 
ending the trade since the Chinese had previously tried to 
stop it in 1839, which provoked the Opium War, and again 
in 1869, when they peacefully urged Alcock to end the 
trade.84 
As a result of his trip, Alexander reiterated the view that 
the Chinese were nearly unanimous in their condemnation 
of the opium habit. Alexander noted, "This cannot be the 
result of any bias due to their religion; the Confucian clas-
sics know nothing of Opium, and the modified form of 
Buddhism that has been incorporated in the religious be-
liefs of the Chinese includes no such prohibition of stimu-
lants as is considered binding by the Buddhists of Burma. 
The Chinese objection to Opium is solely derived from ob-
servation .... It is based on moral, not on religious sanc-
tions."85 
After the publication of the report of the Royal Com-
mission on Opium, the Society found it necessary to re-
double its efforts. In October 1897, the Friend of China pub-
lished a letter that was then being sent to all missionaries 
arriving home on furlough urging them to continue to speak 
out on the evils of opium. The letter stated that the major-
ity report of the Royal Commission had "thrown doubt upon 
our two main positions: That the consumption of opium is 
exerting a distinctly deteriorating effect upon the Chinese 
people, physically, socially, and morally" and "that the past 
history and present enormous extent of the Opium Trade 
with India produces ... suspicion and dislike in the minds 
of the Chinese people towards foreigners and is thus a seri-
ous hindrance to their reception of the Gospel." The letter 
asked for the help of the missionaries since "a sentence or 
two spoken by a Missionary, in the course of an Address on 
the work in which he is engaged, will be heard by many 
whom it is impossible to reach by any direct effort on the 
part of those engaged in the Anti-Opium Agitation."86 
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The Boxer Uprising caused the Society to pause in its 
work, and the 1900 annual meeting held on 6 April was more 
subdued than usual. Yet the members noted that the cause 
of the Society was still just and they needed to work for the 
fulfillment of their aims.87 Dr. Park wrote to the Society 
from Soochow on 19 July that many Chinese in that area 
were joyous over the success of the Boxers in Peking. He 
quoted Chinese as saying, "They brought opium to our 
country; let us drive it out at the same time we get rid of 
the foreigners. "88 
So close was the association of the foreigners with opium 
that one missionary in China attributed to opium at least 
part of the blame for the Boxer Uprising. He wrote, "the 
Chinese trace their national decay and attribute their na-
tional disasters to the use of opium; and ... the introduc-
tion of the habit is indissolubly associated with their inter-
course with foreign nations, and especially Britain. These 
sentiments are common to all classes."89 Sir John Kennaway, 
M.P., president of the Church Missionary Society and mem-
ber of the General Council of the Society for the Suppres-
sion of the Opium Trade, also listed opium as one of the 
causes for the Boxer outbreak, although the editors of the 
Friend of China thought he was not strong enough in his point 
that the British had forced opium on China at the point of 
a gun. The opium trade was also given as a cause of the 
Boxer Uprising when the negotiations of the Boxer settle-
ment began. At the negotiations in Paris, Alexander was 
anxious to have opium recognized as a cause to les~en the 
blame that others wanted to rest solely with the missionar-
ies.90 
Within the British government there was little support 
for the ending of the opium trade, and no action was taken 
after 1891. Too many Englishmen simply believed that the 
Chinese were not sincere in desiring to end the use of 
opium. Too often the English simply saw the desire to end 
the opium trade as the wish of the Chinese to monopolize 
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the opium business for themselves, since domestic produc-
tion of opium was on the increase and was beginning to 
replace the more expensive Indian product. In contrast to 
this belief was that of the Society, which saw as sincere the 
efforts of the Chinese to abolish opium use within China. 
General elections were held in Britain in 1900 and many 
supporters of the Society in both parties were reelected, 
including Sir Joseph Pease. After the election and the settle-
ment of the Boxer problems in China, Joshua Rowntree, 
chairman of the Representative Board of the Anti-Opium 
Organizations, sent a note to members of Parliament out-
lining the board's current view on the opium question. 
Among the points made were that the trade had been de-
clared "morally indefensible" by a vote in Commons in 1891 
yet it still continued, that the Chinese had long recognized 
the harm of the trade and sought to prohibit the importa-
tion of opium, that the British government in India contin-
ued the trade despite the harm it brought to the Chinese 
people, and that England was injured, morally, commer-
cially, and politically by the trade. The note was signed by 
the archbishop of Canterbury; several Anglican bishops; the 
heads of the Wesleyan Conference; the United Methodist 
Free Church; the Evangelical Free churches; the president 
of the YMCA; and many others.91 
In April 1902 Frederick Temple, the archbishop of Can-
terbury, forwarded to Lord Salisbury, the prime minister, 
another memorial from the Anti-Opium Societies in Brit-
ain, which was signed by the leaders of the Church of En-
gland, the Church of Ireland, the Church of Scotland, the 
Congregational, Baptist, Presbyterian, and Methodist 
Churches, and the Society of Friends, which stated they were 
convinced "by manifold and weighty evidence" of the cor-
rectness of their view that the opium trade hurt other as-
pects of British commerce in China, that it fostered "pro-
found feelings of hostility to British Subjects and Interests 
in the mind of the Chinese people," that opium use in China 
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was "a vast national curse," and that "it is unworthy of a 
great Christian power to be commercially interested, in any 
degree, in the supply of Opium in China." Accordingly, they 
took the position that it was "the grave duty of the nation 
... to purge itself anywise of connection with a great and 
public wrong. "92 
Because of the religious inclinations of many of the lead-
ers of the anti-opium movement, many of the meetings of 
the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade were 
religious in tone, and much time was spent in prayer and 
discussion of the biblical condemnations of evil. 93 The 1892 
annual meeting of the Society was preceded by a prayer 
meeting at the Friends' Meetinghouse in Westminster. The 
Reverend Broomhall, secretary of the China Inland Mis-
'sion, presided at the first hour, which was devoted to prayer 
on the subject, "The Opium Trade: A Hindrance to Mis-
sionary Effort." He "pointed out that the traffic not only 
creates prejudice against the Gospel amongst the Chinese, 
but the vice which it feeds incapacitates them from receiv-
ing its blessed message." During the second hour the sub-
ject for prayer was "The Opium Trade a National Sin."94 
The letter sent to missionaries visiting home on furlough 
issued by the Society in 1897 began with "'A True Witness 
delivereth Souls' Provo XlV. 25" and the title page of every 
issue of the Friend of China contained the words "Righteous-
ness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people."95 
Because of the prevalence of clergymen in the anti-opium 
movement and their penchant for quoting Scripture to sup-
port their position and because the most damning evidence 
on the havoc opium wrought on the Chinese population 
came from missionaries, some laymen in Great Britain, in-
cluding members of Parliament, were inclined to dismiss 
the anti-opium movement as so much hellfire and brim-
stone. 
The evidence the China missionaries gave on opium ad-
dicts was accurate and the Society did its best to convey the 
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information to the public in Britain, yet the message was 
not believable to the average Briton. In the late nineteenth 
century some medical doctors were still arguing that opium 
was a mild narcotic, useful in the treatment of many dis-
eases and certainly not the pernicious drug the missionar-
ies claimed it was. If the medical doctors were ignorant of 
the true nature of the drug, then the laymen, who had never 
seen an opium addict, could not be faulted for not believ-
ing that opium was responsible for the destruction of so 
many Chinese lives. Indeed, even the missionary doctors in 
China reported skeptically that the Chinese said babies born 
to addicts needed to breathe opium smoke to eat and sleep 
peacefully. So little was known of drug addiction that none 
of them recognized that the babies had become addicts prior 
to birth, even though most of the doctors knew that the 
addict's entire physiology was affected by the drug. 
The confusion of the layman was further complicated 
by the comparison of opium addiction to alcoholism. The 
chronic alcoholic was familiar in Britain, and drink was de-
nounced from many pulpits, but the missionaries, them-
selves abstainers, insisted that opium addiction was far worse 
than the most advanced stages of alcoholism. To those who 
had not seen China's opium addicts with their own eyes, 
the evils of the drug were simply unbelievable. In the end, 
the missionaries and clergymen in the Society and other 
anti-opium groups served as the publicists who kept the 
opium question before the British public for more than a 
quarter of a century, and refused to allow the government 
to forget that it engaged in a trade Parliament had termed 
"morally indefensible." 
The growing medical knowledge about opium and its 
derivatives was largely the work of the medical missionaries 
in China. If the missionaries were unable to influence the 
Chinese government to suppress opium, it certainly was not 
because they did not try. The commitment and fervor of 
the missionaries were intense, but they alone could not stop 
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the opium trade or opium use. Opium suppression became 
a reality only when public opinion in Britain and China 
favored it. 
CHINESE OPPONENTS OF THE TRADE 
Many Chinese were opposed to the use of opium, and 
prominent among them were the converts to Christianity. 
A group of Chinese Christians in Canton in 1890 addressed 
a letter to Christians in Britain: "Now when your govern-
ment plants and sells opium to minister to the evil propen-
sity of the Chinese, you are partakers with them, and what 
can you say in excuse thereof?"96 In Manchuria in 1893, the 
native clergy of the Presbytery of the United Presbyterian 
and Irish Presbyterian Missions expressed their belief that 
opium smoking was a sin and therefore "cannot be toler-
ated in the Church. No opium-smoker can be admitted until 
he has given up the evil habit. Not only so, but no dealer in 
opium, no one who cultivates the poppy, no one who sells 
the drug in any shape or form, even in the most sugared of 
all forms, as pills for the cure of the evil habit, is to be tol-
erated." Any inquirers who were opium-smokers were re-
quired to seek help from a foreign doctor to free themselves 
of the addiction, and they could be given a special dispen-
sation to be baptized only "if the doctor certifies that to aban-
don the habit threatens to forfeit life." A missionary who 
was present when these rules were adopted commented, 
"Drastic enough, all this, but they know better than we do. "97 
Likewise, the Friends' Church (Kung I Hui), which was mod-
eled after the English Society of Friends, had requirements 
for membership that stated, "Opium smoking is among the 
sins which would form a bar, unless entirely given up on 
reception as a member. "98 
There were some Chinese anti-opium societies active in 
the movement to end the importation of the drug to China 
and its use by the Chinese. Many of these societies had been 
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organized with the help of local missionaries or Chinese 
Christians. Yet some, like the Ch'uan-chieh She, were not 
Christian-oriented. Some of these organizations, such as the 
Tsai-li Society in Chihli, which claimed thousands of follow-
ers, asked their members to take a pledge not to gamble or 
use tobacco, alcohol, or opium. Missionaries, such as John 
Dudgeon, M.D., of the London Missionary Society, who 
worked to organize such societies, sought to have the Chi-
nese government recognize the importance of these groups 
to ending the vice in China. At least one of the Chinese 
anti-opium societies, the Peking Anti-Opium Society (Chieh 
ta-yen hui), communicated with the Society for the Suppres-
sion of the Opium Trade. A note published in the Friend of 
China in March 1891 and· signed by a committee of four 
Chinese recounted the evils opium wrought on China and 
said, "Myriads on myriads perish by it." They also quoted 
the Bible and asked why the British continued to engage in 
the opium trade, which brought such harm to China.99 
The Chinese opposition to opium often appeared in un-
expected forms. Arnold Foster reported that the Hong Kong 
government once gave examinations for a clerkship paying 
only forty dollars a month. The examiner chose the sub-
ject, "The Effects of Opium Smoking," for the English es-
say. Although the government with which the candidates 
were seeking employment collected revenue from the opium 
trade, "everyone of these young men spoke in terms of un-
measured disapproval of the habit and of its effects upon 
the smoker."lOo 
THE ECONOMIC QUESTION 
The question of revenue was important to all concerned 
with the opium trade. It was one thing to say the trade was 
evil and immoral and caused tremendous harm to the Chi-
nese, but it was quite another to call for the end of a trade 
that brought so much revenue to the governments involved. 
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The government of India derived huge sums from the sale 
of the drug, which was grown on government lands. Indeed, 
the British colonial governments in other parts of Asia also 
gained funds from the monopolization of the opium trade. 
The Chinese government gained revenues from the im-
portation of the Indian drug, although it did not tax native 
opium, since it was illegal to grow opium in China. The 
tariffs on imported opium had been set by the treaties of 
1858-60 and revised under the Chefoo Agreement of 1876, 
which allowed for the collection of the likin at the point of 
entry to China, but imports declined after 1880 as the na-
tive drug began to supplant the imported drug. Yet the 
amount of opium imported caused the Chinese serious con-
cern. In Canton, imported opium sold for five to six hun-
dred dollars per picul in 1889 and 23,000 piculs were im-
ported, for which the Chinese paid $12 million. That sum 
was one-seventh the amount of the industrial production 
of export goods in the province. Those who were alarmed 
at the amount spent on opium urged that anti-opium pro-
paganda be used as a means of curtailing the expenditure. 10l 
In 1890 Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Hupeh together 
spent TIs. 5,300,000 on opium, of which the Chinese gov-
ernment got one-third and the rest went to India. 102 
Opium was important in ways other than taxation. At least 
one official of the Customs service noted that the drug was 
being used as a means of exchange. In 1887 an official of 
the Hankow Customs House reported that in both Szechwan 
and Yunnan, where cash and silver were scarce, opium was 
carried in place of money and used in barter. Travelers car-
ried their funds in opium, as did students on their jour-
neys to Peking, selling along the way whatever they needed 
to meet their expenses. 103 
Some British industrialists were worried that opium hin-
dered their ability to sell other goods in China. In 1898 the 
Chamber of Commerce of Blackburn, Lancashire, sent a 
commercial mission to China under the leadership of F.S.A. 
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Bourne of Her Majesty's Consular Service in China. The 
purpose of the mission was to explore possible markets for 
British goods. Bourne reported that opium was the means 
by which Yunnan paid for the salt, cotton, tobacco, and for-
eign goods received from Szechwan and Hong Kong. He 
noted that the people of Yunnan preferred imported cot-
tons from Lancashire, but their addiction to opium made 
it difficult for them to obtain the funds necessary to buy 
the cloth. The Friend of China editorialized that the "hope 
for British commerce is the reclamation of the people from 
the Opium vice. "104 
THE MORAL ISSUE 
In the late nineteenth century both Chinese and foreigners 
were opposed to the opium trade and the use of opium on 
moral grounds. The Christians in Britain had been lectured 
on the immorality of the trade by Chinese, like Li Hung-
chang, whom they considered heathen. In time many of the 
missionaries realized that one's religion had little to do with 
one's opposition to opium and even non-Christians could 
be useful in helping the campaign to stop the use of the 
drug in China. Although the primary purpose of the mis-
sionaries was to convert the Chinese to Christianity, their 
desire to rid China of opium, first brought by their own 
countrymen, led them to engage in activities that had little 
direct connection to the winning of converts. Indeed, the 
missionaries, as well as Chinese Christians, recognized that 
completely reformed opium addicts were rare, and since 
most were untrustworthy, few were ever accepted into the 
church. 
The missionaries devoted much ink and energy to the 
task of convincing the people of Britain that the opium trade 
of the government was sinful and hence ought to be 
stopped. Partly because their denunciations of the opium 
trade sounded like sermons complete with Scriptures to 
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prove the evil nature of the trade and partly because the 
missionaries and the groups that supported their cause 
lacked access to the decision-making centers of the govern-
ment, for many years the missionaries' message fell on deaf 
ears. Yet, the missionaries served as a conscience, particu-
larly of the British government, constantly reminding its 
leaders that the opium trade was un-Christian, to say the 
least. 
Medical doctors in China, most of whom were mission-
aries, were opposed to opium to the extent that some even 
refused to use any form of the drug in their practices. Medi-
cal science had not progressed to the point that addiction 
was fully understood, but the doctors in China had seen 
enough firsthand evidence of the drug's effects to convince 
them that there was no such thing as a moderate opium 
smoker or an addict who did not suffer physiological dam-
age from the drug. 
Many Chinese recognized the harm opium brought to 
their country, and they opposed the use of opium in in-
creasing numbers as the century neared its close. Anti-
opium societies, most with missionary connections, were 
founded. Chinese officials, such as Chang Chih-tung and 
Li Hung-chang, opposed opium use, but they were unable 
to offer concrete plans for ending the use of the drug in 
China. In the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty, when many 
more Chinese came to realize the harm opium wrought, 
the movement to suppress the drug gained momentum. 
In Britain, the Society for the Suppression of the Opium 
Trade was active for more than a quarter of a century in 
trying to get the British government to stop the opium trade 
from which the government of India obtained much rev-
enue. Like the missionaries in China, the Society could not 
stop the use of the drug nor the opium trade, but they re-
fused to allow any government to forget the issue. 
In the late nineteenth century opposition to the use of 
opium was growing among diverse elements in both Brit-
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ain and China. The medical profession, greatly aided by 
the China missionaries, was increasingly aware of the dan-
gers of the use of opium in any form. The British govern-
ment was increasingly plagued by the moral issue of the 
opium trade, which the missionaries were ever ready to point 
out. In China, many educated people were coming to view 
opium smoking as a curse, and they sought to end opium 
growth and consumption. Shortly after the turn of the cen-
tury, all factors were right in both countries so that definite 
and determined steps could be taken to stop the use of the 
drug, which by then had few advocating its benefits, aside 
from those who earned their fortunes from its trade. 
- THREE-
The Pro-Opium Forces 
and Government Investigations 
Denunciations of the opium trade did not deter it, as it con-
tinued throughout the nineteenth century and into the twen-
tieth, in large part because many firms were involved in the 
business of dealing in opium and the government of India 
depended on the trade for some of its revenues and nei-
ther was willing to forgo the profits of the trade. There was 
also a demand for opium because of the number of Chi-
nese who were addicted to it and, indeed, this demand was 
one of the arguments the pro-opium forces used to defend 
their position. The pro-opium forces argued if they did not 
sell opium to the Chinese, someone else would, and since 
they had long engaged in the business, it was logical they 
should continue to supply the Chinese market. 
During these years, questions concerning the use of 
opium and the trade in the drug were investigated by both 
the British government and the United States government 
of the Philippines. Both appointed official commissions to 
study the problem, but there any similarity between the two 
investigations ends. The two commissions did their work 
ten years apart, the British in 1893-95 and the Americans 
in 1903-5, but their methods, purposes, and conclusions were 
separated by more than a decade. Appointed to appease 
the anti-opium party in Britain, the Royal Commission from 
the beginning was constituted and conducted itself in such 
a manner that its conclusions would support the pro-opium 
trade policies of the government. On the other side, the 
Philippine Commission was appointed to determine what 
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the policy of the United States government toward the use 
of opium in the Philippines should be. Composed of only 
three people plus a secretary, it contrasted sharply to the 
larger Royal Commission with its nine members and nu-
merous secretaries and assistants. The Americans traveled 
to all the places they wished to study so that they could 
gather firsthand evidence on which to base their conclu-
sions. The British confined their investigations to London 
and India and never saw fit to visit China, which was the 
scene of the greatest amount of opium consumption. 
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S REVENUES 
The question of revenue for the Indian government was a 
very important one, since part of its official income came 
from the production of opium on government lands and 
the taxes it collected from the sale and transportation of 
opium. At one time, approximately 16 percent of India's 
revenues were from opium. 1 Statistics on the actual amount 
of revenue the Indian government gained from opium were 
a matter of much dispute, owing partly to the problem of 
converting rupees into pounds sterling. The Indian gov-
ernment collected the largest sum from opium in the year 
1880-81, when the amount was 8,451,382 tens of rupees. Of 
this figure, 5,926,924 tens of rupees were from the Bengal 
opium revenue and 2,524,458 tens of rupees were from the 
transit duty on opium. By 1892-93 the amount had declined 
to an estimated 5,399,800 tens of rupees, of which 3,571,000 
tens of rupees were from Bengal and 1,747,000 tens of ru-
pees from the transit taxes. Almost the whole of the Indian 
production of opium was exported to China and the Straits 
Settlement. The China trade reached its peak in 1879-80, 
when 94,835 chests were exported, and the Straits Settle-
ment trade reached its peak in 1890-91, when 20,328 chests 
were exported. The average cost of a chest was 427 tens of 
rupees. Domestic consumption in India was listed at 6,320 
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chests in 1889-90,2 while another account set the amount 
for that year at 4,949 chests, only seven of which were used 
for medicinal purposes.3 The Chinese Recorder cited, in an 
1893 editorial, the figure of £13 million as the estimated 
annual value of the opium crop in India. 4 One unexpected 
aspect of opium suppression in China in the early 1900s 
was to send the demand for Indian opium skyrocketing. The 
result was that instead of declining, the revenues of the In-
dian government increased by about 25 percent during that 
period.5 
Those who said the Indian government would stand to 
lose too much of its income from the stoppage of the opium 
traffic failed to consider that the lands used for the produc-
tion of opium could quickly be converted to produce other 
crops that the government might tax to make up the lost 
revenue. If the government needed to compensate for the 
lost revenues, the editors of the Chinese Recorder suggested, 
they might tax luxury imports and curtail expensive public 
works, huge civil bureaucracies, and the "needlessly elabo-
rate military occupation." They also suggested that the pay 
of European officials in India was exorbitant and that it was 
improper for the British government to tax Hindus to sup-
port the Church of England when, officially, the govern-
ment of India had no religion.6 The extravagances of the 
Indian government were also sharply criticized by Robert 
Brown, who pointed out that the salaries of the India Of-
fice personnel in London surpassed the total income the 
government gained from opium.7 
THE PRO-OPIUM ADVOCATES 
Pro-opium advocates vigorously supported the official 
opium trade of the British government of India, and their 
arguments were aimed at discrediting the views of the anti-
opium forces, as well as demonstrating that opium was a 
harmless drug that the Indian government needed to mo-
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nopolize in order to gain revenues it needed to function. 
While anti-opium advocates were largely clergymen, mis-
sionaries, and missionary doctors, the pro-opium forces in-
cluded opium merchants, employees of the British colonial 
governments, and military men, particularly doctors. 
Of the British firms trading in China, most were involved 
in the opium business. Jardine, Matheson and Company 
had engaged in the trade since the early years of the nine-
teenth century, when the founders of the company sold 
opium illegally along the China coast. Others, such as Dent 
and Company, were also active in the opium trade. A few 
European firms imported opium directly from India to 
China, but it was much more common for the opium trade 
from India to be in the hands of Indian firms, many of 
them controlled by Parsees. The most prominent of the 
firms trading in opium were those of the Sassoon family, 
who were thought to be Sephardic Jews. 8 The Sassoons' com-
panies handled a variety of goods, but huge, quick profits 
attracted them to opium from time to time, particularly if 
they were in need of ready cash, and the family made the 
greater part of their fortune in opium. 
A few of the Western business houses disliked trading in 
opium, especially as the moral issues came more and more 
to dominate the arguments for stopping the trade. Some 
firms, such as the Rathbones and the Holts, preferred not 
to engage in the opium trade but found that it was extremely 
difficult to free themselves of it completely. Even if they 
did not directly engage in the trade, from time to time they 
found it necessary to store their goods in warehouses that 
were also holding opium, or they had to rely on the opium-
trading firms for business transactions. Eventually, the 
Rathbones abandoned their trading house in Canton be-
cause they found it impossible to disassociate themselves 
completely from the opium trade. 9 In the period prior to 
the Opium War, one American firm, Olyphant and Com-
pany of New York, run by D.W.C. Olyphant and his nephew, 
76 CRUSADERS AGAINST OPIUM 
Charles W. King, had refused to engage in the opium busi-
ness as they considered the trade evil. 10 All Americans were 
finally prohibited from engaging in the opium trade in 
China in 1880, with the conclusion of a new Sino-Ameri-
can commercial treaty. 
The pro-opium forces in Britain were quite vocal and 
often used public debates to express their views on the ques-
tion. One such meeting was held at the Royal Society of the 
Arts in 1892. The pro-opium forces dominated the meet-
ing, which centered around a paper presented by G.H.M. 
Batten, formerly of the Bengal Civil Service. The paper and 
responses to it were later published in the Journal of the 
Society. Batten and other speakers defended the position 
of the Indian government vis-a-vis opium and sharply at-
tacked the China missionaries and others who sought to 
abolish the trade. 
Batten told the meeting "the indulgers in the drug have 
been led to the habit by painful diseases, from which they 
have sought and found relief in opium, and that these dis-
eases-not due but antecedent to the resort to the drug-
largely account for the wretched appearance and condition 
of the patients." He quoted a well-known pro-opium leader, 
William H. Brereton, as saying "that opium smoking as prac-
ticed by the Chinese is perfectly innocuous, and that this is 
a fact so patent that it forces itself upon the attention of 
every intelligent resident in China who has given ordinary 
attention to the subject." Concerning the China missionar-
ies, Batten argued, "They are filled with a burning zeal to 
better the physical and spiritual condition of the poor mis-
erable Chinese with whom they are brought into contact." 
When the missionaries were met by Chinese "with the ar-
gument that opium is an evil thing, and that the English 
who import it into China are out of Court when advocat-
ing morality, they fall into the trap, and jump to the con-
clusion that it is the opium trade which prevents their 
making faster progress in the evangelization of China." He 
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concluded that the missionaries and the Society for the Sup-
pression of the Opium Trade might convince the British 
government to end the trade and suppress the cultivation 
of the poppy and smuggling in India, but "you will never 
persuade the Chinese to follow in your footsteps, and aban-
don the ever-increasing culture of the poppy .... You will 
fail in any way to benefit China, unless you count it a ben-
efit greatly to extend the cultivation of the poppy, and the 
manufacture of opium within her borders."l1 
The pro-opium advocates were fond of citing the case of 
the one China missionary who was among those opposing 
the request that Britain end the opium trade. In the early 
1880s the Rev. F. Galpin of the English Methodist Free 
Church at Ningpo refused to sign a petition to the House 
of Commons asking for an end to the opium trade, saying 
he did not believe the "Chinese people or Government are 
really anxious to remove the abuse of opium. The remedy 
has always been, as it is now, in their own hands. Neither do 
I believe that if the importation of Indian opium ceased at 
once, the Chinese Government would set about destroying 
a very fruitful means of revenue. On the contrary, I feel 
sure that the growth of Chinese opium would be increased 
forthwith."12 
Joseph G. Alexander was present at the meeting and, in 
a response following the presentation of Batten's paper, said 
the opposition of the Reverend Galpin was the only case of 
a missionary in China supporting the continuance of the 
opium trade. The rest of the missionaries were agreed that 
opium was an "unmitigated curse to the Chinese." 
Alexander was challenged by the pro-opium advocates to 
explain why only the Protestant missionaries were active in 
the anti-opium movement. His reply was that Henry Ed-
ward Cardinal Manning had said that Roman Catholic mis-
sionaries gave the same evidence as to the effects of opium 
smoking as did the Protestants. 13 
The opinions of several medical men were offered at the 
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meeting. One was quoted as having written, "I do not wish 
to defend the practice of opium smoking, but in the face of 
rash opinions and exaggerated statements ... it is only right 
to record that no China resident believes in the terrible fre-
quency of the dull, sodden-witted, debilitated opium smoker 
met with in print." He also stated that he had not found 
"many Europeans who believe that they ever get the better 
of their opium smoking compradores in the matter of busi-
ness." Another medical doctor, who had been a first assis-
tant opium examiner for the Indian government and who 
had spent three years in China, said, "The effects of the 
abuse of the drug do not come very frequently under ob-
servation" and that those that did occur were the result of 
taking the drug to cure an illness. "As regards the effects of 
the habitual use of the drug on the mass of the people, I 
must affirm that no injurious results are visible," he wrote. 
He concluded that opium use was no more pernicious than 
alcohol. 14 
Batten derided the idea, proposed by the Society for the 
Suppression of the Opium Trade, that domestic cultivation 
of the poppy in China be curtailed as the importation de-
creased. He noted that the Chinese government had had 
opium prohibition edicts for centuries and was unwilling 
or unable to enforce them. He could not imagine ~he Chi-
nese government forgoing the customs revenues, which he 
set at £2 million a year and thought that any request to the 
Chinese that they curtail domestic production of opium 
would be met by laughter. 15 
Among those responding to Batten's paper was Sir Tho-
mas Wade, who had spent some forty years in China and 
was appointed British minister to China in 1871. Wade said 
his information had been obtained in interviews with Chi-
nese officials in the 1880s. The officials admitted the im-
possibility of abolishing opium smoking entirely but said if 
it could be accomplished, the Chinese government was will-
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ing to forgo its revenues from the trade. Wade acknowledged 
that any serious attempt to suppress the opium trade had 
to originate with the smokers. As long as addicts continued 
to smoke and wanted to smoke, the prohibition of the opium 
trade would be very difficult. He also said he believed opium 
reform would not come until the British sent to China men 
of education to convince the Chinese literati to end the use 
of opium. 16 
One of the outstanding pro-opium advocates, Sir Lepel 
Griffin, addressed the meeting, saying, "It was an astonish-
ingly sad thing to see, in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, a Society possessed of such mischievous, homicidal 
characteristics as the Anti-Opium Society. If their convic-
tions were to prevail, they would rank as destroyers of the 
human race with cholera and famine, because a very large 
part of the population of India ... was only preserved from 
death by the habitual use of opium." He ended by saying 
everyone of authority at the meeting knew that what he said 
was true. 17 
The meeting was long and heated and ended before ev-
eryone had had a chance to speak. In the published re-
sponses to Batten's paper, Sir John Strachey stated, "There 
can be no greater delusion than to suppose that China de-
pends on India for her supply of opium. If no opium were 
exported from India, the consumption of China would re-
main practically unchanged. Indian opium in China is a 
luxury of the comparatively rich." He argued that since a 
single province of China produced more opium than the 
whole of India, it was not for the British to reproach them-
selves if the Chinese wanted to smoke opium and concluded 
that it would be "an act of folly and injustice" to deprive 
the Indian government of its opium revenues. Maurice Gre-
gory, editor of Bombay's Banner of Asia, opposed the pro-
opium speakers and cited the medical evidence of the dan-
gers of abusing opium. Gregory wrote, "The fact should 
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be emphasized that the opium prepared by the British gov-
ernment in India is almost entirely used for purposes of 
debauch." 18 
Few Britons ever publicly acknowledged using opium, but 
one who did was Surgeon-General Sir William Moore. In 
comments to the Royal Society, he said he had sought to 
determine if opium was "the very injurious agent which it 
has been asserted to be." In doing so, he spent twenty-five 
years studying the question "among habitual opium con-
sumers, and on the principle of experimenting on the vile 
body I have used opium myself. I confidently assert that 
opium is not the deadly agent which it has been painted; 
and that climate, creed, habits, and customs render it al-
most a necessity for Eastern races." He went on to state that 
opium alkaloids were poisonous, as were the alkaloids of 
tea and coffee, but "no organic disease is caused by opium." 
He suggested that the anti-opium forces could better use 
their energies to eliminate the abuses of alcohol in Britain. 
He continued that if the anti-opium forces succeeded in 
abolishing the opium trade, the Indians would be worse off, 
for without opium "the person suffering from want of food 
would not be able to appease the hungry edge of appetite," 
and when famines occurred, thousands more would die, and 
"the person having to undergo great physical fatigue would 
not be able to render himself proof against it by opium, 
neither would he be able to share the opium with his camel 
or horse, which ... was a point of honor with the riders." 
He concluded that opium was "a safeguard against 
malarious fevers, which could not be done if a physician'S 
prescription were required, for there is not a competent 
doctor in every Indian village," and he thought that if opium 
were prohibited the Indians would take to using Indian 
hemp, "which was more injurious. "19 
E.L. Oxenham, a former British consul in China, com-
mented that opium was a prophylactic against fever and was 
widely used as such in the Yangtze valley and in Taiwan, 
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since quinine was prohibitively expensive. The use of opium 
in other areas, he believed, was abuse. He knew that the 
opium trade had been denounced by the Chinese govern-
ment, the literati, and Buddhist and Taoist priests, but sup-
pressing even half the cultivation of the poppy and the 
opium trade would require "measures, tyrannical and 
bloody in a high degree."2O 
Dr. James L. Maxwell brought up the fact that the In-
dian government refused to permit unlimited cultivation 
of the opium poppy and said that was "prima facie evidence 
that it recognizes its hurtful and demoralizing power." He 
cautioned that there were grave dangers in using the drug, 
except for medical purposes, and noted that the Indian gov-
ernment was aware of these dangers. He said the position 
of the governqlent was self-contradictory; it prohibited the 
free cultivation of the poppy in India because of the dan-
gers of the drug yet allowed the drug to be exported to China 
in great quantities. He questioned why the trade was al-
lowed to continue when the dangers of the drug were well 
known. He wrote, "Since Englishmen have come into close 
contact with the Chinese, the universal testimony, even of 
the smokers themselves, has been that the habit is, physi-
cally and morally, degrading."21 
Batten concluded the meeting by summing up that "in 
both China and India the moderate consumption of opium, 
even taken daily, is not only harmless but beneficial." He 
said that most consumers in both countries were moderate 
users and that "abuse or excessive use of opium is injuri-
ous, though not to the extent asserted by the Society for the 
Suppression of the Opium Trade, but the cases are excep-
tional, and cannot justify the destruction of a trade, the 
benefits of which far outweigh the evils. "22 
Anti-opium advocates sometimes found themselves at 
meetings or debates that were strongly in favor of the 
government's opium policy, as had happened to Joseph G. 
Alexander at the meeting of the Royal Society of the Arts 
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in 1892. The Rev. Montagu P. Beauchamp of the China In-
land Mission found himself in a similar situation when he 
was invited to a debate on opium in 1900 and discovered 
the speakers were "almost to a man speaking in favor of 
opium." Writing in the Friend of China, Beauchamp noted 
that the pro-opium forces' major argument had previously 
been that the government of India depended on the money 
from the trade, but now he found "the constant cry . . . 
'Oh, but opium is such a good thing for the native, and its 
evils have been exaggerated. '" The speakers also mentioned 
"the oft-used argument that there can be no harm in moder-
ate opium smoking" and made the "fatal mistake" of compar-
ing opium use in China to the alcohol problem in Britain.23 
Speakers at the meeting included a former inspector of 
prisons in Hong Kong who asserted that the opium habit 
was easy to break, since anyone confined to jail had to give 
it up immediately, and a businessman who insisted he had 
never been inconvenienced by employees who were opium 
smokers. Beauchamp learned after the meeting that the 
"leader of the debate in favor of opium ... had made every 
dollar he possessed in the opium trade."24 
Britishers who had lived in India were numerous among 
the vocal pro-opium advocates. One refuted the charge that 
opium produced insanity by stating that "in large doses [it] 
produces hallucinations for a short time, but never insanity 
in any form," and another stated that his banker was an 
opium eater and "one of the shrewdest men of business in 
all India." A planter who said he had been an "amateur 
doctor" for many years in India stated that quinine was un-
suitable for many Indians, while opium was not. Sir Wil-
liam Roberts, a physician who served on the Royal Com-
mission on Opium, insisted that opium could not be linked 
to suicide since Assam, with the largest consumption of 
opium, had the smallest number of suicides, and the prov-
ince with the lowest consumption of opium, Madras, was 
second among the provinces in the number of suicides.25 
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One of the charges made by those who opposed opium 
was that the British had forced opium on the Chinese and 
continued to do so under the treaties. These charges were 
refuted by many who supported the opium trade of the 
Indian government. Among those refuting the charge was 
Hartmann Henry Sultzberger who published a work, All 
About Opium, in 1884 that included a section, "The Forcing 
of Opium on the Chinese An Absolute Impossibility." 
Sultzberger argued that since the trade was agreed to by 
treaty it was not forced on the Chinese. Whether the treaty 
was "entered into in a purely commercial way, or obtained 
as a result of a successful war, does not affect the argument." 
He knew that the Chinese could not be forced to purchase 
opium, because in the previous two years he had attempted 
to sell three different qualities of opium in Hong Kong. 
One he sold at a modest profit and it was reordered, one 
"had to be sacrificed at a heavy loss," and the third could 
not be sold at all. He stated that the Chinese preferred the 
imported varieties of opium but that two-thirds to three-
fourths of the opium used in China was domestically pro-
duced. He insisted the Chinese wanted to monopolize the 
entire business and found in the missionary "that rare com-
bination of 'a readily believing and politically perfectly irrespon-
sible tool,' necessary for such an attempt." He did not want 
to accuse the Chinese and the missionaries of "having actu-
ally entered into ... a compact," but he felt sure the "mere 
holding out to the worthy missionary of even the faintest 
of vain hopes in connection with his christianizing work ... 
will at any time be quite sufficient to set him to work at 
once also at home, rendering him completely blind though, 
with respect to the damaging effects of this hopeless but 
persistent anti-opium agitation. "26 
Sultzberger was not alone in thinking the anti-opium 
forces were naive and the Chinese wanted to monopolize 
the trade. H.H. Kane in his account, Opium-Smoking in 
America and China, challenged the portrayal of the decline 
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of a man who smoked opium in Broomhall's The Chinese 
opium Smoker, saying he had met men who had been "hard 
smokers for ten years, and who present none of the fea-
tures usually ascribed to the smoker."27 And William H. 
Brereton, an adviser to an opium farmer, spoke for many 
of the pro-opium advocates when he said, "If the Chinese 
government really wanted to put a stop to [the trade] or 
check the use of opium they would begin by doing so them-
selves. They would first stop the cultivation of the drug in 
their own country." Brereton was sure the Chinese would 
not end opium use because of the large revenue they ob-
tained from it. 28 
Other reasons were given for the Chinese desire to stop 
the trade. W.J. Moore wrote that in their protests the Chi-
nese had not been honest: "the real reason they [do] not 
desire the trade [is] ... first the fear of the great exporta-
tion of silver; and secondly, a stinging sense of humiliation 
from being obliged, as the result of British victories, to ad-
mit Indian opium to the treaty ports on a fixed tariff. "29 
In 1903 some members of the House of Commons ex-
pressed their belief that if India were to stop exporting 
opium to China the Chinese would increase domestic pro-
duction, so that within a few years they would not only ful-
fill their own needs, but would also be exporting the drug 
to fill the needs of other countries. 30 The pro-opium advo-
cates were staunch in their conviction that opium was harm-
less and that, hence, there was no need to end the official 
opium trade. They attributed to the Chinese the desire to 
end the Indian opium trade so that they might increase 
domestic production and monopolize the opium business 
for themselves. There was a distinct difference between those 
who advocated the continuance of the opium trade and those 
who favored its abolition, however. For the most part, those 
advocating the continuation of the trade were either opium 
planters or sellers or officials of the British Indian govern-
ment. Some medical doctors did argue that opium was 
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harmless, but they, too, tended to be employees of the In-
dian government or officers of the British army in India. 
In contrast, the majority of those who opposed opium were 
more familiar with China, and they tended to be mission-
aries or missionary doctors who had no direct or personal 
interest in the policies of the Indian government. Certainly, 
individuals who made their livings from the opium trade 
had a vested interest in the continuation of that trade. 
The pro-opium advocates were frequent in their compari-
sons of opium to alcohol, although they were not alone in 
these comparisons. Some argued that if opium were no more 
harmful than alcohol, then if one wished to abolish the 
opium trade, one also should wish to abolish the trade in 
alcoholic beverages. 
The extremes to which the pro-opium advocates went to 
defend their position is evident by the statement of Sur-
geon-General Sir William Moore, who said opium was a 
necessity because it was useful to assuage the appetite in 
time of famine. He apparently chose not to consider that 
food could be used for the same purpose! 
Some of the medical men who called opium harmless 
might be excused for their statements because of the gen-
erallack of information on the subject of addiction. In the 
late nineteenth century the most accurate information on 
opium addiction was being compiled by the missionary doc-
tors in China, and their evidence often tended to be dis-
counted by doctors employed by the British government in 
India, not so much on medical grounds, but rather, on the 
basis that the government doctors favored the government's 
policy on opium, while the missionary doctors did not. 
THE ROYAL CoMMISSION ON OPIUM 
As the British government became increasingly pressured 
by the anti-opium forces, which were harder and harder to 
ignore, it finally decided to appoint a commission to inves-
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tigate the use of opium and the involvement of the Indian 
government in the opium trade. The Royal Commission on 
Opium, appointed in June 1893, was to study the question 
and report what changes could be made in the military and 
civil expenditures of India, by what means India's resources 
could be developed, and what temporary assistance the gov-
ernment would need to compensate for suppressing the 
opium traffic. 31 
Opposition to the appointment of a commission was in-
tense and the secretary of state for India, the earl of 
Kimberley, declared he would resign rather than consent 
to a resolution that suggested that the opium revenue in 
India might be surrendered. Prime Minister William 
Gladstone, who as a young man had been strongly opposed 
to the opium trade, proposed the resolution on behalf of 
the government, calling for a royal commission to report 
on the issue. The Commission was to consider prohibiting 
the growth of poppies and the sale of opium except for 
medical purposes, the arrangements the British had with 
the Native States regarding shipments of opium, what ef-
fect stopping the trade would have on the finances of In-
dia, whether any change of policy short of complete prohi-
bition was a possibility, consumption of opium patterns by 
different groups of people in India and the moral and physi-
cal effects such use had, and the willingness of the Indian 
people to give up non-medical uses of opium and their will-
ingness to bear the costs of prohibition.32 The vote on Glad-
stone's resolution was 184 for and 105 against, with the anti-
opium M.P.s voting against the measure on the grounds that 
it did not deal with the Chinese aspect of the opium trade. 33 
The Commission was composed of nine members: Lord 
Brassey, chairman; two officials of the Indian government, 
Sir James B. Lyall and Arthur N. Fanshawe, director-gen-
eral of the Post Office of India; two Indians, Sir 
Lachhmesswar Singh Bahadur, maharaja of Barbhanga, 
and Haridas Veharidas, former dewan (prime minister) of 
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Junagarh; two anti-opium representatives Arthur Pease and 
Henry J. Wilson, a Liberal M.P.; an independent medical 
man, Sir William Roberts, M.D.; and an independent mem-
ber of Parliament, Robert G. C. Mowbray, a Conservative. 
The secretary of the Commission was J. Prescott Hewett. 34 
In China, the Chinese Recorder greeted the news of the 
appointment of the Royal Commission with an editorial 
saying, "We rejoice with and congratulate the home anti-
opium crusaders who accept the decision of the House of 
Commons as the greatest and most solid forward step that 
the movement for the suppression of the opium trade has 
yet made. "35 But Li Hung-chang, upon hearing that the Brit-
ish government had appointed the Royal Commission on 
Opium, was reported to have remarked that it was absurd 
to appoint a commission to inquire if opium were harmful 
since "everybody knows that opium is most injurious. "36 
The Commission met for a week in September in Lon-
don where it took evidence from a number of officials who 
had had experience in India and other British possessions 
in Asia. Then it moved to India, where it heard persons 
from India and Burma and other parts of Asia from 18 
November 1893 to 22 February 1894. They also sent ques-
tionnaires to the. British Consuls in China and the colonial 
authorities in Hong Kong and the Straits Settlement, ask-
ing that they be given to "the most intelligent and trustwor-
thy gentlemen of Oriental races, and officials, medical men, 
merchants, and others, who are specially conversant with 
Chinese and other Asiatic consumers of opium. "37 
Because royal commissions were appointed by the Crown 
or Parliament, they were generally thought to be unbiased 
and to conduct "objective enquiries systematically planned 
by unbiased persons of great intelligence who were only 
anxious to find out the truth. There were often anything 
but that." Certainly the Royal Commission on Opium fit 
this description. The anti-opium leaders were unhappy with 
the appointment of the Commission since it was not going 
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to investigate, specifically, the question of the opium trade 
and its effects on China. Like many official commissions 
and committees it was "carefully organized by those who 
promoted [it] to drive home a particular point of view, [and] 
to support one side in a controversy." Such committees had 
members who "were chosen, the evidence carefully selected 
and the proceedings marshalled so that the desired conclu-
sions could be embodied in a report, which could be ... a 
most effective instrument for the control of opinion."38 Yet 
once the Royal Commission on Opium was named, the So-
ciety for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, as well as 
the other anti-opium groups, had to make the best of the 
situation. 
In hopes of influencing the Commission to favor ending 
the opium trade, representatives of various anti-opium 
groups in London issued an appeal to the Commission that 
the truth on opium be brought out, while at the same time 
explaining their position with regard to the Commission. 
They stated that they did not desire the appointment of 
the Commission since the use of the drug in India was "a 
comparatively small though important portion of the moral 
iniquity, as it does not form one-twelfth of the India Opium 
Trade." They said they were more concerned with the fact 
that "a nominally Christian Government" obtained revenue 
from the manufacture and commerce in the drug that was 
so harmful to the people of China and the Straits Settle-
ment. They pointed out that if the majority of the people 
in Britain wanted to end the Indian opium traffic there was 
no need to appoint a commission but rather the need to 
seek a different source of revenue for the Indian govern-
ment. 39 
The statement pointed out that the anti-opium societies 
did not have the funds to send expensive telegrams "in cor-
rection of the one-sided reports from India day by day-
nor have they the resources at their command which in other 
ways are available by the Indian Government, the uphold-
THE PRO-OPIUM FORCES 89 
ers of the Opium Traffic." They noted that Joseph G. 
Alexander, secretary of the Society for the Suppression of 
the Opium Trade, had gone to India at his own expense to 
aid the Commission in its investigation. He found it impos-
sible to do so alone, so had secured the assistance of the 
Rev. Thomas Evans, a missionary who had had thirty-eight 
years of experience in India. The statement appealed for 
£2,000 immediately, £1,000 to go to Alexander in India and 
another £1,000 to be divided between the Society for the 
Suppression of the Opium Trade, the Urgency Commit-
tee, and the Women's Urgency Committee. In an appeal 
that accompanied the statement they noted that there was 
"undue prominence" being given in the press to "those who 
declare the use of Opium, other than medicinally, to be 
harmless, and even beneficial to health, without publish-
ing the strong evidence given against the illegitimate use 
of the drug." As an example, they cited an item from the 
Newcastle Daily Chronicle that said they would be surprised 
if the result of the Commission's investigation were "not to 
increase the consumption of the drug in the Western world, 
where it has hitherto been used very little, if at all. All the 
credible evidence tends to show that those who do not use 
Opium are losers by their abstinence." There was also the 
statement of a medical doctor who insisted that in thirty-
eight years of practice he had "never found Opium to be 
deleterious to health, but to the contrary, considered that it 
increases longevity. Opium eaters ... are generally healthy 
men, and contrast favorably with non-Opium eaters." The 
anti-opium leaders feared that as a result of such statements 
more people would be brought "under the terrible slavery 
of the 'evil habit." They cited the statement of thousands 
of missionaries and doctors in India, China, and Britain as 
evidence of the dangerous effects of opium.40 
Yet, despite the alarm of some of the anti-opium forces, 
many still thought the Commission would explore all sides 
of the question fairly. An editorial in the Chinese Recorder in 
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January 1894 quoted the Friend of China as saying, "All that 
we have seen of these members of the Commission who have 
attended its sittings in London and all that we hear of the 
two native members of the Commission, leads us to believe 
that the Commission is as fair-minded and impartial a tri-
bunal as we could have desired to hear our case." The Chi-
nese Recorder noted that the British government had at last 
been compelled to investigate the matter and expressed the 
belief that a long step had been taken, even though it was 
acknowledged that it was too much to hope "that British 
connection with the opium traffic with China will be bro-
ken immediately. "41 
In India the selection of witnesses for the Commission 
was done by representatives of the Indian government. They 
were quite aware of the position of the British government 
regarding the opium trade and wished to supply witnesses 
who would support the government's position. Accordingly, 
some "acted unscrupulously in the selection of witnesses; 
... when everyone knows what kind of evidence an om-
nipotent government wants, only a very brave man, espe-
cially of the conquered people, will, in open session, give 
evidence opposed to the wishes of his rulers. "42 
Once it became evident to the missionaries in China that 
the Commission would confine its work to Britain and In-
dia and not visit China, some questioned whether the Com-
mission could fully investigate the opium problem. Some 
farsighted missionaries concluded that the final report of 
the Commission would not contribute to ending the opium 
trade, which was the desire of both the China missionaries 
and the anti-opium societies. 
The Royal Commission's work on China consisted of 
sending questions regarding opium consumption and rev-
enues to the British consuls in China. Along with the twenty-
four witnesses from China who had testified in London and 
the ten who testified in India, there were a total of 178 per-
sons who offered evidence from China. These included 
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thirty-four consuls, sixteen Chinese, forty-seven medical 
doctors (including missionary doctors), thirty-seven mer-
chants, and forty-four missionaries.43 
The difficulty of obtaining information from consuls was 
well expressed by Consul Everard H. Fraser, who said there 
was only one merchant in his area and he was a German 
who had nothing to do with the opium trade, which was 
largely in the hands of Chinese. Several of the consuls ex-
pressed the thoughts of Consul Scott, who said the mission-
aries had the best information on the question of opium 
and his own observations were mostly secondhand since he 
had never studied the question of opium addiction among 
the Chinese. Consul T.L. Bullock wrote, "The papers are 
for the most part furnished by missionaries. But missionar-
ies in China, speaking the language, constantly moving 
about, and always in close contact with the people, are able 
to give far more trustworthy opinions on such a subject than 
any other class of persons can, though many of them, of 
course, have strong prejudices concerning [opium]." Con-
sul Clement F.R. Allen wrote, "As a private resident in China 
my experiences in China have not the weight either of those 
of a medical man or those of a missionary. We Consuls have 
little private intercourse with the natives outside our homes 
and offices." Consul Byron Brenan reported that a Chinese 
general told him that "the pseudo pleasure [of opium] is 
obtained at the expense of natural contentment," and that 
farmers, "who work hard all year round [and] know too well 
the value of money," generally did not smoke opium.44 
Nearly all the consuls agreed that alcohol would not be used 
as a substitute for opium by the Chinese. On the question 
of why the British dealt in opium with the Chinese, Sir 
Thomas Wade, testifying before the Royal Commission, 
perhaps best summed up the situation when he said, "Our 
grand difficulty with China is that we never have anything 
to offer. "45 
Those witnesses from China who defended the opium 
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habit offered little positive evidence to suggest that the habit 
really was beneficial. One even said, "It is no doubt a great 
pity that the Chinese should be so addicted to opium." An-
other, who had been a large importer of the drug, argued, 
"Being on demand, and so largely required, it must have 
some beneficial effect." Another, who thought the mission-
aries had greatly exaggerated the harm opium wrought, still 
wrote, "Burden coolies would be better and stronger men, 
and able to endure as much work if they never commenced 
the habit .... I think all native and foreign employers look 
with a watchful and suspicious eye on the opium smoker."46 
The consul at Shanghai gave the Commission's questions 
to the Rev. Griffith John and some other missionaries at 
Hankow for their responses. The replies of John were 
printed in the Chinese Recorder. Among the questions47 asked 
were, "What were the observed moral, physical, and social 
effects of opium upon its consumers?" and "Is the effect 
the same on consumers of each race, or can you draw dis-
tinctions between the effects on consumers of different 
races?" and "Is there any difference between the effects of 
Indian and Chinese grown opium?" John replied, "The 
moral effects of opium are of the most pernicious kind .... 
Not only is the moral sense weakened in the opium victims, 
but they are led by the habit into associations, where they 
are directly tempted to the most profligate vices. The opium 
dens are, for the most part, sinks of iniquity, and opium 
smoking is generally associated with debauchery, gambling 
and other gross vices." He reported that physically the drug 
led to great injury and death. The Chinese recognized the 
effect of opium on reproduction and "affirm[ed] that the 
family of the opium smoker will be extinct in the third gen-
eration." The social effects, he said, were "impoverishment," 
"untrustworthiness," and "lazy habits." Concerning the dif-
ferent effects on the different races, he said, "The effects 
are the same on all the Chinese with whom I have had to 
do." He compared Indian opium to Chinese opium by say-
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ing the former was much stronger and was like comparing 
a coal fire to a fire of wood. Indian opium was "more ex-
pensive and beyond the reach of the poorer classes," but he 
noted that the native product was used to adulterate the for-
eign drug. 
Another question concerned what would happen if the 
supply of the drug from India were cut off. John replied 
that addicts would use the Chinese-produced drug unless 
the Chinese government could take some action to stop its 
growth.48 On this question others were also skeptical that 
stopping the traffic from India would change things in 
China. The former governor of Hong Kong, G. W. Des 
Voeux, in a letter to the Royal Commission, said that even 
if the Commission succeeded in stopping the Indian opium 
trade, this would not alter patterns of consumption in China. 
He noted that Indian opium was "regarded as superior in 
flavor, [and was] used in China as a luxury of the compara-
tively rich. "49 He continued that if the trade were stopped, 
the Chinese would use the native product, but he also be-
lieved that smuggling of Indian opium would increase dra-
matically. He suggested that the inhabitants of Hong Kong 
were the heaviest consumers of opium in the world and at-
tributed this to the comparatively high pay earned by Hong 
Kong residents, which meant they could afford the drug. 
According to his estimate, the amount of opium sold by the 
local opium monopoly equalled the amount estimated to 
be smuggled into the colony from the mainland. He ques-
tioned why the missionaries were so concerned with the 
opium trade when it was not the British or other Europe-
ans, but "the Parsees, Armenians, Hebrews, and others who 
have been brought up and educated in the East" who con-
trolled the trade almost exclusively. He suggested that the 
missionaries' motive was to have a vivid issue with which to 
attract money for their China missions. 50 
Another of the Commission's questions was, "Do people 
of European race contract the opium habit in any numbers? 
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If not, why not? And what makes Asiatics more liable to 
contract the habit?" John's reply was, "Very rarely. During 
my long residence in China I have met with only two cases. 
The phlegmatic temperament and indolent habits of the 
Asiatic make him more liable to contract the habit." Re-
sponding to why the Chinese used opium, John listed first 
"the love of pleasure and vice. The opium dens are moral 
sinks, and opium smoking is associated with gambling and 
gross sensual indulgence." Second, he mentioned the use 
of opium to cure physical ailments or relieve pain; third, 
"it is supposed to facilitate business transactions and the 
striking of bargains"; and, fourth, he suggested "indolence 
and the want of occupation." He discounted its use as a pro-
phylactic.51 
In response to a question asking if the Chinese desired 
that England end the opium trade, John wrote, "There is 
decidedly a wish that the foreign importation should be dis-
continued. The people generally look upon the opium vice 
as having been introduced by foreigners, without distin-
guishing between one nation and another, and they look 
upon its introduction as an immoral and hostile act." He 
continued that "the relation between the two countries can 
never be what it ought to be whilst this traffic lasts, and 
that the moral effect of its abandonment by England on 
the Chinese mind would be very powerful and highly fa-
vorable. The Chinese as a people would begin to see us in a 
new light and feel towards us as they have never done hith-
erto."52 
In conclusion, John said that he was unable to say what 
the Chinese government might do if the importation of 
opium from India were stopped, but he thought the gov-
ernment would make "an honest effort to stop the native 
growth, and the attempt might eventuate the diminution of 
the evil, if not its complete suppression." He could see "no 
hope for the speedy deliverance of China from the vice" if 
the trade continued. He wrote, "The evil is now one of enor-
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mous magnitude, and the venality of the officials is as deep 
rooted as ever, and I therefore fear that no legislative mea-
sures on the part of the Central government, however hon-
estly adopted, would put an end to opium smoking, and 
consequently to opium growth in China itself." John noted, 
however, that there were others who disagreed with him on 
the subject. He did say that whatever the Chinese govern-
ment did "the path of England, as a great Christian nation, 
seems to me to be perfectly clear. It is for us to wash our 
hands clean of the trade which is unworthy of ourselves and 
hurtful to the people of China." John said that opium was 
becoming a very common means of committing suicide and 
concluded that "opium in China is an awful curse, and that 
in more ways than one."53 
Perhaps one of the most unexpected witnesses before the 
Commission was the merchant, Donald Matheson, who had 
resided in China for ten years while a partner in Jardine, 
Matheson and Company, which had long engaged in the 
opium traffic. Matheson was active in the anti-opium move-
ment in Britain, and now he publicly told the Commission 
he favored an end to the opium trade from which many of 
his relatives made their livings. 54 
While the Commission was sitting, the pages of the Chi-
nese Recorder were rich with comments about its work. The 
Rev. Henry Woods in a letter to the editor criticized the 
secular press for "industriously presenting the side of the 
question favorable to opium" and denouncing "those who 
know the facts and tell the truth about opium." He suggested 
the Chinese Recorder publish a symposium on the observa-
tions of the missionaries concerning opium, but he noted 
that such testimonies "might be branded as lies by the op-
posite side who must rely mainly on discourteous epithets 
to uphold their side of the question."55 
The missionaries in China recognized the importance of 
having their views presented to the Royal Commission. Ac-
cordingly, British missionaries who had had at least twenty-
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five years of service in China joined in a memorial to the 
Commission. The points made in the memorial were: that 
it had been established "beyond possibility of reasonable 
doubt that the consumption of opium in China is exerting 
a distinctly deteriorating effect upon the Chinese people, 
physically, socially, and morally"; that the Chinese people 
were "as a whole distinctly opposed to the opium habit"; 
that although the opium trade was no longer illegal, it was 
"highly injurious, not only to China but also to the fair name 
of Great Britain"; and that the opium imported to China 
from India was not for medical purposes nor used as such, 
and "hence we regard the importation as being wholly preju-
dicial to the well being of the Chinese people." The mis-
sionaries asked that the Commission recommend opium 
production in India be limited to that needed for medici-
nal purposes in India and elsewhere. They noted that testi-
mony had been given that stated that "the consumption of 
opium by the peoples of India is not accompanied with the 
same disastrous consequences that we have all witnessed for 
ourselves in China .... We are of the opinion that a longer 
and wider range of experience will certainly show that 
opium is as injurious to all other races as it has been proved 
to be to the Chinese." They noted that England classed 
opium as a dangerous poison, as did other countries, and 
concluded, "We cannot believe that what is a dangerous 
poison to the greater part of the human race acts only as a 
harmless stimulant on other parts of the race."56 
The report of the Royal Commission was presented to 
Parliament on 26 April 1895. On the subject of opium smok-
ing in China the majority report concluded, "By the ma-
jority of the missionaries of every Christian communion, 
the use of opium is strongly condemned." Among those in 
the British consular service, "the prevailing opinion is that 
opium smoking in moderation is not harmful, and that 
moderation is the rule. The evil effects of excess do not 
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thrust themselves prominently on the notice. A minority of 
the Consular service condemn the use of opium in any form 
as essentially bad. The medical opinions were in general 
accord with those of the consular body." Accordingly, the 
Commission thought "that the habit is generally practiced 
in moderation, and that when so practiced the injurious 
effects are not apparent; but that, when the habit is carried 
to excess, disastrous consequences, both moral and physi-
cal, inevitably follow. We may fairly compare the effects of 
opium smoking among the Chinese population to those of 
alcoholic liquors in the United Kingdom."57 The report went 
on to say that the Chinese were "a perfectly free agent" with 
regard to opium and that there was "no evidence from China 
of any popular desire that the import of Indian opium 
should be stopped."58 
THE MISSIONARIES REFUTE THE ROYAL CoMMISSION'S REPORT 
The issuance of the Royal Commission's report produced 
much criticism by those who thought the Commission's work 
had been unfairly conducted because the views of dissent-
ing members were not given widespread publicity. The anti-
opium forces were quick to produce evidence they said re-
futed the conclusions of the Commission, and indeed they 
used the evidence presented to the Commission to illustrate 
that its conclusions were contradictory to its own evidence. 
In India the Commission examined 722 witnesses, includ-
ing 55 native medical men, 74 European officials, 47 mis-
sionaries, 89 officials of native states, and 57 landowners. 
The report issued by the Commission consisted of five vol-
umes and supplements, without indexes, and with no or-
der to the arrangement of the evidence. Joshua Rowntree 
undertook to present a systematic review of the evidence 
in his work The opium Habit in the East: A Study of the Evi· 
dence Given to the Royal Commission on opium, 1893·94 but 
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Upper-class woman and man smoking opium, most likely 
in their own home, probably in Peking. Library of 
Congress. 
noted in his introductory remarks that the "present dura-
tion of human life is hardly sufficient to allow of many per-
sons reading through these five volumes. "59 
Rowntree concluded about the Commission's work that 
the government ministers had given erroneous information 
on opium to the Parliament. As evidence of this he cited 
the statement that the government of India sought to di-
minish the area of poppy cultivation in India and the state-
ment that China was free to terminate the opium trade on 
its own. "Both of these statements were made and confirmed 
by responsible statesmen in their official capacities, and both 
are shown beyond all gain-saying to be misstatements of the 
actual facts," he wrote. Regarding the results of the 
Commission's inquiry on the question of opium in China, 
"poor and partial" as it was, Rowntree wrote, it "show[ed] 
afresh ... the disastrous consequences of the opium habit 
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in China; and point[ed] ... with curious precision, to the 
undermining of the fabric of that ancient State which is 
every day becoming more and more apparent." With re-
gard to China, Rowntree noted that the medical evidence 
concerning the prophylactic properties of opium with ref-
erence to malaria directly contradicted those presented by 
medical men in India, who insisted the drug was useful for 
this purpose.60 
In response to the question why Europeans did not be-
come addicted to the drug, one person told the Commis-
sion that Europeans did not smoke opium because it re-
quired reclining on a couch and it was "uncomfortable to 
lie down for any length of time wearing a pair of tight trou-
sers and ordinary boots." Others reported that Europeans 
who used the drug became quite as addicted to it as did the 
Chinese. One medical doctor reported that the Europeans 
did not like to smoke opium because the habit would asso-
ciate them with Chinese tastes and they wished to avoid such 
an association. Consul Bullock said the Europeans did not 
take opium because if they did they would become "objects 
of contempt, even to the least particular of their acquain-
tances." However, some witnesses noted that opium and 
morphia addiction among Europeans was increasing. One 
reported that in Tongking "among the French people, quite 
a number have taken to opium, and it is becoming quite a 
curse." This was confirmed by Consul Parker, who said the 
French officials in Tongking had been "officially warned" 
about the dangers of the drug. 6J 
Opium had been a problem in Burma until the Burmese 
requested that the Indian government prohibit the sale of 
the drug there on the grounds that the Buddhism they prac-
ticed forbade them to use the drug. In March 1893 the gov-
ernment of India had worked out an agreement with the 
Burmese to ban the use of opium in Lower Burma, as it 
had previously done in Upper Burma. The official state-
ment said, "The use of opium is condemned by the Bud-
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dhist religion; and government, believing the condemna-
tion to be right, intends that the use of opium by persons 
of the Burmese race shall forever cease." Needless to say, 
the China missionaries were greatly encouraged by this state-
ment and they pointed it out to the Royal Commission.62 
Testimony from the Straits Settlement was that "respect-
able Chinese merchants, shopkeepers, clerks and domes-
tics are in a marked degree indisposed to confess to any 
opium smoking, or to admit opium smokers to their em-
ployment. Various explanations are given for this fact, but 
it seems in any case to be firmly held as part of the recog-
nized Chinese code of moral opinion." Although the gov-
ernment of the Straits Settlement monopolized opium, "any 
employee of the opium farm in Singapore who is known to 
smoke opium is at once dismissed," because addicts were 
known to be untrustworthy. Hong Kong derived about one-
sixth of its revenue from opium, and 61 persons responded 
to the questions sent to the colonial secretary there. They 
included only two missionaries, one a medical doctor. Of 
those responding to the questions, only one medical doctor 
said that the opium habit was beneficial, and only one of 
the eight Chinese responding defended the habit. One of 
the Chinese, Lau Wai-chun, concluded his testimony by say-
ing, "In thus stopping the supply of opium, the whole of 
Asia will be benefited, and England will be carrying out 
the will of Heaven in protecting its children, and will re-
ceive in return infinite blessings." Several persons told the 
Commission that morphine was becoming a more serious 
problem in the colony. 63 
In testimony concerning China, which accounted for the 
consumption of nine-tenths of India's production of opium 
but which occupied comparatively little of the Commission's 
investigation, two questions were paramount. One was 
whether Britain had forced opium upon the Chinese and 
the other was whether or not China was now free to refuse 
the importation of the drug. Sir Joseph W. Pease told the 
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Commission that when the English forced opium on China, 
they encouraged the domestic cultivation of the drug. 
Horatio Nelson Lay, who had helped the Chinese with na-
val matters earlier in the century, testified before the Com-
mission that "the pretence that we have forced opium on 
the Chinese is fustian, and [the Chinese authorities] are 
only making those statements for the purpose of damaging 
the English." He also thought the Americans had inserted 
a clause in their commercial treaty with the Chinese mak-
ing opium contraband "as a slap in the face of the English." 
He went on to say the Chinese "have encouraged our opium, 
and we, by allowing the Chinese to overtax it, have stimulated 
the growth of the native article enormously in every prov-
ince. I think that the most short-sighted policy that ever was 
pursued on our part. "64 
The anti-opium leaders challenged the conclusions of the 
Royal Commission in a second major work, this one Arnold 
Foster's Report of the Royal Commission on Opium Compared 
with the Evidence from China that was Submitted to the Commis-
sion: An Examination and An Appeal, published in 1899. In 
his preface-which was signed by Frederick Temple, arch-
bishop of Canterbury, six bishops of the Church of England, 
and 141 other prominent persons-Foster quoted from 
Chang Chih-tung's recently published work, Learn, on the 
evils of opium and challenged anyone to find a statement 
from a Chinese author in support of the opium habit. Fos-
ter also noted that the marquis of Salisbury had stated that 
the British policy toward China was "very simple. It is to 
maintain the Chinese Empire, to prevent it falling into ru-
ins, to invite it into paths of reform, and to give it every 
assistance which we are able to give it, to perfect its defence 
or to increase its commercial prosperity. By so doing we shall 
be aiding its cause and our own. "65 
Foster noted that he used in the text of his book no anti-
opium evidence that had not been presented to the Royal 
Commission and said it was not his intention to explore the 
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whole of the opium question or to write an anti-opium tract 
but rather only to examine the evidence before the Com-
mission. That alone, he said, was enough to refute the con-
clusions of the Commission. Foster suggested that Britain 
could help the Chinese Empire "from falling into ruins" by 
abandoning the opium trade. "If England persists in re-
fusing to recognize this evil, all other movements which she 
may make in the direction of reforming China will be found 
to be unavailing," he wrote. Foster's major thesis was that 
the evidence presented to the Commission directly con-
flicted with the conclusions the Commission drew from that 
evidence, and he systematically set out to prove his point. 
Two examples of such conclusions were "there is no evidence 
from China of any popular desire that the import of In-
dian opium should be stopped" and "in the British Consu-
lar service in China, the prevailing opinion is that opium 
smoking in moderation is not harmful, and that modera-
tion is the rule .... The medical opinions were in general 
accord with those of the Consular body." Foster pointed out 
that the Commission had received a large amount of evi-
dence from Chinese calling for the end of the importation 
of opium from India, and that the great majority of medi-
cal witnesses from China stated that moderation in the use 
of opium was rare and that opium was definitely harmful. 
Foster stated that such inaccuracies led him to have "grave 
suspicions as to the trustworthiness of the China Report as 
a whole."66 
Foster noted that the Commission's report stated that it 
was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses on the moral 
and physical effects of the use of opium in China, yet its 
own report contained testimony from such witnesses whom 
they had cross-examined!67 He believed that a careful ex-
amination of the evidence would support the statement in 
the minority report of one of the Commissioners, Henry J. 
Wilson, who wrote, "The Report adopted by my colleagues 
appears to me to partake more of the character of an elabo-
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rate defence of the opium trade of the East India Com-
pany, and of the present Government of India, than of a 
judicial pronouncement on the immediate questions sub-
mitted to us." Foster criticized the Commission for gather-
ing evidence on opium from Europeans, particularly Euro-
pean government officials in Asia. He said the opinions of 
the native peoples should be considered, and he lauded the 
efforts of Wilson along those lines. Wilson noted that there 
had been a change in the attitudes of government officials 
in recent years-that earlier all officials had condemned 
opium. He cited a letter from the directors of the East In-
dia Company to the governor general in 1817 that described 
opium as "a pernicious drug" and stated "were it possible 
to prevent the use of the drug altogether, except strictly for 
the purpose of medicine, we would gladly do it in compas-
sion to mankind. "68 
Foster attacked the Commission's statement that "the ef-
fects of the use and abuse of opium in China are fairly com-
parable with those of intoxicating liquors in England" and 
its opinion that the moral objections were not sufficient to 
warrant stopping the trade. As long as the Chinese govern-
ment allowed the importation of opium and was not intimi-
dated or pressured into allowing the importation, the 
Commission saw no need for interference from the British 
government to stop the exportation of the drug from In-
dia. Foster pointed out that this justification for the Indian 
government's position failed to consider that great quanti-
ties of opium were being exported to Hong Kong and the 
Straits Settlement for use by people living under British 
rule. He also pointed out that the Commissioners had no 
recommendations for curtailing the consumption of opium 
in any British-ruled area.69 
Foster said the argument that China would supply its own 
opium if the British did not was invalid. He said Sir Joseph 
Pease had succinctly dealt with that question on the day the 
Commission began its hearings when he quoted from 
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Dymond's "Essay on Morality," '''I have no right to do that 
which is wrong, if it is wrong, because somebody else is go-
ing to do wrong.' [This argument] I think has no defence 
in solid international morality." And Wilson, in his min-
utes of dissent, acknowledged that the Chinese grew opium, 
either with or without the permission of authorities, and 
no one could say what the Chinese would do to curtail do-
mestic cultivation if the importation were stopped, "but 
however that may be, a traffic which is contrary to the prin-
ciples of humanity cannot be justified on the ground that, 
if we do not engage in it, it will fall into the hands of others 
who have no such scruples." Foster noted that the Commis-
sioners justified the continuation of the opium trade on the 
very grounds Pease and Wilson condemned it. 70 
In response to the Commission's statement that "there is 
no evidence from China of any popular desire that the im-
port of Indian opium should be stopped," Foster quoted 
numerous people from China who urged the Commission 
to stop the trade. Among these was Yu King-pak, son of a 
yamen official at Canton, who said, "there is no room for 
empty excuses, let them make haste to help China and do 
away with this huge evil." Lu Pao-yu, who was employed by 
the British Consulate at Chefoo, wrote, "The inhabitants 
of Shantung naturally do not like England to import In-
dian opium. Every chest ... is so much irtiury to the people, 
and the flood of poison is never ending." Similar comments 
were received from other Chinese, as well as from British 
government officials, missionaries, and missionary doctors. 
Foster also printed the memorial of the missionaries with 
twenty-five or more years of service in China and cited it as 
evidence that contradicted the conclusions of the Commis-
sion.71 
He criticized the Commission for the use of such words 
as "use of opium," "moderate use," and "without injury"72 
and for the wording of its questionnaire, which was sent to 
the British minister in China for distribution to the con-
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suls, because it contained no questions to ascertain if the 
person replying were a disinterested party or even what his 
standing was in China. To illustrate this lack, Foster cited 
the testimony given by T.W. Duff, "a merchant in China of 
thirty years' standing, whose opinion is 'that in the circum-
stance of their living, food, climate, and habitations, opium 
has no deleterious effects upon the Chinese; indeed, quite 
the contrary, for it is a positive need, and they could not do 
without it. ,,, Although Duff gave evidence twice, once in 
London and once from China, no one asked him his busi-
ness, which Foster learned was opium importation. 73 
Foster quoted from the report, "Opium exported to 
China and the Far East is thus far larger than that consumed 
in India, to which it bears the proportion of about twelve 
to one." He suggested if that were the case, then the Com-
mission should have been concerned with China to a far 
greater extent, since the harm there was "of twelve times 
greater importance to the human race." Concerning the 
views of the China missionaries, the report stated that the 
Commission had taken evidence from seventeen mission-
aries who had resided in China and from Benjamin 
Broomhall, general secretary of the China Inland Mission, 
and, from their testimonies, had concluded, "the evidence 
of these witnesses was practically unanimous as to the evil 
effects of opium-smoking upon the Chinese, though that 
of Dr. W. Lockhart, a medical missionary of the London 
Missionary Society, was less pronounced than that of the 
others. "74 Foster pointed out that the testimony the Com-
missioners had dispatched with that short statement had 
come from the Rev. J. Hudson Taylor, the founder and di-
rector of the China Inland Mission; the Rev. James Legge, 
professor of Chinese at Oxford, who had resided in China 
for thirty-three years; and James L. Maxwell, M.D., who had 
presented the Commission a memorial denouncing both the 
use of opium and the opium trade, which had been signed 
by five thousand medical men in Britain, ten of whom were 
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fellows of the Royal Society and thirty-five of whom had 
practiced medicine in either India or China. Foster pointed 
out that the Commission's statement made it appear that 
Dr. Lockhart was the only medical missionary to give testi-
mony and that his statements, which included the comment 
that the opium smoker "becomes so deteriorated, and so 
debased in every way, that [he is] not allowed to give evi-
dence in any legal proceedings in any of the courts of jus-
tice in China," did not condemn the use of the drug. Foster 
also noted that, of the seventeen missionaries who testified, 
many gave evidence in the form of letters from other mission-
aries who were not able to appear before the Commission.75 
Foster repeatedly illustrated that the Commission's re-
port was based on statements taken out of context or par-
tially quoted to support the pro-opium bias of the Commis-
sion. For example, the report stated, "By the majority of 
the missionaries of every Christian community in China the 
use of opium is strongly condemned." Yet the Commission 
went on to quote at length two missionaries who dissented 
from that opinion, and the testimony of one of them was 
taken out of context in the report. The report stated that 
the Rev. W. Ashmore of the American Baptist Mission, who 
had served forty-three years in China, said "that some men 
will use opium for years and show no marked results," yet 
his whole statement, which appeared in the Commission's 
volumes of evidence, was "some men of vigorous vitality 
will use opium for many years and not show marked re-
sults. Others show the effects almost immediately in a gen-
eral, physical, and moral deterioration. "76 
Foster also questioned the validity of the testimony of 
the British consuls. Consul Allen of Chefoo stated that as a 
private resident of China he had little opportunity to meet 
with Chinese and hence did not know the extent of opium 
use or the harm it might cause but that as a judge of the 
Mixed Court at Shanghai he had seen many opium sots who 
had become criminals." 
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Concerning the opinion of medical men, the Commis-
sion listed ten private doctors and twelve government medi-
cal officers who gave testimony on opium and noted that 
eight of them said the effects of the use of opium were fa-
vorable, five said the effects were doubtful, and nine said 
they were unfavorable. Foster questioned why the report 
listed only these twenty-two medical doctors when forty had 
given testimony to the Commission. Of the eighteen whose 
opinions were omitted from the report's conclusions, all but 
one were unfavorable to the use of opium. The one opin-
ion considered favorable was given by the only medical 
doctor testifying that opium was not frequently used to 
commit suicide in China.7s 
Chinese testifying before the Commission presented spe-
cial problems, particularly with translation. Only two Chi-
nese witnesses gave pro-opium testimony, and Foster sus-
pected that in at least one case the statement attributed to a 
Chinese witness was actually the opinion of the pro-opium 
translator, since the Chinese man was quoted as having 
said that in China "some people regarded opium much as 
a strict Methodist in England would regard theatres or 
cards." Foster commented, "Much a Chinaman knows of 
what strict Methodists in England think of theatres and 
cards!"79 
Foster categorized the missionaries' testimony as thirty-three 
unfavorable to opium, none favorable, and one doubtful. 
Of the Chinese, eight were unfavorable, two were favorable 
(including the one who remarked on "strict Methodists"), 
and one was doubtful. Merchants also gave testimony to the 
Commission, although no attempt was made to ascertain if 
they had any interests in the opium trade. Of the twenty-
six merchants giving testimony, Foster was only able to de-
termine that six, including the representatives of Jardine, 
Matheson and Company, the Sassoons, and T.W. Duff, were 
involved in the opium business. Five of these six testified 
that they were in favor of the use of opium in China. Of 
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the twenty-six merchants in the group, nineteen were fa-
vorable to opium, four were unfavorable, and three were 
doubtful. Foster further noted that only one of the twenty-
six could be said to have extensive knowledge of the Chi-
nese language and customs.80 
Foster dismissed the conclusion of the Commission that 
opium use in China was comparable to the use of alcohol 
in Britain by saying that this was a fallacy commonly held 
by the pro-opium party in Britain. To refute the statement, 
he mentioned that opium was frequently used as a means 
of committing suicide but that alcohol was not. All the doc-
tors testifying before the Commission, except one who was 
also in favor of opium use, said that opium was commonly 
used to commit suicide in China.8l 
In his appeal to overturn the conclusions of the Com-
mission and end the opium trade, Foster wrote that he 
thought it was impossible for China to ever rise from its 
present weak condition unless it could first rid itself of the 
opium evil. He said that the nation that helped China end 
the opium evil would be China's greatest benefactor. He 
also stated his fear that other European nations might try 
to enter the opium trade, since a British royal commission 
had investigated the moral question of the trade and deter-
mined that it was not immoral and that the evils arising from 
the use of opium were slight. He said that the hypocrisy of 
the British concerning the opium trade had long been a 
byword among the other nations of the world. 82 
As Foster's work all too vividly pointed out, the Royal 
Commission on Opium was not an impartial body seeking 
to learn the truth about the opium question. The 
Commission's report defended the status quo and left the 
anti-opium advocates with their unfinished task of stopping 
the opium trade. Indeed, the Commission, which they had 
opposed from the first, hindered their efforts, because once 
the government had duly investigated the problem, it felt 
no need to discuss the matter further. The anti-opium forces 
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were left to carryon their efforts outside Parliament in the 
hope that by convincing the British public that opium was 
harmful the immoral involvement of the British government 
would cease. 
THE UNITED STATES PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON OPIUM 
Ten years after the British Royal Commission on Opium 
did its work, the United States government in the Philip-
pines decided to investigate the problem of the use of 
opium, but the Philippine Commission was much less con-
troversial than the British one had been and proved to have 
a greater impact on the ending of the opium trade from 
India to China, despite the fact that the trade was not its 
concern. The Philippine Commission had only three mem-
bers-Jose Albert, M.D., a Filipino; the Right Rev. Charles 
H. Brent, Episcopal bishop of the Philippine Islands; and 
Edward C. Carter, a major in the United States Army-and 
a single secretary. (In 1903, the Canadian-born Bishop Brent 
had urged a detailed study of opium be undertaken, and 
when the Commission was organized he was appointed to 
it. He later served as president of the International Opium 
Commission which met in Shanghai, and the International 
Opium Conference at The Hague.83) The Philippine Com-
mission was appointed to investigate the opium problem not 
to appease anti-opium forces at home or to support a posi-
tion of the government that created it. Thus its work was 
less biased and its conclusions more apt to be supported by 
those who wished more information on the subject of opium 
and the opium trade. Although the United States govern-
ment had no direct interest in the opium trade, it was con-
cerned about the use of the drug, particularly among Chi-
nese living in the Philippines, which the United States had 
recently acquired. 
The Philippine Commission was charged with studying 
laws regulating the use and trade of opium in Japan, Tai-
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wan, Burma, Java, and other countries the civil governor 
designated. The Commission's members visited Japan, Tai-
wan, Hong Kong, Saigon, Singapore, Burma, and Java as 
well as places in the Philippines. William Howard Taft, civil 
governor of the Philippines, gave the Commission the wid-
est latitude to make whatever investigation it deemed nec-
essary to carry out its work.84 This freedom and the small 
size of the Commission made it possible for its members to 
function effectively. 
On its visit to Shanghai the Commission met with Ameri-
can diplomats, British and American missionaries, and 
Chinese and Western businessmen.85 The testimony of the 
diplomats and missionaries was that opium use was harm-
ful and that moderate use of the drug was almost unknown. 
Dr. W.H. Boone told the Commission that the use of opium 
among women and children was increasing and that yearly 
more and more opium was being harvested in China. He 
thought the Chinese were growing more opium because it 
offered a quick, large, profit, although he noted that pro-
opium Britishers said the Chinese were increasing their 
production with the aim of taking over the British share of 
the trade by exporting opium to other countries. Dr. Boone 
told the Commission that he and other medical missionar-
ies had submitted similar evidence to the Royal Commis-
sion on Opium, although the members of the Philippine 
Commission could find no such evidence in the proceed-
ings of the Royal Commission. Other missionaries also gave 
testimony to the Philippine Commission, including several 
who had long been active in the Anti-Opium League. A 
group of Chinese merchants from Shanghai also gave evi-
dence. Several of them stated that only the poor in China 
smoked opium, but all agreed that opium smoking was 
harmful and they wished that its use in China might be 
ended.86 
The Philippine Commission also sought information 
from Western business firms in China. The examining phy-
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sician of the Shanghai office of the New York Life Insur-
ance Company, Dr. N. Macleod, was questioned. He stated 
that he believed some Chinese could use opium moderately 
for years without suffering ill effects, but he also acknowl-
edged that many were injured by it. He said his company 
did not refuse to hire opium users, but it did try to deter-
mine the general health of the user and the amount of the 
drug consumed daily.87 
In Hong Kong, a Chinese merchant employed by the 
China-American Commercial Company told the Commis-
sion that a nonuser was always preferred as an employee if 
there were a choice between an opium smoker and a non-
user. He estimated that about one-third of the population 
of Hong Kong used opium and said that the effects of its 
use were all bad. A Chinese employee of Jardine, Matheson 
and Company confirmed that nonsmokers were preferred 
as employees.8s 
The evidence the Commission gathered in other cities 
generally supported the opinions expressed in China that 
opium was harmful and that there were few, if any, moder-
ate users. The Commission reported its findings: opium 
use had increased recently in the Philippines despite a high 
tariff, smuggling of opium was common, and any attempt 
by the government to raise revenue from opium would ex-
pose it to criticism. The Commission also opposed allow-
ing local officials to try to control opium. It also reported 
that any attempt to devise a system of opium farms would 
only lead to more smuggling and the charge that the gov-
ernment sought revenue from a vice. Immediate prohi-
bition of opium was thought unwise as it would create a 
hardship on those already addicted to the drug. The Com-
mission thought the best solution to the opium problem in 
the Philippines was to create a monopoly and to make sure 
that the revenues from the monopoly did not exceed the 
expenses it incurred. Accordingly, the Commission recom-
mended that opium immediately be made a strict govern-
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ment monopoly and that all importation of the drug cease 
after three years, except for that purchased by the govern-
ment monopoly or used for medical purposes.89 
Licenses were to be issued to Philippine residents who 
were then addicts, and the drug was forbidden to others. 
Addicts were prohibited from voting or holding public of-
fice. The Commission also recommended that children be 
taught in the schools that opium was an evil and debasing 
habit. The cultivation of opium in the Philippines was to 
be strictly forbidden and opium dens outlawed. Anyone 
seeking medical help to cure the opium habit would be 
treated free of charge in the government huspitals if he were 
indigent.9o 
While the actions of the Philippine Commission sought 
to restrict the use of opium in the Philippines, the Com-
mission had a greater impact in arousing opinion against 
opium, particularly in China. In attempting to determine 
why among all the peoples of the world the Chinese were 
the most addicted to opium, the Commission wrote a stun-
ning indictment of Chinese society. The report of the Com-
mission was translated and widely circulated in China and 
did much to arouse the Chinese against the drug. 
The Commission's report stated, "The Chinese on the 
whole are a moral, law-abiding, industrious and frugal 
people. How comes it then that they are addicted, more 
perhaps than any other race, to opium smoking and gam-
bling, whose effects lead certainly to wastefulness and lazi-
ness, and generally to law-breaking and immorality?" The 
report noted that if this question could be answered "we 
shall have solved one problem connected with the use of 
opium in China." It also noted that, despite "well-worded 
edicts, letters, petitions, and literature condemnatory of 
opium," the government of China took no action to "pro-
hibit or limit its use" and that Chinese government offi-
cials understood their people "better than foreigners do or 
can; and it is not conceivable that all or even a majority of 
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the ruling class in China willfully and deliberately encour-
ages a custom which they all agree in condemning. And yet 
we find the opium vice, fulminated against by priest and 
illuminate, condemned and vilified by merchant and la-
borer, steadily increasing and spreading more and more 
widely."91 
The report suggested that perhaps such questions were 
incomprehensible or imponderable for any non-Chinese, 
but if such answers could be found it would perhaps help 
them in making decisions regarding opium in the Philip-
pines. The report continued with its most stunning indict-
ment of China: "There seems to be in China neither a pub-
lic opinion which controls nor a national life which welds 
and consolidates a people. There is no Chinese nation, there 
is merely a Chinese race." The report criticized the Chi-
nese concern for family instead of nation, describing it as a 
"selfishness which acts as a positive force in urging men to 
sell opium to others of a different family or clan for it is no 
matter how many persons are debauched provided only 
those of the debaucher's family are not harmed but ben-
efited." It also condemned the Chinese concept of duty 
"first and only to his family, that not only is he not his 
brother's keeper, but it is also his highest and paramount 
duty to benefit his family, even though it be by destroying 
morally and physically others not connected with his fam-
ily. To him the injury of the many for the benefit of the few 
may be a righteous duty, provided the few are his family 
and the many are not." The report continued that "this pe-
culiar altruistic selfishness" was also the root of Chinese 
"frugality, patience, laboriousness and well-recognized com-
mercial honesty; and it may not be denied that this charac-
teristic is often, if not generally, a great power for good. It 
is well known that there are many able, conscientious Chi-
nese rulers, and many Chinese whom broad charity and 
uprightness make worthy of profound respect and admira-
tion."92 
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Yet the report continued that the Chinese had few forms 
of entertainment and amusement. It said, "Absolute dull-
ness and dreariness seem to prevail everywhere .... As an 
individual may by habitual toil and attention to business 
become incapable of amusement, so a race of almost in-
credible antiquity, which has toiled for millenniums, may 
likewise reach a point in its development where the faculty 
of being amused may have atrophied and disappeared, so 
that all that remains of that desire is to spend leisure in 
placidity. And nothing contributes to this so much as 
opium." The report also stated that "if the Chinese seem 
more easily to contract habits than other nations, and [be] 
more the slaves of them, is not that due to the dullness of 
the lives of the well-to-do and to the painful squalor of the 
indigent?" The Commissioners were willing to give the Chi-
nese the benefit of the doubt that they were sincere in de-
nouncing the use of opium, but it noted that little was done 
to try to limit the importation and use of opium. They 
wrote, "The Chinese government, at Shanghai, at any rate, 
does nothing more than place a somewhat heavy duty and 
tax on opium. So far as the Committee was able to deter-
mine, no special measure to discourage or limit the use of 
opium exists in Shanghai. "93 
The Commission noted that its work produced "no evi-
dence" that the Chinese government was making "any ear-
nest effort to diminish the use of opium." It pointed out 
that "certain ... high officials wrote the most eloquent let-
ters, condemnatory of the opium traffic, and appealing to 
foreign nations to prevent its introduction into China," yet 
these individuals were believed to "have steadily increased 
the areas under opium cultivation in their own domains." 
The Commission concluded that it was the intention of the 
Chinese to exclude the British from the opium trade so that 
they might monopolize it themselves.94 
The Commission noted that it would be very hard to sup-
press the use of opium in China without the cooperation 
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of the central government. One Chinese witness had testi-
fied that a governor had attempted to suppress opium in 
his province but was shortly replaced by the central govern-
ment. The opium suppression was not carried on by his 
successor. 95 
This assessment of Chinese society and the reasons Chi-
nese used opium in far greater numbers than other peoples 
was apparently not intended as a blanket indictment of the 
Chinese people, because the report did include mention of 
the positive aspects of Chinese life. However, the report was 
issued in 1905 and a Chinese translation, done shortly there-
after, was widely circulated in China and quickly became 
another bit of fuel to feed the fires of growing Chinese na-
tionalism, particularly among returned students. Thus, what 
was begun as an investigation to determine what the policy 
of the United States government in the Philippines should 
be toward the use of opium there resulted in the publica-
tion of an important piece of literature in the anti-opium 
campaign in China. 
If the pro-opium advocates had had their way, the Indian 
opium trade would have continued forever. The demand 
was unceasing; the profits were good, and m~ny made for-
tunes dealing in the drug. But arrayed against the pro-
opium people were forces over which they had no control-
the growing medical evidence of the dangers of opium, the 
Chinese awakening to the harm the drug wrought on their 
people, and the increasing recognition in Britain and else-
where of the immoral aspect of the opium trade. The mis-
sionaries would have added that God was also against any-
one who supported the opium trade. But, most significant, 
time was against the pro-opium faction. Time was limited 
for the opium trade in the last years of the nineteenth cen-
tury, as the anti-opium cause was gaining the momentum 
that would doom the trade shortly after the turn of the new 
century. 
- FOUR -
The Anti-Opium lobby 
Comes of Age 
In the last decade of the Ch'ing dynasty, reforms of the gov-
ernment, the military, and education were implemented in 
response to the growing public demands for change from 
the traditional ways. The most successful of these reforms 
was opium suppression. l Medical evidence of the dangers 
of using the drug had been accumulating for years and now 
public opinion demanded an end to the curse that had 
plagued China for centuries. Students returning from 
abroad joined the call for reform, because they realized that 
while many countries had drug problems, none had a prob-
lem as serious as China's. More important, the people of 
the Western nations and Japan viewed the Chinese with 
contempt because of the opium problem. Many of these stu-
dents were involved in the various organizations that were 
seeking refor~ and! or the overthrow of the dynasty. How-
ever, they realized that whatever government the country 
had, China could not be a strong nation capable of dealing 
with other nations on a basis of equality if the country could 
not rid itself of the opium evil. In this milieu, the Ch'ing 
court issued an imperial edict prohibiting the use of the 
drug and negotiated an agreement with the British to end 
the opium trade from India. There was also a revival of the 
anti-opium societies during this period. These efforts at 
controlling opium also resulted in the first of the interna-
tional drug conferences, which met at Shanghai in 1909 and 
at The Hague in 1913, for the purposes of establishing in-
ternational cooperation to control opium and other dan-
gerous drugs. 
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THE 1 906 ANTI-OPIUM EDICT 
On 20 September 1906, in response to the rising tide of 
opinion in China that now opposed the use of opium and 
recognized the harm it did to the Chinese people, an im-
perial edict was issued prohibiting the use of the drug. This 
edict differed from those issued earlier because it called for 
the suppression of domestic cultivation of opium poppies, 
which had recently become a serious problem. The edict 
was accompanied by specific regulations to eradicate opium 
use. The edict read, 
Since the restrictions against the use of opium were 
removed the poison of this drug has practically per-
meated the whole of China. The opium smoker wastes 
time and neglects work, ruins his health, and impov-
erishes his family, and the poverty and weakness which 
for the past few decades have been daily increasing 
amongst us are undoubtedly attributable to this cause. 
To speak of this arouses Our indignation, and, at a 
moment when We are striving to strengthen the Em-
pire, it behooves Us to admonish the people, that all 
may realize the necessity of freeing themselves from 
these coils, and thus pass from sickness into health. 
It is hereby commanded that within a period of 
ten years the evils arising from foreign and native 
opium be equally and completely eradicated. Let the 
Government Council frame such measures as may be 
suitable and necessary for strictly forbidding the con-
sumption of the drug and the cultivation of the poppy, 
and let them submit their proposals for Our approval. 2 
Along with the edict, the government issued ten "regula-
tions prohibiting opium smoking." Regulation One stated 
that "to limit the cultivation of the poppy is the way to eradi-
cate the evil." It went on to note that the poppy was widely 
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cultivated, particularly in the provinces of Szechwan, Shensi, 
Kansu, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Shansi. Viceroys and gov-
ernors were to instruct magistrates that they had to register 
all land then under poppy cultivation. Noland not then in 
poppies was to be used for growing them, and land in pop-
pies was to be reduced by one-tenth each year until all cul-
tivation was eliminated. The regulation said, "Any person 
violating this rule will forfeit his land, and any person ceas-
ing to grow the poppy and adopting some other crop be-
fore the time required by the Decree shall be considered as 
meriting special reward."3 
Regulation Two stipulated that certificates be issued to 
all opium smokers to "prevent the possibility of new smok-
ers." The government estimated that three-tenths or four-
tenths of the people smoked opium and noted, "We must 
be lenient to those who have already acquired the habit, 
but must be strict for the future." The gentry and officials 
were called on to set the example for the common people. 
Under this regulation everyone, whatever his status, was to 
report his addiction to the local yamen, which would issue 
him a permit to purchase opium. Anyone caught buying 
opium secretly and without a permit was to be punished. 
Regulation Three called for the gradual reduction of the 
amount of opium the addicts smoked. Anyone over the age 
of sixty was to be treated leniently, because of age, but 
younger addicts were to be issued a second certificate call-
ing for a yearly reduction of their consumption by two-tenths 
or three-tenths and setting the date when they would cease 
smoking the drug. When a person ceased to smoke opium 
and his neighbors could testify to the fact at the yamen, his 
name was to be removed from the register and his certifi-
cate returned to the yamen. All addicts under the age of 
sixty who did not give up the opium habit were to be re-
ported to a higher yamen and their names were to be made 
public so that they would not be treated "as equals of the 
general public." 
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Opium shops were ordered closed by Regulation Four, 
but it was noted this could not be done until the date for 
the complete prohibition of the drug was determined. How-
ever, those shops that enticed the young to try the drug were 
to be closed within six months. Restaurants and bars were 
not allowed to keep opium for their customers, who were 
also prohibited from bringing in pipes in order to smoke 
opium in these places. The regulations said, "If there are 
any who violate the rule, they shall be severely punished." 
Taxes on opium lamps were not to be collected after three 
months, and the sale of opium lamps, pipes, and other uten-
sils was to be prohibited after six months. 
Every opium shop was ordered to register, so that the 
exact number of them would be known, under the provi-
sions of Regulation Five. Certificates were to be issued to 
the owners and they would be required to show these when 
purchasing the drug. No new opium shops were to be per-
mitted. The amount of opium and opium dross these shops 
sold was to be reported to the local yamen so the officials 
could determine the amount to be reduced each year to ef-
fect total prohibition. Any surplus at the time of total pro-
hibition was to be confiscated and a fine, double the value 
of the opium, levied. 
Regulation Six asked that medical students in each prov-
ince work on determining the best cure for the opium habit. 
The pills they manufactured were to be inexpensive and not 
to contain opium or morphia and were to be distributed 
throughout each province and sold at cost. Poor people were 
to receive the pills free. 
Anti-opium societies to aid the addicts in breaking their 
habits were ordered established by Regulation Seven. How-
ever, these societies were to focus on anti-opium issues and 
were cautioned not to "discuss any other matters, such as 
political questions bearing on topical affairs or local admin-
istration, or any other matters." 
Regulation Eight stressed that local officials and local 
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gentry would be heavily relied upon for the suppression of 
poppy cultivation and opium smoking. They were to report 
statistics on the area under cultivation, the number of smok-
ers, the amount of anti-opium pills sold, and the number 
of anti-opium societies in their areas. Irregularities were 
not to be permitted and any official found guilty of an ir-
regularity or bribery was to be punished for fraud. 
Officials who were opium smokers were the subject of 
Regulation Nine, which directed them to set the example 
for the common people and required them to give up the 
habit more rapidly. Officials over the age of sixty were ex-
empted from the regulations because of their age, but all 
other officials, including princes, generals, and governors, 
were "not allowed to conceal their affairs, and if they smoke 
opium, they shall report themselves and the dates when they 
should stop" smoking. They were not allowed to retire from 
public affairs while curing themselves from the habit, and 
they were prohibited from taking opium for any illness as 
that would prolong the cure. Lower officials, such as met-
ropolitan and provincial, civil and military officials, pro-
fessors and students, were required to stop smoking within 
six months. 
Regulation Ten noted that foreign opium was imported 
to China and instructed the Wai-wu Pu (Foreign Office) to 
undertake negotiations with the foreign powers to restrict 
the importation of opium gradually over a period of years 
so that importation would cease before the date of final pro-
hibition in China. In cases where opium was being imported 
from countries with which China had no treaties, the im-
portation was to be stopped under Chinese law. The com-
missioner of Customs was instructed to find a way to stop 
the importation of both opium and morphia at the fron-
tiers.4 
Further instructions were issued on 7 February 1907, call-
ing for anti-opium societies to be extended and opium dens 
throughout the provinces to be closed according to the regu-
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lations. All Tartar generals, viceroys, and governors and 
their subordinates were to take a "conscientious" part in 
carrying out these provisions. More important, the instruc-
tions noted that cultivation of the poppy was to be strictly 
forbidden, so that within ten years it would be entirely abol-
ished. Yet another set of instructions was issued on 26 June 
1907, noting that the officials were to take strict measures 
to rid the country of the opium evil. "If an official merely 
keeps up appearances and, while outwardly obeying, secretly 
disregards these commands, he is to be denounced by name 
for punishment," the instructions read. Officials were to 
report annually to the central government the amount of 
opium land under other cultivation in their areas. 5 
Following the issuance of the edict and the regulations, 
numerous memorials were issued by government depart-
ments giving instructions as to how the prohibitions would 
be carried out. They also dealt with such matters as allow-
ing properly licensed persons to purchase opium in vari-
ous cities if they were traveling, surveillance throughout the 
countryside to assure that the prohibitions were being 
obeyed, and awards to those who promoted opium suppres-
sion. 
Some officials who thought the gradual suppression of 
opium was not the ideal way to end the use of the drug sent 
memorials to the Throne. Among them was Hsi-liang, vice-
roy of Yunnan and Kweichow, who thought it would be pos-
sible to suppress the cultivation of opium in Yunnan on a 
much faster schedule but allowed that the accomplishment 
of this rested with the officials of that province. Another 
memorial, from Ch'en Chih-tai, the governor of Kiangsu, 
called for special penal laws for those selling morphia. He 
noted that morphia addiction was increasing since many 
people used it as a cure for the opium habit. He urged a 
strict prohibition against the manufacture and sale of 
morphia and instruments for its injection.6 Other memori-
als stated that officials were complying with the provisions 
122 CRUSADERS AGAINST OPIUM 
of the imperial edict. These generally followed the style of 
the Ningpo magistrates, prefects, and policemen, who had 
issued memorials to the various districts of the province, 
covering such topics as opium prohibition, the prohibition 
of poppy cultivation, exhortations to farmers to raise cot-
ton and grain instead of poppies, the closing of opium dens 
and a prohibition that private houses could not be used as 
opium dens, the registration of smokers and dens, and the 
destruction of opium-smoking equipment.7 
THE TEN-YEAR AGREEMENT WITH BRITAIN 
Along with the domestic suppression of opium, the Chi-
nese sought to restrict the importation of the drug, most of 
which came from British India. The Chinese probably could 
have refused to buy Indian opium, thus forcing an end to 
the trade, but the Chinese opium suppression movement 
coincided with a change in the political attitude in Britain, 
which now favored an end to the involvement of the British 
government in this trade. 
The tide had finally turned in favor of the anti-opium 
movement with the Parliamentary elections, which brought 
the Liberals to office in 1906. The new Parliament was 
mostly middle class and many of the new M.P.s were mem-
bers of the nonconformist churches, which had long been 
active in the crusade against opium. The elections also 
brought to office nearly 250 candidates who had formally 
expressed their support for the anti-opium cause. Under 
the new government, John Morley became the head of the 
India Office and Sir Edward Grey became foreign secre-
tary. They were destined to playa large role in ending the 
official opium traffic from India to China. Both had sup-
ported the 1891 Parliamentary motion of Sir Joseph Pease, 
which had declared the opium traffic "morally indefen-
sible. "8 
On 30 May 1906, a motion was made in Parliament "that 
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this House re-affirms its conviction that the Indo-Chinese 
Opium Trade is morally indefensible, and requests His 
Majesty's Government to take such steps as may be neces-
sary for bringing it to a speedy close." Morley said that the 
cabinet had given him carte blanche to deal with the ques-
tion of opium and he knew that opinion in England and 
Scotland was strongly against the trade. He said that the 
opium revenue then accounted for only 7 percent of the 
revenue of British India, although it was more important 
to the Native States. When the measure came up in Com-
mons, he declared on behalf of the government that if 
China wanted to restrict the consumption of opium, "the 
British Government would not close the door . . . to any 
plan ... brought forth in good faith ... [and] would agree 
[to it] even though it might cost us some sacrifice."9 The 
motion was approved without division, but Morley wrote 
that, had a division occurred, the motion would have been 
carried by a two hundred vote majority. IO Once the vote was 
taken, the anti-opium forces, a "'happy band of pilgrims' 
... who had fought so long to reach the goal now in sight, 
linked each other's arms and marched down from the lobby 
to the street singing the doxology."11 
It should be noted that the Chinese official, T'ang Shao-
yi, on a trip to India in 1905, had been told by Finance Min-
ister Edward Baker that the Indian government could do 
without the revenue it gained from opium. The statement 
was repeated in some correspondence of the India Office 
but little, if anything, was ever said about it in Parliament. 
The remark can be attributed either to Baker's reputation 
for being impulsive or to his desire to rid the government 
of the inconvenience of the great fluctuations in the funds 
it gained from the opium revenues. 12 
Following their 1906 edict suppressing opium, the Chi-
nese formally requested that the British end the opium trade 
from India. 13 The Chinese sent their request to the British 
on 26 January 1907, but it was 12 August before the British 
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responded. The delay was the result of the need for corre-
spondence between India and London on the matter. Fi-
nally, the British agreed that the annual export of opium 
would be reduced by one-tenth annually for ten years pro-
vided the Chinese made corresponding reductions in the 
domestic production of opium. The agreement was to last 
for an experimental period of three years, but it would be 
extended to run the entire ten years if the Chinese kept 
their part of the agreement by suppressing the drug in 
China. The agreement went into effect on 1 January 1908, 
at the insistence of the Chinese. The British had hoped to 
delay implementing it until July of that year, but the Chi-
nese insisted that was unrealistic, since the poppy would be 
gone from many parts of China by that date. The agree-
ment called for the Indian government to reduce the gross 
export of opium based on the average amount imported 
into China in the years 1901 to 1905. The amount of 51,000 
chests was accepted as the base, with a reduction of 5,lOO 
chests per year to begin in 1908. The British also agreed to 
allow a Chinese government official to reside in Calcutta 
for the purpose of inspecting the export of opium to China, 
as long as he did not interfere with the trade. However, the 
British opposed the Chinese proposal to double the tax on 
Indian opium on the grounds that it was twice as strong as 
the native drug. The British argued that the Chinese drug 
had improved in recent years and that there was no scien-
tific basis to prove the strength of one variety compared to 
another. However, the British did agree to restrict the ex-
port of opium to Hong Kong and to curtail smuggling from 
Hong Kong to China. It should be noted that the three-
year trial period was insisted upon by the British govern-
ment because very few Britishers thought the Chinese were 
sincere in their desire to rid themselves of the opium prob-
lem. Many Englishmen thought the Chinese were seeking 
to suppress the Indian drug so that they might monopolize 
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the trade for themselves. Sir Edward Grey suggested that 
Sir Alexander Hosie undertake an investigation of poppy 
cultivation in western China to see if the Chinese were keep-
ing their part of the agreement and suppressing domestic 
poppy cultivation. Chinese officials agreed to the proposal. 14 
THE ANTI-OPIUM SOCIETIES 
As it became increasingly evident that there was growing 
popular support in China for opium suppression and par-
ticularly after the issuance of the 1906 edict, the missionary 
anti-opium societies renewed their efforts to end the use of 
the drug in China. Chinese anti-opium societies also sprang 
up in many areas, particularly as public opinion opposing 
opium use increased. 
The Anti-Opium League, which had been active prior to 
the Boxer Uprising, renewed its efforts to convince addicts 
to give up the drug. Although the league's members were 
greatly encouraged by the 1906 edict, they recognized that 
they needed to continue their efforts if complete suppres-
sion of opium were to become a reality. For each provincial 
capital the league appointed an Executive Committee to 
"watch over the closing of the dens, the diminution of the 
poppy-acreage, and the sales of raw opium, and report the 
failures" to appropriate officials. 15 
In a letter to missionaries, the Rev. Hampden C. DuBose 
urged them not to relax their efforts against opium. He said 
that the next months would be crucial and noted that he 
had a report from Hsuchow, Kiangsu, which said, "The 
poppy this year was pulled up through fright; the few who 
kept the plant in their fields paid only a nominal tax; there 
is great danger lest the whole country grows the poppy next 
year." As with all such letters DuBose asked for money for 
the Anti-Opium League. Missionaries were urged not to 
forget the churches at home. DuBose called for them to 
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"Hear the voice from Heaven, 'Write.' Write to papers at 
home, religious and secular, city and village on opium re-
form in China."16 
The Chinese delegation to the International Opium Com-
mission in Shanghai in 1909 reported on the work of the 
anti-opium societies in Fukien, stating they had issued fifty-
six letters and documents "urging the people to give up 
the opium habit and striving to create a sentiment against 
opium." Both the Anti-Opium League and the Chinese 
anti-opium societies were active in public burnings of opium 
equipment. The Fukien anti-opium society held eight 
public burnings of opium and opium-smoking equipment 
with the following destruction reported: 4,433 pipes, 4,482 
pipe bowls, 3,693 lamps, 3,497 boxes, 3,620 plates, 8,971 
needles, 427 large and 87 small cooking vessels, plus 3,138 
ounces of opium and 577 ounces of opium deposits from 
pipes. 17 
After the issuance of the 1906 edict the Chinese govern-
ment appointed seven mandarins with plenipotentiary pow-
ers to act as the Governmental Opium Commission. They 
were to "travel from province to province and prefecture to 
prefecture, closing the dens, destroying the fields of poppy, 
cashiering the opium-smoking officials, shutting up the raw 
opium hongs, strengthening the hands of the Anti-Opium 
Societies, helping the poor inebriates to get rid of the crav-
ing and with the iron rod of Anti-opium breaking in pieces 
the potters' vessels of poison. "18 
As these anti-opium activities increased, some Chinese 
officials came to realize that the missionaries, with whom 
they had many differences on other issues, could be useful 
allies in the fight against opium. Nanking Viceroy Tuan 
Fang wrote to the Reverend DuBose in 1908, saying, "Your 
whole-hearted exhortations in the anti-opium cause, [and] 
the fame of your benevolence commands the respect of all 
both far and near. "19 And the Throne took note of the work 
of the foreigners in combating opium in an imperial de-
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cree dated 22 March 1908. The decree outlined the evils of 
opium and the harm it brought to China and mentioned 
the fact that officials, gentry, literati, and common people 
were now urging that the drug be given up. The decree ac-
knowledged that people from various countries were active 
in the movement and that many had made anti-opium medi-
cines. The foreigners "show deep regret in seeing that the 
people of China do not abolish the drug from the country. 
If people of other countries show this feeling, how much 
more should it be our duty who have this fatal habit among 
us to use our best endeavors to eradicate the habit from 
our midst. "20 The decree continued mentioning the 1906 
anti-opium edict and the 1907 agreement with Britain call-
ing for the ten-year reduction of the opium trade. It cau-
tioned, "Once we fail, it is to be feared that the opportunity 
may not come again to us. If we should ourselves eternally 
be unable to get rid of the fatal habit we shall be a lost coun-
try. When one thinks of this, from the Emperor on his 
Throne, the Ministers with him, down to the meanest sub-
ject, all ought to be filled with shame, alarm and uneasi-
ness."21 
In attempting to learn how widespread was the popular 
support against opium, the Anti-Opium League in 1908 sent 
out questionnaires to mission stations throughout China 
asking the status of anti-opium movements in each area. 
The 180 responses indicated that, except in some small ar-
eas where there was indifference, there was general enthu-
siasm for opium reform. The respondents reported that 
support come from the upper classes, who recognized that 
opium suppression was for the public good, and from the 
merchants and farmers, who saw it as a means of national 
reform. Those who opposed the reform either could not 
see the benefits of refraining from opium use or thought 
officials would be unable to cope with the task of suppres-
sion. From Szechwan came the report, "As this is an opium 
center the people fear the spoiling of their business and 
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therefore public opinion is against the suppression of the 
trade."22 
Members of the Anti-Opium League saw public opinion 
finally coming to support the position they had maintained 
for years. They said that the bell was finally tolling for the 
opium trade and that the work of so many in the past was 
finally bearing fruit. The long-ago petition of the clergy-
men of the Church of England and the speeches in the 
House of Commons on the moral issue involved in the offi-
cial opium trade were finally resulting in the removal of 
the curse from the Chinese countryside. Five years from the 
opening of the International Opium Commission meetings 
in Shanghai (31 December 1914) the Anti-Opium League 
predicted, "The funeral rites of poppy and opium will be 
performed, and glad hosannah resound, from desert to 
sea."23 
With the success of the anti-opium crusade in China, the 
missionaries could point to at least one area where their 
years of effort had paid off. One Westerner in conversa-
tion with the Reverend DuBose said the evangelistic efforts 
of the missionaries had borne little fruit. DuBose agreed if 
the man meant converts, but "if we look at opium there was 
more accomplished in the months of April, May, and [June] 
this year than in the three score and ten years that are past." 
The man agreed and said, "I see your meaning. The 
progress for a century has been slow; there may soon be 
large and rapid in-gatherings into the church. "24 Such must 
have been the wish of countless missionaries. Since none 
of the churches allowed opium addicts into membership, 
the missionaries now saw vast numbers of former addicts as 
potential converts. To the missionaries who had had their 
attention and efforts diverted from preaching the Gospel 
to fighting opium, surely the predicted end of the opium 
problem came as a welcome relief. The end had come, not 
only through the missionaries' efforts, but also as the result 
of the changed attitudes on the part of the Chinese, who 
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now encouraged the domestic suppression of the opium evil, 
and on the part of the British, who now favored the end of 
the government's involvement in the opium trade. None-
theless, the missionaries were pleased. 
THE 1907 PROTESTANT MISSIONARY CoNFERENCE 
In 1907 the Protestant missionaries held the China Cente-
nary Missionary Conference at Shanghai and discussed their 
anti-opium work and the successes of the recent reform 
movement in China. Because of the government's anti-
opium decree, more and more people were seeking help in 
the opium refuges the missionaries ran. They viewed this 
as a new opportunity to make contacts with Chinese who 
might otherwise have never come into close contact with 
Christians. 
In resolutions adopted by the conference, the missionar-
ies reaffirmed their opposition to the opium trade, which 
they had stated at the Missionary Conference in 1877 and 
reaffirmed at the one in 1890. They expressed their thank-
fulness for the efforts of the British and Chinese govern-
ments to end the trade and the use of opium and morphia 
in China. The missionaries praised the Chinese government 
for its ten-year plan to suppress the use of the drug and 
noted that they ·believed the government was sincere in its 
efforts, regardless of the final success or failure of the cam-
paign. They also stated that regardless of the outcome of 
the Chinese government's program, it was the missionar-
ies' conviction that nothing could justify the continuation 
of any government or individual in the demoralization of 
the Chinese people with opium-not even the pretext that 
the rulers of China were doing the same.25 
The conference also resolved "to urge Christians in all 
lands where numbers of Chinese are living to earnestly co-
operate in securing public sentiment against the use and 
sale of opium. "26 In discussing this resolution, Arnold Fos-
130 CRUSADERS AGAINST OPIUM 
ter expressed the opinion that the officials who were pres-
ently in charge of opium suppression were themselves 
opium addicts. He also feared that if the opium revenue 
abruptly ended and no new revenues were found to replace 
them, there would be a negative reaction to the opium sup-
pression campaign. Dr. William H. Park urged that the 
church reaffirm its stand that church members could not 
smoke opium, grow poppies on their land, sell the drug, 
rent houses for use as opium dens, or engage in selling the 
anti-opium remedies that contained opium and its deriva-
tives. He also urged the missionaries to join with the Chi-
nese in the anti-opium societies they were beginning to es-
tablish throughout the country. He noted that the Chinese 
were capable of leading the anti-opium societies but that 
many welcomed the help of the missionaries, who had long 
been opposed to opium. Archdeacon Arthur E. Moule 
noted that he had opposed opium at the 1877 Missionary 
Conference and continued to do so. He reported that upon 
his return from England five years earlier he had been hor-
rified to find that opium smoking was "no longer regarded 
with shame, but was becoming fashionable." He said he was 
astonished at the change in attitude toward opium that had 
come over Britain and China in recent years but hoped that 
it would bring an end to the opium curse.27 
THE OPIUM REFUGES AND CURES·FOR ADDICTION 
The missionaries had long been concerned with trying to 
cure opium addicts of their habits, but the problem became 
more crucial with the decision of the government to pro-
hibit the use of the drug. As early as the 1860s, both medi-
cal and nonmedical missionaries established opium refuges 
where they sought to cure those who voluntarily came for 
help. The primary aim of many of the missionaries was to 
cure the addicts so that they might be admitted to church 
membership. Within an opium refuge run by missionaries, 
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the addicts were treated to liberal doses of Christianity as 
they withdrew from their dependence on the drug. In 1906 
the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
reported that in one of their refuges "morning and evening 
prayers were held with the patients. They are taught Chris-
tian hymns, the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer. 
The period of enforced seclusion and idleness gives great 
opportunity for sowing the seed, and good soil is often 
found in the hearts of men who are fighting victoriously 
with their greatest enemy."28 Yet, as withdrawal symptoms 
became intense, Christianity alone was not enough to ease 
the suffering and the addicts would do almost anything to 
obtain opium to satisfy their cravings. 
Missionaries reported a constant struggle to keep the ref-
uge inmates from securing opium. The problems the mis-
sionaries had with their refuges were complicated by their 
lack of medical knowledge about the nature of opium ad-
diction and the difficulties of withdrawal. Every mission-
ary who ran a refuge reported the addicts suffered with-
drawal symptoms, and this led to a debate on the best way 
to end addiction. Some missionaries favored complete with-
drawal of the drug at the time the addict entered the ref-
uge, while others favored gradual withdrawal over a period 
of weeks. Some of the missionaries tried pharmaceutical 
cures to ease the pains of withdrawal. In his survey of doc-
tors, Dr. William H. Park had asked their opinions on the 
method they used to withdraw the drug from the addict. 
Of those replying, forty-one said they withdrew the drug 
suddenly, twenty-two said they withdrew it gradually, and 
seven said they used both methods, depending on the gen-
eral condition of the patient. Of those who withdrew the 
drug suddenly, all reported the addicts suffered severe with-
drawal symptoms. However, some doctors argued that these 
symptoms were the same as those the addicts suffered if 
the drug were withdrawn slowly.29 
The problems of the refuges were vividly described by 
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the founder of one of the earliest refuges, the Rev. Frederich 
F. Gough of the Church Missionary Society in Ningpo. He 
started his work in the 1860s by taking addicts into his home 
to help them break the habit. Accepting several at a time, 
he treated a total of 133 patients, charging them each a small 
fee to cover his costs. He reported that after a few days with-
out the pipe they "suffered agonies of craving . . . worse 
than any drunkard for drink." To obtain opium, Gough re-
ported, the addicts lowered baskets through the windows to 
people outside who supplied them with the drug. When 
the windows were barred, the addicts broke down the bars. 
Inside the refuge, as the withdrawal symptoms became 
worse, "violent quarrels took place, tempers being irritated 
by restraint and by the sight of some securing the longed-
for drug." Others reported that the best opium refuge had 
high walls, no windows, and a gatekeeper who was abso-
lutely incorruptible. Although the opium addicts had vol-
untarily sought help in the refuge, many wanted to leave 
once the withdrawal symptoms began. Many missionaries 
required that addicts promise to stay in the refuge until 
cured of the habit, but only the strongest and most deter-
mined addicts were able to endure the cure, and only the 
strongest and most determined missionaries were able to 
endure the groans and pleading of the addicts. 30 
The Rev. Moir Duncan of the English Baptist Mission in 
Shensi wrote of the opium refuge he ran that "voluntary 
endurance of a few days' misery was evidence that the men 
were sincere in their wish to abjure the evil habit." Yet he 
noted that he sometimes had to use force to get the patients 
to stay, as "some scaled the walls during the night, [and] 
some groaned to elicit pity and relax stringency." He said 
it was impossible to know how many remained free of the 
drug after leaving the refuge. 31 
The methods of curing the opium habit were much de-
bated by medical doctors. Cures ran the gamut from the 
latest opium derivatives to home remedies. Some mission-
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aries who lacked funds to purchase opium cures reported 
they had good success simply by withdrawing the drug and 
feeding the addict good food. Within a few days, they re-
ported, the addict was cured. 32 Because medical science had 
not yet acquired adequate information on opium deriva-
tives, many of them were thought to be the answer to the 
opium addicts' problem. Anti-opium pills, usually·contain-
ing morphine, were widespread in China in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Dr. John Dudgeon sold 
anti-opium pills containing morphine in a street shop near 
his hospital. Other doctors sold pills containing quinine or 
belladonna or combinations of both. 
In his survey of physicians, Park asked if opium addicts 
desired to break the habit and if they could do it alone. 
Nearly all the doctors replied that addicts did desire to stop 
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using opium, although some qualified their answers by say-
ing addicts wished to stop the habit if it could be done pain-
lessly. Dr. Henry M. McCandliss replied, "Yes, if someone 
else could do the suffering for them." Most of the doctors 
acknowledged that it was possible for an addict to break the 
habit by himself, but some doctors said this was rare for a 
confirmed addict. Yet, nearly all the doctors knew of at least 
one such case. Almost all the doctors also said that anti-
opium pills containing morphine were sold freely in their 
areas. Some recognized the dangers of the pills and sug-
gested that they should be banned by the Chinese authori-
ties. Indeed, the value of morphine entering China in-
creased dramatically in the 1890s, when it entered duty free. 
The Shanghai Customs House reported that 15,711 ounces 
of morphia had entered that port in 1892, but by 1897 the 
amount had reached 68,170 ounces. This morphia was val-
ued at $18,790 (Mexican) in 1892 and at $172,578 (Mexican) 
in 1897. 
In addition to morphia pills, hypodermic injections were 
becoming more common in the late 1890s. Dr. Park re-
ported that "ghouls, with hypodermic syringes and morphia 
solutions up their sleeves, frequent the tea shops, giving 
injections at seven cash a piece. Their victims stand in a 
row and pass before them ... they never cleanse their sy-
ringes, and when their solutions give out they prepare a 
fresh supply, using dirty water found in the tea shops and 
mixing it in cups that have not been properly washed since 
the days of Yao and Shun. "33 The treatment incapacitated 
many coolies, and Dr. Park knew of one death caused by it. 
Some doctors even tried the morphia cure on their pa-
tients. Dr. Henry D. Porter reported that with anti-opium 
pills "the danger is that it simply continued the habit un-
der a new though very mild form," although he said that 
minute doses of morphia given by injection seemed to pro-
duce more promising results. 34 
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The wide range of cures was evident at the International 
Opium Commission meetings in 1909, where one Ameri-
can exhibited seventy-six opium cures that he had found 
contained opium.35 Earlier in 1893, the Rev. George L. Ma-
son of the American Baptist Missionary Union in Chekiang 
reported that in native shops one could purchase "dozens 
of preparations, liquids, powders, pills, lozenges, put up in 
attractive shape and flamingly advertised as sure cures of 
the opium habit." Some of these were made by foreigners 
and some by Chinese druggists, and of the seven Mason 
had analyzed all contained opium as the chief ingredient.36 
A systematic study of anti-opium pills done in conjunc-
tion with the International Conference on Opium held at 
The Hague in 1912 revealed that virtually all of the eighty-
nine brands contained morphia. The pills had such names 
as "Resurrection pill," "Awakening China anti-opium pill," 
"Heaven-made cure," "Cure for old habit," "Instantaneous 
cure," "Universal Salvation," "Benefit of Heaven," "Glori-
fying Heaven anti-opium powder," "Race protecting pill," 
and "A fortnight cure."37 
Medical science lacked a real cure for the opium habit, 
but many doctors were experimenting with drugs and com-
binations of drugs. Dr. G. King reported he had had some 
success with quinine, nux vomica, phosphorus, and bella-
donna (Nux vomica was the seed of Strychnos nux-vomica 
Linne, commonly known as Quaker or bachelor's buttons). 
Dr. King reported that quinine alone was the least effective 
cure he had tried. Nux vomica was quite effective, but it 
worked too slowly for the opium addict, who needed an 
immediate cure. Phosphorus was the best cure and it was 
most effective when used in combination with quinine, nux 
vomica, or some other nerve stimulant. Phosphorus and 
belladonna used in combination were also thought to be 
quite effective. Unfortunately, Dr. King noted, most of these 
cures were too expensive for purchase by missionaries, but 
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he reported the Kirby firm of London was willing to sup-
ply a special preparation of phosphorus, quinine, and nux 
vomica for anti-opium work only at a special reduced price 
for missionaries. At this special price the cures would cost 
only about one penny a day. 38 
Dr. King's prescriptions for curing the opium habit were 
disputed by Dr. Dudgeon, who noted that quinine was very 
effective but that its price was too high for it to be widely 
used. He preferred a pill he made, composed of camphor, 
extract of gentian, cinnamon, ginger, capsicum, and a quar-
ter grain of Smyrna opium. Capsicum or cayenne pepper 
was an ingredient of many opium cures.39 
Anti-opium pills containing opium were so commonly 
prescribed by the missionaries that they were known as 
"Jesus opium," much to the horror of those dispensing them. 
The distribution of pills containing opium derivatives by 
medical missionaries was denounced by the China Medical 
Missionary Association, which urged that church members 
not be allowed to use them.40 Laudanum, the most common 
form of opium used in the Western countries, was also used 
as an opium cure in China, even though most doctors knew 
it was an opium derivative. Dudgeon noted that laudanum 
mixed with peppermint and quassia was as effective an 
opium cure as were morphine injections.41 
Considering the cures the missionary doctors tried, the 
addict was probably better off if he went to a refuge run by 
a nonmedical missionary. Many such missionaries, lacking 
medical knowledge about drugs and the money to purchase 
the cures, simply withdrew the drug and fed the addict nour-
ishing food. Many, to their surprise, found this to be an ef-
fective cure. Indeed, because many addicts chose to buy 
opium instead of food and because opium upset the diges-
tive system, many addicts simply had not had proper nour-
ishment for a long time. Once the body received food in-
stead of opium, many addicts soon broke their dependence 
on the drug.42 
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THE INTERNATIONAL OPIUM COMMISSION 
The British and the Chinese realized that their attempts to 
end the India to China opium trade and the illegal use of 
opium in China could not be successful without a much 
wider effort to stop the illegal use and trade of opium and 
its derivatives. Following the work done by the Philippine 
Commission, the Americans, too, realized that international 
controls for drugs were needed. Under the leadership of 
President Theodore Roosevelt, the Americans urged that 
an international conference be called to deal with the ques-
tion of opium in China and more generally with the world-
wide drug situation. 
Accordingly, the International Opium Commission, the 
first ever organized, met at Shanghai on 1 February 1909. 
Countries sending delegates included Austria-Hungary, 
China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Neth-
erlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia, Siam, and the United 
States. Noteworthy among the delegates were the Right Rev. 
Charles H. Brent, D.D., bishop of the Philippines, who be-
came president of the conference; His Excellency Tuan 
Fang, viceroy of Kiangsi and Kiangsu; and Sir Alexander 
Hosie, British consul-general in China. The conference di-
vided itself into seven committees, with Sir Alexander Hosie 
serving on the committee to consider the "Growth of the 
Poppy and the Production of Opium." He was assisted by 
Hamilton Wright, M.D., a member of the United States 
delegation, and the Honorable Lew Yuk-lin, a member of 
the Chinese delegation.43 
The Commission began its work with a statement by Tuan 
Fang on the status of opium in China. He noted that the 
1906 decree had called for a ten-year plan to abolish opium 
production and use in China. He said there had already 
been an 80 percent reduction in the Kiangnan area of 
Kiangsu and that officials from six provinces-Shansi, 
Yunnan, Fukien, Anhwei, Honan, and Heilungkiang-had 
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informed the throne that all opium poppies would be gone 
from their areas by winter. He noted that the officials and 
the gentry in many provinces were taking the lead in anti-
opium societies to help addicts break the habit. He predicted 
that the cultivation of the poppy would be stopped entirely 
within the next several years.44 In the opening session of 
the meeting, Bishop Brent noted that the delegates were 
not envoys extraordinary nor ministers plenipotentiary and, 
hence, any conclusions or recommendations they made 
would not be binding upon their governments.45 
Much of the work of the Commission dealt with a study 
of the Jaws and actions of the countries represented in 
regard to opium and other drugs. On 8 February, T'ang 
Kuo-an presented a report on China, covering such topics 
as cultivation, production and consumption of opium; 
morphia; anti-opium remedies; and anti-opium measures. 
He acknowledged that it was extremely difficult to obtain 
adequate statistical information because of the lack of 
proper government machinery to collect such data. He 
stated that "about 25 percent of the total quantity of opium 
produced in China escaped taxation, and that the Imperial 
Exchequer received not more than one-third of the revenue 
actually collected, the remaining two-thirds being retained 
by the different provinces for local administrative purposes." 
He estimated that "more than 600,000 piculs of opium were 
consumed annually within the Empire up to the year 1906." 
T'ang also said that enormous quantities of morphia were 
being "imported clandestinely" to China. He called for ac-
tion to stop the spread of anti-opium remedies, most of 
which contained opium or its derivatives. He described the 
task "as stupendous, and declared that the Chinese people 
were grappling earnestly with a problem greater than any 
that had ever confronted a nation in the history of the 
world."46 
Addressing the Commission on 12 February, Sir 
Alexander Hosie called on the Chinese to furnish more 
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accurate information on opium cultivation. He noted that 
as part of the opium suppression decree the government 
had called upon local officials to obtain this information 
for the central government. He said he thought rough ap-
proximations of the acreage under cultivation detracted 
from the value of the Commission's work, particularly when 
those approximations concerned the inland provinces where 
the largest amount of opium was produced. Hosie also took 
issue with some of the figures in the Chinese report. He 
said that it was impossible to tell where imported opium 
was being consumed in China, because once it entered the 
port and the tax on it was collected it might be transported 
anywhere in the empire without again coming under the 
scrutiny of the Customs Service. He also noted the big dif-
ferences in the amounts of opium production reported 
within China and said that these reports were misleading. 
He also took issue with the report that opium cultivation 
would be suppressed by the following winter, since in some 
parts of China, notably Manchuria, opium was a summer 
crop.47 
Hosie gave the Commission his own estimates on the num-
ber of opium smokers in China. He estimated them to be 
6.64 percent of the adult population, taking into consider-
ation women, many of whom were opium smokers. For adult 
men, he estimated the rate was 13 percent. He acknowl-
edged, however, that his figures were based on the 1906 
Customs reports on the amount of opium in China and he 
knew that these figures might be erroneous. He concluded 
by saying that the actual figures on the production and con-
sumption of opium in China were still unknown, as there 
was no reliable way of compiling statistical data on the sub-
ject. The members of the Chinese delegation indicated that 
they accepted Hosie's criticism in the light in which it was 
made, since they knew he was sincerely interested in end-
ing the opium evil in China.48 
The question of anti-opium remedies was also con sid-
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ered by the Commission. T'ang Kuo-an stated that China 
was having difficulty suppressing the sale of these items and 
noted that all of them entered the country through the treaty 
ports and that it would be impossible to suppress them with-
out the cooperation of the treaty powers.49 
At a session on 23 February, Charles D. Tenney, Chinese 
secretary to the American legation, Peking, addressed the 
Commission, saying it was fortunate "that the deliberations 
... have not been disturbed by the clashing of extreme or 
hysterical views on one side or the other of the opium ques-
tion .... The world knows and admits that opium and 
morphia constitute a danger that threatens the welfare of 
China, and ... other nations." He also acknowledged that 
it was beyond question that the use of opium and morphia 
"enfeebles the will, diminishes the efficiency, and injures 
the characters of the people." He pointed out that of the 
nations at the meeting only China was not free to safeguard 
its people from opium use and they had "suffered most se-
verely from the spread of the opium habit." Although he 
noted the inaccuracies in the Chinese reports to the Com-
mission and the difficulties the Chinese government had 
in controlling various provinces, he thought the Chinese 
government was thoroughly committed to the anti-opium 
movement, that public sentiment was in favor of it, and that 
real progress had been made since the issuing of the Impe-
rial Edict of 1906. He called upon the other nations to help 
the Chinese in their effort, as he stated the Chinese were 
like other people and thus capable of "earnest endeavor 
and great sacrifice" when it was to their benefit.50 
T'ang Kuo-an, speaking on behalf of the Chinese del-
egation, acknowledged that the opium problem was a "most 
acute moral and economic question" and stated that how-
ever much other countries might help China in the end it 
was the Chinese who had to work for their own salvation. 
He noted that many thought China incapable of taking ac-
tion against opium but acknowledged the efforts of those 
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who had worked on China's behalf, particularly Lord 
Shaftesbury, Lord Morley, Sir Joseph Pease, Joseph G. 
Alexander, Benjamin Broomhall, and J. Hudson Taylor. 
T'ang thought it was normal to assume that the Chinese 
would not be able to "grapple successfully with the evil in 
her own borders." Yet he noted "the curse was so wide-
spread, the difficulty of breaking the opium habit [was] so 
great, the clandestine use of the drug [was] so easy, and the 
difficulties [were] so baffling and enormous, that it [was] 
not strange if anyone should have conceived success to be 
impossible. To these doubts, however, the national sentiment 
against opium has proven an effective answer." He said that 
opium was the first question that had aroused the whole of 
the Chinese people to action. Because there was now the 
commitment to take action he asked the help of other na-
tions. He noted, "It is a well-known fact that such an inten-
sity is difficult to maintain over an extended period. The 
public mind cannot be kept centered for a long period of 
years upon a single reform. When a people is ready to abol-
ish an evil, it should be done as soon as possible. Delay 
increases difficulties immeasurably." T'ang ended his state-
ment by calling for China to have a "new relationship of 
friendship and understanding with the rest of the world" 
and by appealing to the others to recognize the higher moral 
law that transcends all else, "which through Confucius, says, 
'Do not unto others what thou wouldst not have others do 
unto you,' and which through Jesus Christ, says, 'Thou shalt 
love thy neighbor as thyself. "'51 
The resolutions adopted by the Commission acknowl-
edged the sincerity of the Chinese government in its at-
tempts to suppress opium throughout the country. The 
participating countries were urged to work for the gradual 
suppression of the practice of opium smoking in their ter-
ritories. The use of opium for any but medicinal purposes 
was declared a matter for prohibition and careful regula-
tion. The Commission found that each participating gov-
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ernment had strict laws to prevent the smuggling of opium 
and urged their enforcement. The Commission also noted 
that the unrestricted manufacture and use of morphine was 
harmful and urged the various countries to take the neces-
sary measures to control the spread of the morphine habit. 
Regarding anti-opium remedies, the Commission noted that 
it did not have the facilities to investigate them scientifi-
cally but urged that the various governments do so. Since 
the question of opium in the foreign concessions and settle-
ments in China was a problem now that China was suppress-
ing the drug, the Commission recommended the closing 
of the opium dens, the prohibition of the sale of anti-opium 
remedies containing opium, and the enforcement of the 
various countries' pharmacy laws in these areas.52 
THE HAGUE CoNFERENCE 
The International Opium Commission that met in 1909 
could only make recommendations and had no authority 
to make binding agreements, and many people recognized 
that its value had been limited. As a result of this short-
coming, American president William Howard Taft proposed 
that another conference be called and that the delegates 
have plenipotentiary powers. Accordingly, the second con-
ference met at The Hague from 1 December 1911 to 23 Janu-
ary 1912. The same nations that had attended the 1909 meet-
ing were present at the 1911-12 meeting, with the exception 
of Austria-Hungary, who declined while noting that the pro-
ceedings would be watched with sympathy. Turkey was also 
invited to The Hague Conference but did not attend. Prior 
to the meeting the United States government had sent to 
all participating nations a list of topics to be considered, 
including uniform national laws regulating the production, 
manufacture, and distribution of opium and its derivatives; 
restrictions on the number of ports opium-producing coun-
tries might use to ship the drug; measures to prevent opium 
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being shipped to countries that wished to restrict or pro-
hibit its importation; notification of the countries involved 
of the amount of the drug in international transit; regula-
tions for the mailing of opium; and restriction and control 
of the cultivation of the poppy so that no other nation would 
attempt to fill the void created by China's and India's drop 
in production. Other matters to be considered were: the 
application of various governments' pharmacy laws to 
the consular districts, concessions, and settlements in China; 
the re-examination of treaty obligations and international 
agreements under which the opium traffic was then regu-
lated; uniform penal laws for offenses against the laws of 
the powers regarding the production and traffic in opium; 
uniform identifying marks for packages of opium in inter-
national transit; permits for opium exporters; the recipro-
cal right of search of vessels suspected of carrying contra-
band opium; measures to prevent the illegal use of flags by 
vessels carrying opium; and the advisability of an interna-
tional Commission to be entrusted with carrying out the 
agreements. 53 
The British indicated their objections to several of the 
points but added they would like to have morphia problems 
dealt with at the conference. They also wished the confer-
ence to refrain from considering matters that had been regu-
lated by treaty between Britain and China, as well as mat-
ters dealing with the production of opium for domestic use 
in India and other British dominions. 54 
The Hague Conference was criticized by many anti-opium 
leaders because they thought it would lack authority as long 
as the British were not willing to have the question of their 
trade with China discussed. However, the conference did 
result in the signing of an international convention in which 
all the contracting powers agreed to take measures to pre-
vent the export of raw opium. With regard to prepared 
opium, the contracting powers were to take measures to 
gradually suppress its manufacture, trade, and use within 
144 CRUSADERS AGAINST OPIUM 
their countries, and its export was prohibited. Medicinal 
opium, morphine, and cocaine were also regulated under 
the terms of the treaty. 55 
With regard to China, the contracting powers that had 
treaties with China were to work in conjunction with the 
Chinese government to prevent the smuggling of opium and 
other drugs into Chinese territory, the powers' Asian colo-
nies, and leased territories in China. The Chinese govern-
ment was to take measures to prevent the smuggling of these 
drugs from China into the foreign colonies and leased ter-
ritories. In addition, the Chinese government was to pro-
mulgate pharmacy laws regulating the sale of these drugs 
in China. Both the treaty powers and the Chinese were to 
take measures to restrict and control the habit of smoking 
opium, and opium dens were to be closed. The use of the 
drug in all places of entertainment was to be forbidden. 
All the nations attending the meeting signed the conven-
tion, but several did so with reservations. France reserved 
the right to have a separate ratification or denunciation for 
its protectorates. Britain signed, stating the convention 
would apply to India, Ceylon, the Straits Settlement, Hong 
Kong, and Wei Hai Wei but reserved the right to denounce 
the treaty for any other possessions. Persia and Siam also 
signed with reservations, since they were not treaty powers 
in China. 56 
The Shanghai Commission of 1909 and The Hague Con-
ference of 1911-12 set the stage for further international con-
ferences to deal with the problems of the international traf-
fic in drugs. Another International Opium Conference was 
held at The Hague in 1913, and subsequent conferences were 
held under the auspices of the League of Nations. The in-
ternational cooperation on the control of drugs, which had 
begun in China in 1909, continued with the purpose of pro-
tecting the other nations of the world from the evils of the 
unregulated and indiscriminate drug use that had plagued 
China for so long. 
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CHINA'S ECONOMIC QUESTION 
Addressing the International Opium Commission in 1909, 
T'ang Kuo-an told the delegates that many people wondered 
how China would deal with the loss of revenues gained from 
opium. His response was that the Chinese people were so 
determined to end the use of opium in their country they 
would gladly pay new taxes on other items if it meant the 
country were free of the drug.57 He continued that the eco-
nomic burden of opium had become "almost unbearable." 
He cited as a conservative estimate 584,800 piculs of opium 
produced domestically in 1906: he valued it at TIs. 220 mil-
lion. Added to the 1905 value for imported opium, TIs. 30 
million, this meant that the Chinese had expended TIs. 250 
million on the drug. The land that had been producing 
opium was now planted in wheat and other crops, which he 
estimated would yield an annual return of TIs. 150 million. 
This sum added to the other cost meant the cultivation of 
opium cost China TIs. 400 million per year. The social cost 
of the loss of productivity among addicts was even more 
difficult to determine, but it was thought to be TIs. 1,250,000 
per day, for an annual loss of TIs. 456,250,000. 
T'ang went on to note that opium also caused China to 
suffer a great loss of foreign trade. He acknowledged that 
other factors, such as inadequate transportation, the likin, 
and the small number of ports, hindered foreign trade, but 
he said that the poverty and inefficiency of the Chinese 
people, both of which were related to the opium evil, were 
the biggest factors preventing further development of 
China's international trade. He noted that China's attitude 
toward foreign trade was much different from what it had 
been fifty years earlier when all China wanted from abroad 
was opium and silver. He noted that cotton goods, kero-
sene oil, flour, and matches were among the imported items 
all Chinese now wanted. He said that "there can be no doubt 
about it, the opium traffic is economically, as well as morally, 
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indefensible." He said that some special interests would suf-
fer from the abolition of the opium trade if they failed to 
look beyond their immediate interests, but "there can be 
no doubt of the facts: opium is an economic loss to the world 
too great to be further endured."58 
The question of the loss of revenue was on the minds of 
many people. In China, some opium merchants requested 
that the government delay suppressing the drug until they 
could sell their present stocks to avoid any loss of money!59 
In Hong Kong, the government decided to make up its lost 
opium revenue by taxing wine and spirits. There was some 
opposition to this plan, but the government argued that it 
was the "least injurious form of new taxation which could 
have been devised. "60 
With regard to foreign trade, T'ang Kuo-an's statement 
that the Chinese now desired other products from abroad 
was borne out by the increase in the importation of certain 
goods. Kerosene imports increased yearly after the turn of 
the century as more and more Chinese, even in remote parts 
of the interior, began to demand the oil. 61 Imports of woolen 
and cotton goods were also increasing, particularly those 
from Britain, which were of better quality than the Rus-
sian fabric that was being imported to Manchuria. The Chi-
nese were also importing industrial equipment for railroads 
and mines, as well as coal, since they did not then produce 
enough to meet their demands. Foodstuffs, particularly 
sugar and wheat flour, also increased among imports at this 
time.62 
As the opium suppression campaign in China continued, 
it became evident even to skeptics that the Chinese were 
indeed serious about their desire to rid themselves of the 
drug. The change in the Chinese attitude toward opium 
coincided with a change in attitudes in the Western coun-
tries, which now favored control of opium and other drugs 
by domestic laws and international regulations. The mis-
sionaries viewed these changes as the results of their long 
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years of effort but, except for the scientific evidence gath-
ered by the medical missionaries, the changes in Chinese 
attitudes probably had little to do with the preaching of 
the missionaries on the evils of opium. Rather it was recog-
nition by the Chinese that opium was harming their people, 
and, hence, must be carefully controlled. 
In terms of economics, it became evident that other prod-
ucts would replace opium in China's imports and that lands 
planted in poppy would produce other crops that could be 
taxed by the government. Before the real economic impact 
of opium suppression could be felt, however, the 1911 revo-
lution began disrupting the suppression movement, which 
had begun with successes far greater than even its most dedi-
cated advocates could have hoped. 
FIVE -
Success and Failures 
of Opium Suppression 
As the opium suppression campaign progressed, there were 
more and more signs that the Chinese were indeed sincere 
in their desire to rid their country of all opium. Those who 
doubted the motives of the Chinese soon had to admit they 
were dedicated to the effort and committed to seeing com-
plete suppression a reality. Though the Ch'ing dynasty was 
weak and tottering, this did not stop many officials at all 
levels of the bureaucracy from trying to improve the coun-
try by eradicating poppy cultivation and the use of opium. 
Because the Chinese attitude toward opium had changed 
from toleration, or at least inaction concerning it, to intol-
erance, determination to rout out the evil was widespread. 
As the Chinese became increasingly aware of the fact that 
opium weakened them as a people and hindered their de-
velopment into a modern nation, the suppression campaign 
became more aggressive. Of course, there were those who 
for personal or economic reasons did not wish the drug to 
be eliminated. Addicts faced the difficult task of breaking 
the habit. Merchants whose business was to import the drug 
from India, farmers who grew opium as a cash crop, and 
shopkeepers who operated opium dens all opposed suppres-
sion because it meant they would lose their incomes. Weak-
nesses existed in the government and nation in the closing 
years of the Ch'ing dynasty, but the success of the opium 
suppression campaign awakened many Chinese to the idea 
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that weaknesses need not be permanent and that change 
was possible. 
China's strength in the past had been sapped by the ad-
diction of so many of its people to opium but, as the new 
century neared the close of its first decade, increasing num-
bers of Chinese came to believe that China in the future 
need not be weak for the same reason. As the Chinese awak-
ened to the new possibilities for greatness, many of them 
came to believe that if enough of them desired and worked 
for it, they really could rid the country of the drug curse. 
Many Chinese also realized that if they began such a cru-
sade and failed they could not blame the failure on anyone 
but themselves. The 1907 agreement with Britain was linked 
to the domestic suppression of poppy cultivation, and the 
success of that lay totally in the hands of the Chinese. In 
their determination, the Chinese were ready to take action 
against anyone who sought to continue the opium trade or 
the use of the drug. The legalistic, business-as-usual atti-
tude of the British concerning opium frequently conflicted 
with the Chinese goals, and when it did the Chinese re-
sponded vigorously. No longer would Chinese allow foreign-
ers to dictate what the Chinese would buy and use. China 
was now determined to chart its own course. Unfortunately, 
the drive to eliminate opium lost some of its momentum 
with the 1911 revolution, which brought unrest to the coun-
tryside and conflicting ideas about what was best for China. 
Under the 1907 agreement with Britain, the export of 
Indian opium to China was to decrease as Chinese produc-
tion declined.! The evidence of domestic suppression was 
extensive, but the reliability of the Chinese statistics and 
methods of collecting information left much to be desired 
by the British. Tuan Fang told the International Opium 
Commission in 1909 that opium cultivation was consider-
ably reduced. According to his report the poppy was totally 
suppressed in Fengtien, while other areas reported 25 to 
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80 percent of the crop suppressed, with total eradication 
expected in most areas by the end of 1909. But no one knew 
precisely how much opium was still being produced in 
China, and estimates varied widely. In figures given to the 
International Opium Commission in 1909, Hosea Ballou 
Morse estimated that the total production in China in 1905 
was 22,737,735 kilos. However, the Chinese Board of Rev-
enue set the estimate for 1906 at 8,956,006 kilos. And these 
figures differed greatly from the 1906 estimate, based on 
Customs reports, which set the amount at 35,364,435 kilos. 
Customs reports also estimated the 1908 production would 
be 22,208,599 kilos.2 
According to figures presented to the Commission, the 
foreign importation of opium actually increased slightly in 
1907 following the 1906 edict banning domestic cultivation 
and use of the drug. Total importation was listed at 54,177 
piculs in 1906 and 54,584 piculs in 1907. However, importa-
tion declined in 1908 to 48,397 piculs. In publishing its re-
port, the Commission cautioned that it "acknowledged that 
accurate statistics about opium are most difficult to obtain 
in China, and it must therefore be understood that the fig-
ures given are in many cases only approximate and the re-
sult of sifting the scraps of information received here and 
there and the putting of 'two and two together' in the minds 
of the framers of the estimates." Estimating production in 
the southwestern provinces, which produced the largest 
amounts of opium, was especially difficult since the amount 
consumed locally was unknown and "taxation [was] irregu-
lar and, for the greater part, evaded, and where public or 
official returns are practically unknown."3 
SIR ALEXANDER HOSIE'S INVESTIGATIONS 
It was precisely this difficulty in obtaining reliable statistics 
from China and particularly from the provinces where most 
of the poppies were grown that made the British reluctant 
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to reduce the trade from India without some proof that the 
Chinese were keeping their part of the 1907 agreement. 
Unwilling to accept the reports of the Chinese that poppy 
cultivation was being suppressed, the British insisted upon 
sending their own inspector to investigate the extent of 
poppy cultivation in the remote provinces. Sir Alexander 
Hosie, who had served in the British diplomatic service in 
several parts of China and who had long been interested 
in the opium problem, was selected to undertake a major 
investigation for the British in 1910-11 to report the success, 
or failure, of the opium suppression campaign. 
Following his investigation, Hosie sent reports to the Brit-
ish diplomats in Peking and published his findings in a two-
volume account, On the Trail of the Opium Poppy. His plan 
was to visit the six provinces that produced most of China's 
opium: Shansi, Shensi, Kansu, Szechwan, Yunnan, and 
Kweichow. Beginning his travels in the late spring of 1910, 
Hosie went first to Shansi, Shensi, and Kansu, it being too 
late in the season to visit the southwestern provinces where 
the poppy was then being harvested. 4 
Hosie began his journey in the city of T'aiyuan, Shansi, 
where he met with Chinese government officials, includ-
ing Ting Pao-ch'uan, governor of the province. In 1909 the 
governor had invited a representative of the British lega-
tion to visi t the province and he had been unable to find a 
single poppy plant during a journey of four hundred miles. 
Both Governor Ting and J.F. Brenan, the British consul, 
told Hosie that there were no poppies growing in the prov-
ince. In 1910 there had been an attempt to replant them in 
one district but "repressive measures were taken, resulting 
in the death by shooting of over twenty persons, the wound-
ing of over thirty, and the uprooting by troops of the young 
plants."5 
The governor reported that in 1904 there had been 1 
million mou of poppies in the province, but when he ar-
rived in 1905 he immediately set out to reduce its cultiva-
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tion. By 1908 the area was down to 330,000 or 340,000 mou 
and in 1909 and 1910 no land was planted in poppies. There 
had been fifty-six wholesale opium establishments in Shansi, 
but all were closed in 1910. There were ten official opium 
refuges in the province and over four hundred unofficial 
ones, and the governor estimated that 100,000 addicts had 
been cured, 50 to 60 percent of them completely. Despite 
these reports, Hosie noted that the central government ap-
parently was not satisfied that Shansi was completely free 
of the drug because on 27 September 1910, they had issued 
an edict listing the province as one where secret investiga-
tors had found poppies growing.6 Yet, Hosie reported, the 
provincial officials "seemed to be justly proud of the achieve-
ment of their province" and "hinted" that they felt there 
should be a further reduction of imported opium because 
of the success of Shansi. Hosie told the officials that "the 
menace to China was not Indian but native-grown opium." 
The officials "seemed surprised when I told them that at 
the Shanghai Opium Commission the Chinese delegates 
... admitted that the annual production of opium in China 
amounted to about eight times the quantity annually im-
ported from India and in former years had even exceeded 
that amount."7 
Traveling by pony, Hosie was careful to avoid the main 
roads in favor of the less-traveled routes where he might be 
more likely to see poppies. He entered Shensi and traveled 
for five days before he saw any poppies, but he acknowl-
edged that it would take months to travel up each valley so 
he admitted his observations were not complete. In Shensi, 
as well as in the other provinces he was to visit, Hosie found 
that in some out-of-the-way hamlets offices of the opium 
prohibition board had never been staffed. In all the prov-
inces he visited he saw random poppies growing on the side 
of the road but dismissed them as unharvested stray plants 
from former poppy fields that were now planted in other 
crops. In his travels, Hosie frequently consulted with local 
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missionaries on the extent of poppy cultivation in the area. 
Near Sian, Shensi, missionaries told him the poppy had in 
recent years been replaced by cereal grains, because offi-
cials were determined to eradicate poppy cultivation. On 
occasion, when he saw a field of poppies and tried to dis-
cover who owned it, he found the local people most reluc-
tant to discuss the matter. In Shensi, as in other provinces, 
he sometimes found evidence of poppies concealed within 
fields of peas, wheat, or other grains. He also reported nu-
merous poppy fields had been partially uprooted. At one 
place along the Wei River a farmer told Hosie that the pre-
vious year the area had been ablaze with poppies, but this 
year the officials were more stringent in their demands that 
poppies not be grown. As a result, all the farmers had 
planted cotton or sesamum in its place.s 
In Sian, Hosie met the governor of Shensi, En Shou, who 
told him stringent measures had been taken to reduce poppy 
cultivation, with the result that a 60 to 80 percent reduc-
tion had been achieved in the last year and that the poppy 
would be gone by the following year. The governor stated 
that poppies "might still be found growing in out-of-the-
way places and corners of the province, [but] cultivation 
might be considered as practically stopped." He also told 
Hosie that the people resented the suppression, but Hosie 
thought that would not stop the governor from continuing 
the suppression campaign. Hosie believed the reduction was 
about half the governor's estimate and that "the assurance 
given that no poppy would be grown in Shensi in 1911 can 
only be taken as a pious wish."9 
The governor and other officials tried to convince Hosie 
that he should not take the Wei River route into Kansu and 
suggested other routes to him. However, Hosie insisted upon 
following the river valley, rightly assuming that the officials 
wished him to avoid the area because they knew poppies 
were growing there. 10 
In traveling up the Wei valley, Hosie found that close to 
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the city farmers tried to conceal the fields of poppies but 
farther out in the countryside there was no attempt to hide 
them. In a distance of thirty miles he counted fifty-two fields 
of poppies. He said the officials of the area could not have 
been ignorant of their existence, because he met one offi-
cial traveling the same route and poppy fields were clearly 
visible from the road. One of the Chinese guards assigned 
to accompany Hosie told him that the poppy fields then 
growing in the province were only about one-tenth of the 
amount grown in recent years. He also said that opium 
prices had fluctuated enormously because of reduced pro-
duction and the prohibition on trade with other provinces. 
When asked why farmers grew poppies in defiance of the 
strict government measures against them, the man said, 
"One mou of land will produce opium which will realize 
seven times the price of wheat grown on the same area; and 
not only will it realize this larger amount, but it will always 
find a ready market, and what is of still greater importance 
to the farmer, ready money."11 
Prior to the imperial edict there were about 530,000 mou 
of poppies in Shensi. By 1909 this had been reduced to about 
372,695 mou. After the suppression movement it was re-
ported that the drug was still sold in 2,894 shops and 2,602 
licenses had been issued to people who were allowed to sell 
it. It was also reported that the province had 404 opium 
refuges that had cured 568,055 addicts and still had 370,036 
in their care. At the same time it was estimated that there 
were still 938,091 addicts in the province. 12 
The Rev. Arthur G. Shorrock of the English Baptist Mis-
sion in Shensi wrote Hosie about poppy cultivation in the 
province, "In the Shangchow district a great change is re-
ported this year; but, owing to much bribery, the men sent 
out to investigate gave false reports to the officials, and in 
consequence a good deal of opium has escaped detection 
among the hills away from the big roads." Yet, overall, 
Shorrock concluded, there had been a "vast change," which 
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was "supported by popular sentiment." He noted that "al-
though the people have incurred great loss by the suppres-
sion of opium growing, no [up]risings have yet taken place, 
at least to any extent. Men have been beaten, numbers have 
worn the cangue, crops have been destroyed everywhere, 
and yet the people have suffered it." He gave three reasons 
for acceptance of the situation: first, the people believed 
the officials to be earnest in the endeavor; second, "the gen-
try and better educated people are really in sympathy with 
the Government, and from patriotic reasons use their in-
fluence in the right direction"; and, third, the people as a 
whole supported the movement as they recognized the dan-
gers of opium. 13 
Hosie traveled into Kansu as far as the city of Lanchow, 
seeing 595 poppy fields on the way. At Lanchow, Hosie met 
the governor-general of Kansu-Shensi, Ch'ang Keng, who 
told him the poppy crop was reduced by some 40 percent. 14 
Several British missionaries, including George Andrew of 
the China Inland Mission, reported to Hosie that cultiva-
tion was vastly reduced in the last two years in the great 
opium-producing regions in the north and northeast parts 
of the province. However, Hosie reported that Andrew 
"would not pledge himself to actual figures. He was wise, 
for I do not think that the Chinese authorities, the Chinese 
Government, or, indeed, anyone can or will be able to say 
with any degree of precision what the actual reduction has 
been here or elsewhere."15 
The British consul in Kansu, O.R. Coales, wrote to Hosie 
that in one district of the province 50 percent of the Chi-
nese were thought to be addicts, but Muslims, Tibetans, and 
Mongols who also lived in the area did not use the drug. 16 
Going back to Shensi, Hosie counted 2,036 fields of pop-
pies in the Wei River valley, and even in the heart of the 
poppy-growing areas in southwest China he had never seen 
fields as tightly packed with flowers as he did in Kansu. It 
was on this journey back to the Kansu-Shensi border that 
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Hosie counted the largest number of poppy fields he saw 
in one day-707. rt 
The difficulty of suppressing the growth of the poppy 
was related to Hosie in the account of one such attempt. At 
the end of May, the prefect of Lanchow had been sent to a 
district to suppress poppy cultivation because the local mag-
istrate had been unable to do so. Farmers were summoned 
to meet the prefect at a resthouse, and when they were pre-
sented to him, one of them knelt before him and seized 
him by the legs. The rest of the farmers joined in the at-
tack on the official, who was severely injured and had to 
seek aid from a nearby China Inland Mission doctor. As a 
result of the attack, one of the official's assistants was be-
headed and another was imprisoned. The magistrate was 
dismissed, but the farmers continued to grow their poppies. 18 
Following his trip to the northwest, Hosie returned to 
Peking. In December 1910 he departed to visit the south-
western provinces of Szechwan, Yunnan, and Kweichow, 
where the poppy was planted in the fall and harvested the 
following spring. Lacking reliable statistics, Hosie estimated 
that in 1904 the production of opium in Szechwan was 
200,000 piculs, of which 180,000 piculs was consumed in 
the province and the rest exported, mainly via the Yangtze, 
to other provinces. According to Hosie's estimate, the opium 
production of the province was four times the amount im-
ported to China from India annually. Hosie had previously 
lived in Szechwan for five years and had traveled extensively 
in the west, south, and central parts of the province, but on 
this journey he was determined to visit the eastern section, 
about which he knew little and which was said to produce 
the largest opium crop in the province. Traveling there he 
found no poppies and learned that officials had had the 
crops destroyed in 1909 and 1910, and there had been no 
further attempt to grow them. 19 
In Wanhsien, south of the Yangtze, Hosie reported that 
poppies had been grown in two places in 1909-10, but at the 
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time of his journey opium had been entirely suppressed. A 
missionary who had taken a trip through the area a month 
before Hosie also reported no poppies. He said, "There 
were remarkable results, and there could be no doubt that 
the measures taken by the authorities had been most effec-
tive in this part of Szechwan. Farmers, however, still held 
stocks of seed in anticipation of the stringency being re-
laxed." The eastern area of the province between Wanhsien 
and Chungking had formerly produced the greatest amount 
of opium in Szechwan, and Fuchow was the center of the 
opium market. In this area there had been strenuous op-
position to the suppression measures, and in 1910 a larger 
than usual crop of opium had been harvested. Journeying 
up the Yangtze, Hosie remembered that he had visited the 
same place eight years before and had found the fields com-
pletely planted in poppies. Now he saw none. Around the 
village of Ch'ichiang on the Szechwan-Kweichow border, 
where Hosie had seen extensive poppy fields in 1882, he 
now found none. The results were the same in other areas 
where he had observed poppies in 1882 and 1903. Both mis-
sionaries and Chinese officials assured him there were no 
poppies in the province. Leaving the province Hosie noted, 
"I had now spent sixty-six days in Szechwan, once the great-
est opium-producing province in China, and, in spite of 
careful investigation, had not found a single poppy plant."2O 
From Szechwan Hosie traveled to Yunnan, where after a 
fortnight he wrote, "My quest of the poppy had been fruit-
less." Then, in the city of Tungch'uan, Yunnan, Hosie was 
told that poppies had been seen in bloom the previous week 
in one or two places to the southwest of the city. He imme-
diately set out to see for himself and encountered some of 
the most difficult terrain of his journey. On the second day 
out of the city, he came to a high plateau ideally suited for 
poppy cultivation. The people there told him they had 
planted poppies the previous autumn, but in January offi-
cials had forced them to uproot the crop. Then, in a re-
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mote mountain valley, Hosie found four plots of poppies 
from which opium was being harvested. One plot was twenty 
by five yards and the others were about twice that size, but 
the crop looked quite inferior. On a six-day journey on side 
roads, Hosie counted sixty-three plots of poppies, "an indi-
cation of the conditions prevailing in the remoter parts of 
the province." Yet Hosie noted that at a place where in 1882 
he reported that two-thirds of the valley had been in pop-
pies there were now none. He also reported that "native 
opium in Yunnan was now worth exactly its weight in silver 
or about six times its value in 1906."21 
For Yunnan, Hosie estimated the pre-1906 production at 
about 60,000 piculs. The opium of the province was con-
sidered the best produced in China and was often adulter-
ated with lower quality Szechwan opium. In the main 
opium-producing districts of the province he found culti-
vation had been suppressed, but in the remoter regions of 
the west he found a total of seventy-two plots. He thought 
this was also the case in other more remote sections of the 
eastern part of the province, which he did not visit, and 
noted that "it is true that raw opium could be purchased 
secretly at most places along the road I traveled, but that 
the supply is derived from old stocks held by private indi-
viduals, who employ friends and agents to dispose of it re-
tail." He estimated that by 1910-11 the production of the 
province had decreased by about 75 percent. Hosie cred-
ited Hsi-liang, the viceroy of Yunnan-Kweichow from 1907 
to 1909, with the suppression of much of the cultivation. 
Hsi-liang had proclaimed that cultivation of the poppy had 
to cease by 21 January 1909 and that no opium would be 
allowed to pass a customs station or likin barrier after 21 
September 1908. The viceroy, Li Ching-hsi, who came to 
the province in 1910, had, after repeated refusals, finally 
allowed opium to be exported to Tongking in 1911.22 
From Yunnan, Hosie went to Kweichow, where, stopping 
for the night at an official resthouse, he wrote he had seen 
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Lower-class opium smokers reclining on sawhorses and planks. 
Arthur E. Moule, New China and Old, 1902. 
no poppies that day, "but I was not long in smelling opium 
fumes . . . and I found it necessary to put a stop to the 
smoking of two of my porters, who were all guaranteed non-
smokers when we started from Yunnan-fu!"23 
In Kweichow in 1882 and 1883 Hosie had seen vast 
amounts of poppies growing in the narrow valleys of the 
province. In one high valley, where he had observed that 
90 percent of the crop in 1882 was poppies, he now saw only 
three stray plants, "proof that stringent measures had been 
taken to suppress cultivation." Yet the suppression effort had 
not been uniform. At one place he saw part of a field 
planted in poppies, the rest of which had evidently been 
destroyed, and a second field that had not been tampered 
with. In other places poppies grew undisturbed. 24 
The area around Longtait'ing had been the best opium-
160 CRUSADERS AGAINST OPIUM 
producing area in Kweichow, but its importance had been 
diminished as a result of the prohibition edict. Hosie found 
one field of poppies in a village where the people told him 
the poppy had been completely suppressed two years ear-
lier, but when they learned it still grew in a neighboring 
district, they too had replanted it. Then in December,Janu-
ary, and March their fields had been raided and the crop 
destroyed by officials. Hosie reported that the raids had not 
been totally effective because he saw some fields partially 
destroyed, while adjoining ones had not been touched. In 
the district, he counted sixty-seven plots still containing 
poppies. 25 
In a conversation with the governor of Kweichow, P'ang 
Hung-shu, Hosie was told that poppy cultivation was dimin-
ished about 70 to 80 percent and that it would be eradi-
cated the following year. The best estimates were that 
Kweichow produced 40,000 to 50,000 piculs a year prior to 
1906, but the opium of the region was quite inferior to that 
of Yunnan and Szechwan. While Hsi-liang took no direct 
role in the suppression movement in Kweichow, leaving the 
matter entirely to the provincial authorities, the stringent 
proclamations, repeatedly issued, had been mostly ignored 
by the farmers. In February and March 1911 troops were 
sent out to uproot the crops; sometimes they met with resis-
tance, such as the skirmish between troops and Miao-tze 
tribesmen who were growing opium, in which about a hun-
dred of the latter were killed. In twenty-nine days of travel 
in the province, Hosie counted 211 fields of poppies. 26 
Hosie wrote, in conclusion, that in 1910 poppy cultiva-
tion was eradicated in Shansi and reduced 30 percent in 
Shensi and 25 percent in Kansu, compared with 1907. Cul-
tivation had ceased in Szechwan and was reduced by 75 per-
cent in Yunnan and 70 percent in Kweichow. "This was, on 
the whole," he noted, "a notable achievement which was, 
however, nullified by the outbreak of the revolution in Oc-
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tober 1911 when the Central and Provincial Governments 
lost control and were unable, for the time being, to prevent 
a recrudescence of poppy cultivation. "27 
As Hosie's findings had vividly illustrated, the success of 
the opium suppression movement in any area depended 
upon the actions of the officials. In Szechwan the suppres-
sion was very effective, largely because of the efforts of the 
officials, Hsi-liang, Chao Erh-hsun, and his brother and 
successor, Chao Erh-feng. Just prior to leaving the prov-
ince in May 1907, Hsi-liang had written, "Opium suppres-
sion is the foundation on which China is seeking wealth and 
power, and everyone, including officials, local elite, and the 
masses must know this; going forward with their full 
strength and determination, they will be able to achieve it."28 
The British ambassador in China, Sir John N. Jordan, 
wrote that Chao Erh-hsun "had done more than any other 
man to rid his country of opium." Chao had told Jordan 
"that the knowledge that British eyes were watching and 
British observers reporting on the progress of the opium 
campaign in every corner of the province had served as a 
great stimulus to himself and his subordinates to carryon 
the struggle to the finish. "29 
It was particularly significant that Szechwan had been able 
to eliminate the poppy, which in the latter years of the nine-
teenth century had become increasingly important in the 
economy of the province. Because of its location, Szechwan 
was a major trading center, but in the 1890s several factors 
began to alter the trading patterns. Increasing imports to 
China of kerosene oil resulted in a sharp decline in the de-
mand for candle wax, which had been a major export of 
the province. The demand for vegetable dyes, long an im-
portant export, declined as chemical dyes from the West 
began reaching the Chinese coastal cities. Into these gaps 
opium quickly moved.30 Although Hosie thought there was 
popular support in Szechwan for the suppression movement, 
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a British consul told him he thought the farmers were in-
different or hostile to the movement. 31 Others thought that 
instead of direct protest against the opium suppression 
movement there was increased participation in antigovern-
ment organizations, such as the Railway League. Some 
people in Szechwan thought the success of the 1911 revolu-
tion meant they were free to do as they pleased with regard 
to planting opium.32 At the International Opium Confer-
ence at The Hague, the Chinese delegate T'ang Kuo-an 
commented upon a report in the London Times that attrib-
uted the revolutionary movement to the revival of opium 
cultivation, stating that "if this was true, it was only a re-
grettable incident of the present situation, and that when 
order was re-established, the Chinese Government would 
pursue its anti-opium measures with still greater energy 
than before."33 
In Yunnan, Hsi-liang was much more strict in his pro-
gram for opium suppression than was required by the cen-
tral government. All officials there were required to quit 
smoking immediately. Persons not holding official posts 
were given one year to stop the habit or face prosecution by 
the state. 34 This requirement that officials quit smoking 
immediately was also adopted in other provinces, with the 
result that some officials died from sudden withdrawal of 
the drug. General Ma Yu-k'un, commander-in-chief of 
northern forces at Pakou, Chihli, was "one of the noted 
victims of the anti-opium regulations. Addicted to the smok-
ing of the drug, he made a manful attempt to obey Impe-
rial behests to break off the habit. But it proved too much 
even for so strong a man as he was, and he died at 
T'ungchow in the fall of 1907. "35 
But all officials charged with opium suppression were 
not so vigorous and many were themselves addicted to the 
drug. As one Westerner noted, "the private squeeze from 
the trade, especially when it became illicit, is of course, one 
of the most elastic sources of income for the unscrupulous 
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official, and he was under the strongest temptation to be-
come a partner in the traffic. "36 
THE CHINESE RECORDER SURVEY 
The unevenness of the suppression movement was evident 
in many reports. In March 1908 the Chinese Recorder pub-
lished replies to a circular sent to missionaries in various 
parts of the country. Few replies were received from the far 
southwestern provinces, but of the others about four-fifths 
replied affirmatively to the question, "Has the anti-opium 
edict been posted?" There had been more delays in post-
ing the edict in the central provinces, and from Hupeh it 
was reported that officials had taken no action to have the 
edict made public. Asked if the move to close opium dens 
had been successful, those from Manchuria, Shantung, 
Kiangsu, Hunan, Chekiang, and Fukien reported that all 
dens had been closed, but a few missionaries noted that 
some illicit dens were still operating. Provinces reporting 
partial success in closing dens were Chihli and Anhwei. The 
effort was said to be unsuccessful in Kwangtung, Honan, 
and Hupeh. Regarding Honan, it was reported that "no 
honest attempt appeared to have been made by the high 
officials to enforce the edict," and in Hupeh "high officials 
seem to have ignored the edicts, and such success as has 
occurred in parts has been due to the action of local offi-
cials." To the question asking if there were any attempt to 
stop the sale of opium in shops, replies from Manchuria, 
Chihli, Kiangsu, and Fukien were that only officially li-
censed shops were allowed to sell the drug. Provinces re-
porting sales as usual were Shantung, Anhwei, Honan, 
Hupeh, Hunan, Chekiang, and Kwangtung. Regarding the 
reduction of poppy cultivation, the reports from Anhwei and 
Manchuria said all cultivation was forbidden; Chihli, 
Kiangsu, Chekiang, Shantung, Honan, and Fukien reported 
great reductions; Hunan and Hupeh reported there had 
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been no reduction. There was no report on cultivation from 
Kwangtung. 37 
Opium refuges had been opened in some provinces as a 
result of the suppression movement. Manchuria, Shantung, 
Honan, Chekiang, and Kwangtung each reported having 
one refuge. There were refuges in Chihli, but the mission-
aries reported that anti-opium pills and morphia were pre-
ferred methods of curing addiction there. Kiangsu had ref-
uges in Shanghai, Soochow, Chinkiang, and Hwaian, and 
Anhwei had several in various cities. Hupeh had no refuges, 
but one was said to be in the planning stages at Hankow. 
From Fukien came the report that the magistrate was at-
tempting to cure forty addicts per month but had not yet 
been successful. Asked if the suppression movement were 
a popular one (involving the gentry and the people) and if 
the official attitude were zealous, most missionaries reported 
the movement did have support among the gentry and the 
people. Yet, negative comments included, "there is opium-
smoking among the officials and consequently no zeal," 
"some officials are zealous, but the Prefect is an opium 
smoker," and "officials [are] the reverse of zealous." Only 
from Hupeh did all the reports say there was no popular 
movement and the officials were uninterested in the reform. 
More difficult to answer was the question were the Chinese 
making any attempt to influence public opinion regarding 
the opium suppression campaign. The missionaries' con-
clusion was that "public opinion in China is of so recent a 
growth, and the idea of educating it along moral lines so 
novel, that nothing systematic other than the posting of the 
edicts has been attempted. "38 
The conclusions of the reports were that opium suppres-
sion was most successful in the coastal provinces and less 
successful in the central provinces. It was also acknowledged 
that "the power of the official class to make or unmake the 
movement is evident and the fact that opium-smoking still 
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largely obtains among this class, is one of the depressing 
features of the situation. "39 
BRITISH DIPLOMATS AND THE END OF THE TRADE FROM INDIA 
The British documentation on the ending of the opium 
trade is enormous. British officials in China sent numer-
ous reports to their ambassador in Peking and to London 
on the progress of opium reform, particularly after the 1907 
agreement to reduce the trade from India to China. As pre-
viously noted, the British took the position that China had 
to be entirely free from all native opium before the export 
of the drug from India would cease. It is important to note 
that the 1907 agreement only called for the British to re-
duce the export of opium from India. It was up to the Chi-
nese to control the import of the drug to their country. The 
Chinese took the position that once an area of China was 
free from the drug, they had the right to demand that the 
importation of Indian opium to that area cease. Determin-
ing where opium was and was not growing in China and 
where the importation of the drug from India was and was 
not permitted by Chinese authorities became extremely 
complicated as the suppression movement continued. 
Because of the differences in the interpretations of the 
1907 agreement, disputes between the Chinese and the Brit-
ish quite naturally arose. Both sides hoped to resolve dis-
putes when on 8 May 1911, the British minister, Sir John N. 
Jordan, and the president of the Wai-wu Pu (Foreign Of-
fice), Tsou Chia-Iai, signed a further agreement intended 
to cover the seven remaining years of the original 1907 agree-
ment. Jordan wrote to Sir Edward Grey, Britain's foreign 
minister, that the new agreement recognized "the signal 
success which has so far attended the Chinese efforts to sup-
press the growth of native opium, and, as a token of their 
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readiness to facilitate the continuance of this work and to 
ensure its ultimate consummation. "40 
During the negotiations of the new agreement several 
major diplomatic problems regarding prohibition of the 
foreign drug and the stocks of the drug then in China arose. 
The Chinese insisted on banning the import of Indian 
opium on a province-by-province basis as domestic cultiva-
tion was curtailed. Jordan wrote to Grey that agreeing to 
this proposal would create a major problem in the coastal 
provinces; they produced little native opium, and if the 
Chinese suppressed that small amount they would be free 
to demand the exclusion of the foreign drug from these 
areas. This would mean that Canton and Shanghai, as well 
as other treaty ports located in the coastal provinces, could 
legally be closed to the drug, stopping the opium trade en-
tirely. A second problem concerned the stocks of opium then 
in the warehouses of the treaty ports. The Chinese were 
demanding that all opium coming from India be certified 
before entering China so that the amount could be care-
fully controlled. They insisted they were not responsible for 
the stocks of the drug then in the treaty ports, while the 
British pointed out that the stocks were there because of 
Chinese demand for the drug. The most the Chinese would 
offer on this point was to allow existing stocks to make up 
some of the yearly quota allowed to be imported from In-
dia.41 This matter of the existing stocks in China was to 
plague the British minister for many months to come. 
The 1911 agreement called for continuing the reduction 
of the opium trade so that it would cease entirely by 1917 or 
before that date if the Chinese could prove that all native 
cultivation had stopped (Article 1). Jordan noted that the 
movement against opium was not uniform throughout 
China, and in accordance with this situation the agreement 
provided "that Indian opium shall not enter any province 
which can establish clear evidence that it has effectively sup-
pressed the cultivation and import of native opium. It is 
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understood, however, that the closing of the ports of Can-
ton and Shanghai . . . shall not take effect except as the 
final step" of the program (Articles 2 and 3). British offi-
cials, accompanied by Chinese officials if they so desired, 
were permitted to make investigations in the Chinese prov-
inces to determine if domestic cultivation were being cur-
tailed (Article 4). The Chinese were allowed to send an 
official to India to watch the export of opium (Article 5). A 
uniform tax of 350 taels per 100-catty chest was levied on 
domestic opium (Article 6), and all restrictions imposed by 
provincial authorities on the wholesale trade of Indian 
opium were to be withdrawn and all duties consolidated in 
the import duty (Article 7). Opium exported from India to 
China was to be accompanied by a certificate so that the 
amount could be controlled to meet the yearly reductions 
necessary for the trade to end by 1917 (Article 8). The final 
article permitted the revision of the agreement with the 
consent of both parties.42 
This 1911 agreement was to cause many problems. In their 
zeal to suppress opium in their country, the Chinese, par-
ticularly some local officials, often took actions that were 
now illegal. In a message to Prince Ch'ing on 7 September 
1911, Jordan pointed out several instances of breaches of 
the treaty. He cited Fukien, where local officials had im-
posed anti-opium regulations in violation of both the 
Chefoo Agreement and the 1911 agreement. Also, local 
officials there were seizing opium that did not have the li-
cense they required. Hunan officials also required purchas-
ers of imported raw opium to pay a smokers' license tax, 
and a local tax was being levied against Chinese opium, al-
though such taxes were prohibited by the agreement.43 
The problem of local restrictions on imported Indian 
opium increasingly concerned the British diplomatic rep-
resentatives as the Chinese became more determined in 
their efforts to rid the country of opium. There were nu-
merous breaches of the 1911 agreement, which the British 
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repeatedly pointed out to the Chinese. It should be noted 
that many firms engaged in the business of importing In-
dian opium to China and did not wish to see the trade end, 
hence, they were very unhappy with the Chinese move to 
suppress the use of opium. Members of the Sassoon family 
were most vocal in protesting to British officials every at-
tempt by the Chinese to stop the trade. Quite often they 
were disappointed by the lack of vigor on the part of the 
consular officials to whom they complained, and they fre-
quently resorted to appeals to more senior officials in Lon-
don. 
Opium belonging to the Sassoons was seized by Chinese 
officials at Amoy in March 1911 and a second shipment was 
taken the following month. At least part of the problem was 
that all opium shipped from India was to be certified by 
the government there before it left for China, and frequently 
the Sassoons' ships carried uncertified opium, which Chi-
nese officials rightfully seized once the ships reached a 
Chinese port. The Sassoons also had trouble trying to sell 
the stocks they were holding in China at the time the 1911 
agreement took effect.44 
British officials could not ignore the numerous protests 
from the Sassoons and usually tried to get the Chinese to 
return the confiscated opium to the merchants. Quite fre-
quently, the Sassoons demanded both payment for the 
opium and punitive compensation for their losses, but they 
were lucky if they succeeded in getting the opium returned. 
One of these seizures of Sassoon-owned opium led the Brit-
ish to take more drastic action. The incident began when 
E.D. and David Sassoon, on behalf of their companies, in-
formed the foreign office on 23 September 1912 that 
"Anking authorities have forcibly seized and destroyed by 
fire seven cases Malwa opium taken from China Merchants' 
Steam Navigation Company's hulk. Such oppressive and 
high-handed measures have caused utmost consternation 
amongst all dealers and merchants, and we respectfully re-
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quest prompt protective action."45 On the 24th, Jordan in-
formed Grey that "continued representations to the Cen-
tral Government have hitherto proved futile, and I would 
propose, subject to your approval, to send His Majesty's con-
sul-general at Shanghai in a man-of-war to Anking, which 
is the capital of Anhwei and not an open port, to investi-
gate this case on the spot." India Office reports indicated 
that as a result of the Anhwei incident and regulations im-
posed by officials there the "opium market [is] said to be 
demoralized." Grey approved the action Jordan suggested 
on 28 September and the foreign office informed the 
Sassoons of the planned action.46 
Consul Sir Everard H. Fraser of Shanghai sailed for 
Anking on the gunboat Flora on 2 October 1912. In meet-
ing with the local official, Pai, who had seized the opium, 
Fraser quickly realized that the official was ignorant of the 
provisions of the 1911 agreement and the fact that the Re-
publican government had agreed to abide by it. Both the 
official and his chief assistant were quite disturbed by the 
visit of the British consul once they realized their own ac-
tions were in violation of international treaties. The whole 
visit seems comical in retrospect, since the Chinese official 
was unsure of the proper protocol for dealing with a visit-
ing British official, and, after the first meeting, retreated 
behind the excuse that he had "a cold due to the sudden 
change of temperatures." He recovered his health when he 
finally learned what was expected of him from an Ameri-
can missionary with whom he was on friendly terms. Dur-
ing the three days the Chinese official was suffering from 
his cold, the captain of the Flora "insisted that the unusual 
lowness of the water, which was falling steadily, rendered it 
imperative" that the British sail without delay. Fortunately 
for Fraser, the Chinese official recovered before the British 
found themselves stranded by the receding waters, and at 
another meeting Pai told Fraser that "the matter was be-
yond his province, and he had therefore sent a full report 
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to his Government, whose instructions, whatever might be 
their tenor, he would carry out scrupulously." Fraser ob-
served that the action of Pai "appeared to me not without 
cleverness," because "he could tell his provincial assembly 
and the native public that his well-meant efforts to eradi-
cate the vice had been thwarted by his superiors at the 
bidding of Great Britain, whereas if he yielded to my rep-
resentations he would have to confess that he had acted ill-
advisedly." Fraser continued that "Pai is a genuine fanatic 
on the subject of opium, inexperienced in government 
administration and ignorant of the treaty stipulations, and 
owing probably to his sojourn at a military college in Ja-
pan, imbued with the belief that China has been the victim 
of foreign aggression, from which it is a patriot's duty to 
free her." Fraser thought "the appearance of His Majesty's 
ship, Flora, undoubtedly had a good effect on" the Chinese. 
Officials of the central government later tried to defend and 
explain the actions of the Anking officials, but they refused 
to pay compensation for the opium. Still, Jordan believed 
sending the gunboat had been beneficial, since the Chinese 
realized the British were determined not to tolerate repeated 
treaty violations.47 
To comply with the 1911 agreement, inspections to deter-
mine the extent of domestic poppy cultivation were neces-
sary and several were made, but none were as extensive as 
Hosie's had been. The British minister Jordan listed the 
places where the foreign drug was prohibited once it was 
proven that they were free of native cultivation. Reports of 
these investigations were similar to the one from Consul-
General H.E. Fulford in Tientsin on the actions of Chihli 
officials in suppressing opium in the spring of 1911. They 
had issued instructions for stopping the use of the drug 
within two years. The two years were divided into eight pe-
riods of three months each, during which opium preven-
tion committees were to be organized, smokers were to be 
identified and placed on lists, preparations were to be made 
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for breaking the habit among the smokers, all shops selling 
opium were to be closed, addicts were to give up the drug, 
all establishments that helped addicts break the habit were 
to be disbanded, final measures were to be taken to make 
sure the habit had been eradicated, and the central bureau 
was to make an investigation of the work and report to the 
viceroy. Fulford noted that the instructions were thorough 
and that no one was to be excluded because of age. As part 
of the final measures to make sure the opium habit had 
been eradicated, all private opium stocks were to be sur-
rendered under threat of heavy penalties, and informers 
were to be rewarded.48 
In sending this report to Grey, Jordan noted that what 
was being done in Chihli was fairly typical of other prov-
inces and two years was generally the length of time set for 
the anti-opium campaign. He wrote, "It is considered im-
possible to keep up the popular enthusiasm for a longer 
period, and, rather than admit failure the Chinese Govern-
ment and the Chinese people are evidently determined to 
incur any sacrifice, however great." He continued that in 
the next two years he expected to "see the most drastic meth-
ods applied to opium suppression, and neither treaties nor 
other considerations will, I fear, receive much attention if 
they are found to stand in the way of the great reform on 
which this country is now fairly embarked."49 
The collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty and the coming to 
power of the new Republican government altered the opium 
suppression campaign in some ways, but again it depended 
upon the local officials whether or not the campaign was 
successful. Officials in London suggested to Jordan that they 
might ask for a promise from the Republican government 
to continue opium suppression as a requirement for recog-
nition of the new government. Jordan was opposed to this 
idea, because, he said, the 1911 agreement had been worked 
out with the greatest difficulty and in opposition to the 
wishes of many Chinese who wanted the opium trade to 
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stop immediately. He acknowledged that opium was again 
being grown in some provinces where the foreign drug was 
banned, but "it appears to me that the less opium is brought 
into the question of recognition the better it will be for Brit-
ish prestige and British interests in China."50 
As further evidence of the difficulty the opium issue 
might cause, he enclosed with his report an undated item 
from the Peking Daily News, which said one of the respon-
sibilities of the Chinese people in building a "new national 
life is the strong, vigorous movement against the opium 
habit," because "the curse of opium has brought ruin and 
sorrow to [the] land." The article continued that the 1911 
agreement with the British was more favorable to the opium 
traders than it was to the Chinese, and asked, "Can such a 
condition continue under the Republic of China? No! is 
the reply of the Republican officials and the people alike." 
It suggested that the way to rid China of the opium evil was 
by "strong public action by the Government, so that the 
world may know that it is the real desire and determination 
of the new republic to end this source of weakness and ruin 
in China. The people will earnestly support this strong 
moral appeal by the Government, that in the name of hu-
manity this evil trade may stop." The article went on to note 
that Christians in Britain would help the Chinese. It said, 
"The citizens of this great nation feel as never before that 
the opium habit is a disgrace to the republic and it must 
go." The article concluded by quoting two British mission-
aries, J. Hudson Taylor, who wrote, "Ah! we have given 
China something besides the Gospel, something that is do-
ing more harm in a week than the united efforts of all our 
Christians are doing good in a year. Oh, the evils of opium!" 
and Arnold Foster, who wrote, "Indian opium ... has 
poured into China a never-ceasing stream of poison all 
through the Victorian era. Ours have been and are the prof-
its, ours is the sin. "51 Eventually, the British recognized the 
republican government without tying the recognition to the 
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matter of opium suppression. However, the new government 
agreed to abide by the 1911 agreement and others concern-
. . 
mgopmm. 
Reports of the recrudescence of poppy cultivation after 
the 1911 revolution began to be received from British offi-
cials in various regions of China. From Yunnan on 9 Feb-
ruary 1912, H.W. Gammon reported that the poppy was 
again being grown in the province. He indicated that the 
military governor had recently issued a proclamation pro-
hibiting the cultivation of the poppy and the sale of the 
drug. However, Gammon thought the proclamation was 
"merely an obvious and hypocritical pretense on the part 
of the provincial authorities in consideration of recent 
opium agreements with foreign Powers, to carry on the work 
of suppression begun by his Excellency Hsi-liang and con-
tinued by the ex-Viceroy." Another report, on 6 June 1912, 
said that poppies were numerous along the railroad from 
Haiphong to Yunnanfu.52 
Consul P.E. O'Brien-Butler reported on 25 June that the 
production in Yunnan was then four-fifths what it had been 
prior to the 1906 prohibition. He said that the local gov-
ernment had attempted to buy the entire crop at thirty cents 
a Chinese ounce but that the amount the officials were able 
to purchase was quite small. It had been their intention to 
sell the drug in Tongking, but the farmers found others 
willing to buy it secretly at sixty-five to seventy-five cents an 
ounce. In reporting to Grey on 6 January 1913, Jordan wrote 
that cultivation of the poppy was increasing dramatically in 
Yunnan, and D.J. Harding of the China Inland Mission at 
Chuching had written that people in the area did not want 
opium suppression and that he had been cursed in the mar-
kets by people because he was from England, "'that coun-
try that is compelling China to give up the opium,' and only 
a few months ago one of the authorities told me that what 
they wanted was that England should leave them alone to 
deal with the matter as they think best."53 From Szechwan, 
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Consul Wilkinson reported on 10 January 1912 that farm-
ers who had lost money in the railway venture were plant-
ing poppies to recoup their losses. He reported that the 
government in Chengtu had issued a circular stating opium 
eradication was necessary to strengthen China and that 
there would be severe punishments for anyone who grew 
poppies. In 1913, it was reported that poppies were being 
cultivated in at least two districts in Szechwan but that offi-
cials had demanded that they be destroyed. 54 
In February 1912 Jordan wrote Grey that in a conversa-
tion with Yuan Shih-k'ai on the 20th he "took the opportu-
nity of remarking on the recrudescence of opium cultiva-
tion, and his Excellency gave me to understand that as soon 
as peace and order were restored this, like many other mat-
ters, would not be lost sight of." The republican govern-
ment did try to continue the opium suppression movement. 
Shortly after speaking to Jordan, Yuan issued an order not-
ing that while restrictions against opium had recently been 
relaxed by some officials, they were now instructed to re-
new their suppression efforts. He wrote, "The abolition of 
opium is intended to save the people and free them from a 
grievous danger .... Suppression should not be overlooked 
for the sake of a temporary gain." Sun Yat-sen in March 
1912 urged that the people not relax their efforts to rid 
China of opium. He said, "Those who consume this poison 
for sensual pleasure, and besotted and stupid, refuse to re-
form, cannot be regarded as citizens of the republic." He 
recommended that the new government adopt laws banning 
opium addicts from the privileges of citizenship. 55 
Although the British were disturbed that opium was again 
being grown in the provinces where the Indian drug was 
prohibited, it was not long a problem for the British. The 
British and Indian firms engaged in the opium trade con-
tinued to have difficulty selling the stocks already in their 
warehouses in China. As the Republican government did 
not have complete control over the provinces of China, the 
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merchants realized that the British diplomatic officials 
would have only limited success in resolving difficulties the 
merchants had with local officials concerning opium. 
Unwilling to risk trying to sell their opium under such con-
ditions, the foreign merchants asked the British to stop sell-
ing opium in India for the China market. On 31 December 
1912, W. Langley of the foreign office notified the Sassoons 
that the Indian government was being asked "that the Gov-
ernment sales of opium ... be postponed until the posi-
tion in China improves. "56 
Meanwhile the Sassoons continued to complain that they 
were unable to get rid of their enormous stock of opium 
already in China. They tried to convince Grey to pressure 
the Chinese government to buy up their stocks, so that their 
monetary loss would not be so great. Grey refused. Much 
of the opium in the warehouses had been bought on specu-
lation that the price in China would increase as the Chi-
nese curtailed their domestic production. The merchants 
failed to realize that the Chinese people were indeed deter-
mined to suppress the use of the drug in China and that 
there would be no demand for the stockpiled opium. 57 
But the opium firms were not the only ones who were 
hurt by the suppression movement. The situation put many 
of the foreign banking firms in jeopardy because they had 
financed the speculative buying. Chekiang officials had is-
sued a prohibition against Indian opium in February 1912, 
and in June the managers of eleven Shanghai banks, led by 
the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China and the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, wrote to 
British officials that the situation was becoming critical. 
They said that native opium was prevalent in Chekiang and 
was openly sold in Shanghai and that the prohibition of 
Indian opium was "in absolute contravention of existing 
treaties." The stocks in the warehouses were increasing and 
the value of the opium was declining as a result of this ille-
gal action. Because of the action of the Chekiang officials, 
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"the opium market has been paralysed, the merchants hav-
ing been unable to move off their stocks and repay the 
money the banks have advanced to them and should the 
present state of affairs be allowed to continue, disastrous 
failures may result involving the banks in heavy losses." The 
amount of money tied up in the opium stocks was several 
millions of pounds.58 
In December 1912, the Sassoons protested to British offi-
cials that all of China was closed to imported opium except 
for the port of Shanghai, even though the exclusion was a 
violation of the 1911 agreement. Opium merchants in Hong 
Kong were urging that the sale of certified opium for China 
be stopped. At the end of January 1913, the Chinese for-
eign minister asked Jordan to have his government stop the 
sale of opium bound for Chinese ports. By May, Jordan was 
suggesting to London that the 1911 agreement be revised in 
view of the current conditions in China, and before the sum-
mer ended the agreement was canceled and the export from 
India of opium bound for China had ceased. 59 
The opium problem was not settled, however, because the 
foreign opium merchants in China still had huge stocks of 
the drug of which to dispose. Several suggestions were en-
tertained. At one point, the Chinese government offered 
to buy it for sale through the government opium monopo-
lies. Later, the Chinese withdrew this offer but said they 
would pay the freight if the merchants would remove the 
opium from China. Interestingly, the opium merchants had 
been looking for several months into the possibility of sell-
ing the surplus opium in Mexico. Then, in early 1914, the 
republican government again offered to buy the stocks for 
the express purpose of publicly burning it once the trans-
action was completed. Jordan took a dim view of this idea. 
He noted that the Chinese government was in severe finan-
cial difficulties and that the Chinese people were not likely 
to silently accept the expenditure .of £6 million {the cur-
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rent value of the stocks} for opium to be burned. He 
doubted the Chinese would be able to pay, and if the Brit-
ish pressed the Chinese for payment they would gain no 
friends. Jordan concluded his message to Grey, "We seem 
so far as I can see, to have reached a stage in the history of 
the opium question when we must either make a virtue of 
a necessity and remove stocks, which I venture to think 
ought never to have been sent, or risk national dishonor by 
ending the opium traffic in a holocaust at the expense of 
China."60 
The government of India had been requested as early as 
June 1912 to stop the trade, but sales continued until 1913, 
with an additional 10,863 chests reaching China during that 
period. Jordan was furious that the trade had been allowed 
to continue that long. He asked Grey how the British gov-
ernment could consent to the provisions of The Hague Con-
vention and at the same time allow the trade from India to 
continue. Regarding the opium in the warehouses in China, 
Jordan wrote, "The Chinese know as well as we do that we 
dare not in the last resort enforce our opium treaties, and 
the situation is an undignified one which reacts unfavor-
ably on all our relations with China." He continued that 
"the spontaneous withdrawal of the stocks would produce 
an excellent impression and would go far towards remov-
ing the feelings of resentment and soreness which now 
exist in the minds of the Chinese. It would be a just and 
generous act which would form a fitting end to a trade which 
has become a moral anachronism." He further noted that 
if the British prolong the "sales and extract the last farthing 
from the traffic, we shall certainly go down in Chinese his-
tory as a people who ended as we began, by forcing opium 
upon China. The end, if generous, will do much to obliter-
ate the remembrance of the past and to remove the only 
blot which has stained our reputation in the Far East." Jor-
dan wanted the Indian ~overnment to take back the stocks 
L 
178 CRUSADERS AGAINST OPIUM 
and treat them as exports to non-Chinese markets, and he 
was strongly opposed to asking the Chinese to help pay the 
cost of transporting the stocks out of China.61 Because less 
than two years earlier Jordan had ordered a gunboat to 
Anhwei to protest the seizure of foreign-owned opium, some 
people in the British government thought he had "entirely 
lost his balance and ... became absolutely pro-Chinese" on 
the matter of the opium stocks.62 
The problem of the opium stocks was not easily resolved. 
Some of it was sold to an opium monopoly in Hong Kong, 
whence quantities were later smuggled into China and the 
United States. By 1915, the Chinese government had qui-
etly purchased some of the stocks for resale through the 
government opium monopolies, and eventually another 
monopoly purchased the remaining stocks for resale in 
Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung. There still remained a 
problem of the opium stocks at Shanghai, which were even-
tually sold to a Chinese monopoly there. Grey wrote to Jor-
dan that the consul in Shanghai, Sir Everard H. Fraser, who 
had gone to Anking on the gunboat, had suggested the so-
lution to the problem was to "make it a criminal offense for 
any British subject to have any interest in opium" after 31 
March 1917.63 Later that year in Britain, the Society for the 
Suppression of the Opium Trade formally disbanded, but 
not before appointing a Vigilance Committee.64 
The official opium trade in which the British government 
of India had engaged for a century had ended without fan-
fare. The opium suppression campaign in China had not 
been a complete success, but it had aroused the Chinese to 
the point where they would no longer tolerate foreign 
opium being sold in their country. At the beginning of the 
opium suppression movement, many people had noted that 
if the suppression were to be a reality, it would have to be 
done quickly, because the fervor of the people could not be 
sustained for a very long time. As it turned out, the sup-
SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF SUPPRESSION 179 
pression campaign was most successful in those areas where 
there was strong support for it among the officials who were 
charged with carrying out the orders of the central gov-
ernment. In those areas where officials relied on the re-
ports of others or took little or no interest in the campaign, 
poppies continued to grow and opium continued to be used 
as it had for many years. If sometimes the Chinese officials 
became overzealous in their efforts, they might be excused 
on the grounds that opium was an issue about which few 
Chinese did not hold strong opinions in the early years of 
the twentieth century. The Chinese had embarked upon a 
vast program of social reform, which they had decided their 
country needed. The national mood regarding opium was 
such that they were not willing to tolerate protests over the 
niceties of treaty provisions, particularly from the British, 
who had brought opium to China a century earlier, creat-
ing the problem. 
If the British and other foreigners had been skeptical in 
their views of the possibility for Chinese success in the pro-
gram when it began in 1906, they soon had to admit that 
many Chinese were indeed determined to eradicate opium 
from China once and for all. The task was not impossible, 
as the case of Szechwan had proved, but it was difficult. The 
recrudescence of poppy cultivation in China was most evi-
dent in those areas where the republican government had 
the most difficulty with other matters as well. The remote 
parts of southwestern China, long the largest opium-pro-
ducing regions of the country, were the ones where the re-
publican government had little influence. With no strong 
central government to insist upon continued opium sup-
pression and local officials who did not press for it, farm-
ers soon began growing poppies again. Despite the best 
efforts of the Chinese government both before and after 
the 1911 revolution, opium was still available for purchase 
either through the government opium monopoly or illegally 
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from private stocks, and addicts were still numerous enough 
that there was a demand for the drug once domestic pro-
duction resumed. The suppression campaign had not been 
completely successful, long-lived, or widespread enough to 
eliminate opium addiction. And since some demand re-
mained, production soon resumed to meet it. 
Conclusion 
Opium was an evil that had long sapped the strength of 
China. By the late nineteenth century many people real-
ized how physically debilitating the constant use of the drug 
was. Earlier in the century many people had defended the 
use of the drug by the Chinese on the grounds that physi-
ologically the Chinese were different from other people and 
that, consequently, they needed the drug to sustain life. Such 
statements illustrated the lack of medical knowledge about 
the true nature of opium, which had beneficial uses if prop-
erly controlled but had disastrous effects when used indis-
criminately. Largely through the work of the missionary 
doctors, medical evidence was accumulated that dispelled 
many of the commonly held beliefs about opium, includ-
ing that it protected the user against malaria or other dis-
eases. The Chinese had long recognized the dangers of the 
drug. They said that if one were suffering from an illness 
and opium was prescribed as a cure, as was frequently the 
case, the person shortly had not only the original illness, 
still uncured, but also the opium habit. 
The Protestant missionaries in China were among the 
first people to actively and fervently campaign against the 
use of the drug. Opium addicts were untrustworthy and 
hence banned from church membership. With so many 
Chinese automatically excluded from the possibility of con-
version, missionaries began to campaign against the drug. 
Also, the missionaries were concerned with reforming Chi-
nese society, particularly with regard to those customs, such 
as footbinding, which they viewed as uncivilized, and as a 
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part of this general campaign to change China they sought 
to eliminate the use of opium. The missionaries were most 
successful not in convincing the Chinese to give up the drug 
but in keeping the issue before the public in Britain and 
finally in getting the British government to admit the error 
of its involvement in the drug trade. For the missionaries 
and their allies, the struggle against opium was long and 
difficult. The Society for the Suppression of the Opium 
Trade was founded in 1874, but it was not until 1891 that it 
was able to get the Parliament to adopt a resolution calling 
the trade "morally indefensible." But getting the Parliament 
to adopt a resolution and actually stopping the trade were 
not the same. Not until 1907, after the issuance of the Chi-
nese edict banning the use of the drug, did the British gov-
ernment take further action to curtail its involvement in the 
opium trade. And in 1913, it was not missionaries but the 
opium merchants who asked that the trade from India be 
stopped. 
The missionaries faced several problems in their cam-
paign against opium. They knew the harm the drug did, 
and the missionary doctors were gathering evidence to prove 
their point medically, but they had difficulties convincing 
people both in Britain and in China that they were right 
about opium. To Englishmen, if opium were a problem in 
China, that was a Chinese problem. In China, the mission-
aries faced a difficult challenge. Despite all the energy the 
missionaries expended, only when the Chinese finally rec-
ognized the harm opium did to their people did they take 
action to suppress it. If the missionaries did not eliminate 
opium from China or stop the trade from India, it was not 
because they did not try but rather because they recognized 
the evils of the drug too soon, at a time when others were 
not yet ready to accept what they said. The role of the mis-
sionaries was one of publicist: constantly keeping the issue 
before the British government until it was forced to take 
action. 
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The time and conditions in China were right in 1906 for 
opium suppression. Many Chinese had long recognized the 
dangers of the drug, but widescale efforts to eradicate its 
use came only as a part of the reform movement of the late 
Ch'ing dynasty. Even though the Chinese produced more 
of the drug than was imported from India by the turn of 
the twentieth century, opium was associated in the minds 
of most Chinese with foreigners and foreign domination. 
In the milieu of emerging Chinese nationalism, the cam-
paign against opium, begun in 1906, proved quite success-
ful. It was one reform that everyone could understand and 
the results of which were evident to all. There was nothing 
abstract about opium reform. If the illiterate worker could 
not understand the intricacies of other reforms proposed 
and implemented at this time, he could understand what 
opium suppression meant. It was this wide appeal that made 
the campaign as successful as it was. 
Ironically, it was opium that brought the Chinese to an 
international conference as an equal rather than as a de-
feated nation for the first time. It was also the recognition 
by the Chinese that other nations, too, had drug problems 
that allowed the Chinese to face their own problem realisti-
cally. The international conferences were called because the 
Western nations realized that harmful drugs had to be con-
trolled, and these meetings coincided with the passage of 
drug laws in many nations. At the international conference 
in Shanghai in 1909, the Chinese realized for the first time 
that if they were sincere in their desire to rid their country 
of opium the other nations of the world were willing to com-
mit themselves to helping China by regulating the interna-
tional trade of drugs. And Britain, particularly, indicated 
willingness to help China eradicate opium in 1907 when it 
agreed to decrease the export of opium from India to cor-
respond with the decline of domestic production in China. 
But in the end, it was individual efforts on the part of 
many Chinese that made opium suppression the most suc-
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cessful of the reforms of the late Ch'ing dynasty. The indi-
vidual addict had to suffer through the agony of breaking 
the habit. The individual official had to risk the displea-
sure, and not infrequently the physical abuse, of farmers 
and opium merchants whose incomes depended upon the 
drug. And they, in turn, each had to face the problem of 
finding another means of livelihood. To anyone, Chinese 
or foreign, who was skeptical in 1906 about the Chinese 
desire to eradicate opium, proof was not long in coming. 
True, opium suppression was not uniform throughout 
China, but in some areas it was successful enough to con-
vince even the most hardened skeptic that the Chinese re-
ally were determined to rid their country of the drug that 
had plagued them for so long. 
Perhaps complete suppression of a social evil is never 
possible in any society. In the case of China in the first de-
cade of the twentieth century, there really was not enough 
time to learn if opium could be entirely suppressed. The 
elimination of the drug from the once poppy-covered prov-
ince of Szechwan certainly proved that eradication was not 
an impossibility. But before there was time to discover if 
the use of the drug and the cultivation of the poppy could 
be completely eradicated, the 1911 revolution intervened, 
bringing new problems to China. Certainly the inability of 
the republican government to control the major opium-pro-
ducing provinces of the southwest contributed to the recru-
descence of poppy cultivation. China had come close to be-
ing free of opium in 1911, but the campaign wavered under 
the new republican government. It was many long years 
before another government of China would try again to 
eradicate opium. The successes of the suppression campaign 
can be attributed to many factors. The new Chinese atti-
tude, which favored suppression of the drug, was the pri-
mary reason the campaign enjoyed the success that it did. 
But the foreign opium merchants, who had sold the drug 
for a century, were also responsible for helping to suppress 
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it when they finally asked the British government to stop 
selling opium in India, since there was no market for it in 
China. And the change of opinion among British political 
leaders allowed them to alter their policies on opium just 
as the Chinese were demanding that those changes be made. 
If the missionaries were not directly responsible for the 
eradication of opium from China in the early 1900s it mat-
tered not at all to them, since the goal they had sought for 
so long was finally in sight and they could glory in that ac-
complishment. 
Appendix 
Questions asked in the survey of Western-trained medical doc-
tors in China (see chapter 2) and published as William H. Park, 
M.D., comp., Opinions of Over 100 Physicians on the Use of Opium in 
China (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1899). 
1. What have you observed to be the effects of opium, moral, 
physical and social, on its consumers? 
2. What are the proportions of those who smoke opium: 
A. Without injury? 
B. With slight injury? 
C. With great injury ("opium sots")? 
3. A. Is the number of opium-smokers increasing in your 
district? 
B. Do women smoke to any extent? 
C. Do children smoke? 
D. Do the effects of opium-smoking by parents show in 
their children? 
4. Is there a tendency to increase amount smoked? 
5. Can a person, in your opinion, smoke opium daily for years 
without becoming a confirmed opium smoker? 
6. A. What percentage of laborers, merchants, and 
artisans smoke opium in the part of China with 
which you are acquainted? 
B. What is the effect of opium on their efficiency? 
C. Do many employers object to employing opium 
smokers? 
D. If so, what are some of the reasons assigned for 
not employing them? 
7. Is the opium habit condemned as degrading or injurious by 
the Chinese in general? 
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B. How do they regard the opium habit as compared with the 
alcohol habit? 
9. Is opium, within your knowledge, a prophylactic against 
fever, rheumatism, or malaria? 
10. Is it so regarded commonly by the inhabitants of the part of 
China with which you are conversant? 
11. A. Do Chinese physicians prescribe opium smoking 
for chronic illnesses? 
B. If so, and relief is afforded, is it temporary or 
permanent? 
12. A. Is suicide common in your section of China? 
B. What is the agent most generally employed? 
13. A. Do opium smokers usually desire to get free of the 
habit? 
B. Can they break themselves of it? 
C. Are opium-cure morphia pills freely sold in your 
city? 
14. If you run an opium refuge, do you cut off opium suddenly 
or gradually? 
15. If opium is cut off suddenly do the patients suffer? If so, 
give symptoms. 
16. A. Give percentage of smokers who began for some 
ailment. 
B. Give percentage of your permanent cures of the 
opium habit. 
C. What number, after being cured, have joined the 
Church. 
17. Can you give any estimate of the area under cultivation of 
the poppy in your part of China, and the average out-turn 
of opium? 
lB. Have you any other remarks to make in regard to opium 
smoking among the Chinese? 
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